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Abstract
Various labor market policies aim at stimulating the economy and tackling unemployment.
However, contrary to expectations, some do not create a positive impact on labor market out-
comes. An empirical evidence-based evaluation of past policies is crucial for an effective design
of future policies and for preventing avoidable costs.
Likewise, immigrant integration is of important concern for policy makers. With the increase
in immigration flows to Europe over the last decade, the issue gained even more attention from
the public and the media. Successful labor market integration of immigrants is of particular
interest to policy makers, because it simultaneously benefits immigrants and the host countries.
Numerous empirical studies analyze existing policy instruments intended to promote immigrant
integration. However, uncertainty remains about the effects of specific integration policies due
to the complex and multidimensional nature of this public policy issue.
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays on migration and labor economics, with
a particular focus on the evaluation of policy interventions in Germany. The three essays an-
alyze three reforms and their effects on immigrants and establishments on the labor market.
The first two essays investigate the effect of policy instruments on immigrant integration in
Germany. The policy instruments under consideration are naturalization and voting rights ac-
quisition in Germany. The third study analyzes the impact of dismissal protection regulations
on small German establishments.
This dissertation makes several important contributions to the literature on migration and
labor economics. First, it investigates the effect of policy instruments and regulations on the la-
bor market integration of immigrants. The literature on the causal effects of integration policies
remains relatively scarce. Naturalization has been investigated by a number of existing studies
that find a positive association of naturalization with immigrant integration. However, it is still
not clear whether these results represent the causal effect of naturalization or come from immi-
grant selection into naturalization. The existing literature on integration effects of voting rights
is very rare and there is no prior study that analyzes the causal effect of enfranchisement the
integration of immigrants in Germany. Since these two studies eliminate the endogeneity prob-
lem with appropriate methodology, they provide valuable causal evidence for to the existing
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literature. Second, the effect of employment protection legislation on behavior of firms is not
well understood yet. The third essay studies the effects of a dismissal protection deregulation
on worker flows and hire quality in small German establishments. It deals with a number of
measurement and data issues in prior German studies on worker flows and it is the first study to
analyze the effects of dismissal protection on the quality of new hires in Germany.
Section 2 studies the causal impact of naturalization on the labor market outcomes of immi-
grants in Germany. The study includes 3 different outcome groups: indicators of labor market
access, outcomes describing success on the labor market and measures of investment in host-
country specific human capital. The analysis focuses on two reforms of German citizenship
laws in 1991 and 2000, which introduced and changed minimum residency duration require-
ments for German citizenship eligibility. The study exploits the exogenous variation generated
by these two reforms in naturalization regulations and applies an instrumental variable estima-
tion strategy. It uses a novel dataset collected by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) in
cooperation with the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the IAB-SOEP Migration sam-
ple. This dataset provides detailed information on recent immigrants and their migration biogra-
phies, which allows a precise calculation of eligibility for citizenship. The estimation sample
consists of first-generation immigrants born abroad, aged 17-65, and who had not obtained Ger-
man citizenship at birth. After taking into account the potential endogeneity of naturalization,
the findings reveal that male immigrants’ labor market outcomes do not benefit significantly
from naturalization. In contrast, naturalization decreases the risks of unemployment and wel-
fare dependence and increases employment stability for female immigrants.
The study in Section 3 analyzes the causal effects of non-citizen voting rights in municipal
elections on the integration of EU immigrants in Germany. The analysis considers the follow-
ing outcomes as measures for immigrant integration: subjective well-being, German language
skills, the intention to stay in Germany permanently and identifying as a German. The analysis
exploits a late-1995 extension of voting rights in German municipal elections to non-German
European Union citizens residing in Germany to identify a causal effect of voting rights. The
study applies difference-in-differences techniques using this reform as a source of exogenous
variation in voting eligibility. Greek and Italian immigrants who acquire municipal voting rights
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serve as the treatment group, while the control group consists of Turkish immigrants. Using a
representative longitudinal survey dataset, the German SOEP, the findings suggest that there
is no significant effect of extending municipal voting rights to EU immigrants on any of the
analyzed integration outcomes.
Section 4 investigates the causal effects of relaxed dismissal protection on worker flows
and hire quality in small establishments in Germany. To identify the causal effects of dismissal
protection regulations, the study exploits a change in German dismissal protection law in 2004,
which raised the establishment size threshold from more than five to more than 10 full-time
equivalent (FTE) workers. This reform serves as a source of exogenous variation in dismissal
protection coverage in a difference-in-differences estimation framework. While the treatment
group consists of establishments with 5.75 to 9.25 FTE workers, establishments with 10.75 to
20 FTE employees form the control group. The worker flow outcomes include the number of
hirings and separations within a given year, and the respective hiring and separation rates. Using
the unique linked employer-employee administrative data provided by the IAB, I find a positive
significant effect on both hirings and separations in establishments. The increase in separations
is smaller in magnitude and associated with a time lag. Incumbent workers maintaining their
protections after the reform could explain this. In contrast, I do not find any effects of relaxed
dismissal protection on the minimum or the spread of hire quality.
Sections 1 and 5 frame this dissertation. Section 1 offers a brief review of theoretical con-
siderations and existing empirical research on the analysis of immigrant integration and on the
analysis of dismissal protection regulations. Section 5 summarizes the main findings, contribu-
tions and limitations of the three studies included in this dissertation. Subsequently, it outlines
proposals for future research.
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Zusammenfassung
Verschiedene arbeitsmarktpolitische Maßnahmen zielen darauf ab, die Wirtschaft anzukurbeln
und die Arbeitslosigkeit zu bekämpfen. Entgegen den Erwartungen wirken sich einige jedoch
nicht positiv auf die Arbeitsmarktergebnisse aus. Eine empirische evidenzbasierte Bewertung
vergangener politischen Maßnahmen ist entscheidend für eine effektive Gestaltung zukünftiger
Politiken und für die Vermeidung vermeidbarer Kosten.
Die Integration von Zuwanderern ist ebenso ein wichtiges Anliegen der politischen Entschei-
dungsträger. Mit der Zunahme der Einwanderungsströme nach Europa in den letzten zehn
Jahren hat das Thema in der Öffentlichkeit und in den Medien noch mehr an Aufmerksamkeit
gewonnen. Die erfolgreiche Arbeitsmarktintegration von Zuwanderern ist für die politischen
Entscheidungsträger von besonderem Interesse, da sie gleichzeitig den Zuwanderern und den
Aufnahmeländern zugute kommt. Zahlreiche empirische Studien analysieren bestehende poli-
tische Instrumente zur Förderung der Integration von Zuwanderern. Aufgrund des komplexen
und mehrdimensionalen Charakters dieser Fragestellung besteht jedoch weiterhin Unsicherheit
über die Auswirkungen bestimmter Integrationspolitiken.
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei eigenständigen Forschungsaufsätzen zu Migrations- und
Arbeitsökonomie mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf der Bewertung wirtschaftspolitischer Maß-
nahmen in Deutschland. Die drei Aufsätze analysieren drei Reformen und deren Auswirkungen
auf Einwanderer und Betriebe auf dem Arbeitsmarkt. Die ersten beiden Aufsätze untersuchen
die Auswirkungen von Politikinstrumenten auf die Integration von Zuwanderern in Deutsch-
land. Als politische Instrumente werden die Einbürgerung und der Erwerb von Wahlrechten
in Deutschland betrachtet. Der dritte Aufsatz untersucht die Auswirkungen von Kündigungss-
chutzregelungen auf kleine deutsche Betriebe.
Diese Dissertation liefert mehrere wichtige Beiträge zur Literatur über Migration und Ar-
beitsökonomie. Zunächst wird untersucht, wie sich politische Instrumente und Regelungen
auf die Arbeitsmarktintegration von Zuwanderern auswirken. Die Literatur zu den kausalen
Auswirkungen integrationspolitischer Maßnahmen ist nach wie vor relativ knapp. Die Ein-
bürgerung wurde durch eine Reihe bestehender Studien untersucht, die einen positiven Zusam-
menhang zwischen der Einbürgerung und der Integration von Einwanderern feststellen. Es ist
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jedoch noch nicht klar, ob diese Ergebnisse den kausalen Effekt der Einbürgerung darstellen
oder von der Selektion der Einwanderer in die Einbürgerung kommen. Die vorhandene Lit-
eratur über Integrationseffekte von Wahlrechten ist sehr selten und es gibt keine vorherige
Studie, die die kausalen Auswirkungen von Wahlrechten auf die Integration von Einwander-
ern in Deutschland analysiert. Da diese beiden Studien das Endogenitätsproblem mit einer
geeigneten Methodik beseitigen, liefern sie der vorhandenen Literatur wertvolle kausale Be-
weise. Zweitens, die Auswirkung von Kündigungsschutzregelungen auf das Verhalten von Un-
ternehmen ist noch nicht gut verstanden. Der dritte Aufsatz untersucht die Auswirkungen einer
Deregulierung des Kündigungsschutzes auf die Arbeitnehmerströme und die Qualität von Neue-
instellungen in kleinen deutschen Betrieben. Der Aufsatz befasst sich mit einer Reihe von Mess-
und Datenproblemen in früheren deutschen Studien zu Arbeitnehmerströmen und ist die erste
Studie, die die Auswirkungen des Kündigungsschutzes auf die Qualität von Neueinstellungen
in Deutschland untersucht.
Abschnitt 2 untersucht die kausalen Auswirkungen der Einbürgerung auf die Arbeitsmark-
tergebnisse von Zuwanderern in Deutschland. Die Studie untersucht drei verschiedene Grup-
pen von Zielgrößen: Indikatoren für den Zugang zum Arbeitsmarkt, Indikatoren, die den Er-
folg auf dem Arbeitsmarkt beschreiben, und Investitionen in das für das Gastland spezifische
Humankapital. Die Analyse konzentriert sich auf zwei Reformen des deutschen Staatsbürger-
schaftsrechts in den Jahren 1991 und 2000, mit denen Mindestanforderungen an die Aufen-
thaltsdauer für die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft eingeführt und geändert wurden. Die Studie
nutzt die exogene Variation, die durch diese beiden Reformen der Einbürgerungsvorschriften
erzeugt wird, und wendet einen Instrumentenvariablenschätzer an. Dabei wird ein neuartiger
Datensatz verwendet, die IAB-SOEP-Migrationsstichprobe, der vom Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-
und Berufsforschung (IAB) in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Sozioökonomischen Panel (SOEP),
erhoben wurde. Dieser Datensatz enthält detaillierte Informationen über neu eingewanderte
Personen und ihre Migrationsbiographien, was eine genaue Berechnung der Berechtigung zur
Einbürgerung ermöglicht. Bei der Stichprobe handelt es sich um Zuwanderer der ersten Gener-
ation, die im Ausland geboren und zwischen 17 und 65 Jahre alt sind und bei der Geburt keine
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deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft erworben haben. Unter Berücksichtigung der potenziellen Endo-
genität der Einbürgerung zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Arbeitsmarktergebnisse männlicher
Einwanderer von der Einbürgerung nicht wesentlich profitieren. Im Gegensatz dazu verringert
die Einbürgerung das Risiko von Arbeitslosigkeit und Wohlfahrtsabhängigkeit und erhöht die
Beschäftigungsstabilität für weibliche Einwanderer.
Die Studie im Abschnitt 3 analysiert die kausalen Auswirkungen des Wahlrechts von nicht-
deutschen Bürger der Europäischen Union bei Kommunalwahlen auf deren Integration in Deutsch-
land. Als Maßstäbe für die Integration von Migranten werden in der Analyse folgende Ziel-
größen betrachtet: subjektives Wohlbefinden, Deutschkenntnisse, die Absicht, dauerhaft in Deutsch-
land zu bleiben und die Identifikation als Deutscher. Die Analyse nutzt eine Ende 1995 er-
folgte Ausweitung des Wahlrechts bei deutschen Kommunalwahlen auf nichtdeutsche Bürger
der Europäischen Union, die ihren Wohnsitz in Deutschland haben, um einen kausalen Effekt
des Wahlrechts zu ermitteln. Die Studie wendet Difference-in-Differences-Techniken an, die
diese Reform als Quelle für exogene Variation der Wahlberechtigung verwenden. Als Behand-
lungsgruppe dienen griechische und italienische Einwanderer, die kommunale Stimmrechte
erwerben, während die Kontrollgruppe aus türkischen Einwanderern besteht. Anhand eines
repräsentativen Längsschnittdatensatzes, dem deutschen SOEP, lässt sich feststellen, dass die
Ausweitung des kommunalen Wahlrechts auf EU-Zuwanderer keinen wesentlichen Einfluss auf
die analysierten Integrationszielgrößen hat.
Abschnitt 4 untersucht die kausalen Auswirkungen eines gelockerten Kündigungsschutzes
auf die Arbeitnehmerströme und die Qualität von Neueinstellungen in kleinen Betrieben in
Deutschland. Um die kausalen Auswirkungen von Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen zu ermit-
teln, nutzt die Studie eine Änderung des deutschen Kündigungsschutzgesetzes im Jahr 2004,
mit der die Betriebsgrößenschwelle von mehr als fünf auf mehr als 10 Vollzeitäquivalente
angehoben wurde. Diese Reform dient als Quelle für exogene Variation in der Kündigungss-
chutzdeckung in einem Difference-in-Differences-Ansatz. Während die Behandlungsgruppe
aus Betrieben mit 5,75 bis 9,25 Vollzeitkräften besteht, bilden Betriebe mit 10,75 bis 20 Vol-
lzeitkräften die Kontrollgruppe. Die Arbeitnehmerströme umfassen die Anzahl der Einstellun-
gen und Trennungen innerhalb eines bestimmten Jahres sowie die jeweiligen Einstellungs- und
XVIII
Trennungsquoten. Anhand der verknüpften administrativen Daten von Arbeitgebern und Arbeit-
nehmern, die vom IAB zur Verfügung gestellt werden, finde ich einen positiven signifikanten
Effekt sowohl auf Einstellungen als auch auf die Trennungen in Betrieben. Die Zunahme der
Trennungen ist betragsmäßig geringer und mit einer Zeitverzögerung verbunden. Die amtieren-
den Arbeitnehmer, die ihren Schutz nach der Reform aufrechterhalten, könnten dies erklären.
Im Gegensatz dazu finde ich keine Auswirkungen eines gelockerten Kündigungsschutzes auf
das Minimum oder die Streuung der Qualität von Neueinstellungen.
Die Abschnitte 1 und 5 bilden den Rahmen dieser Dissertation. Abschnitt 1 bietet einen
kurzen Überblick über theoretische Überlegungen und bestehende empirische Untersuchungen
zur Analyse der Integration von Migranten und zur Analyse von Kündigungsschutzregelungen.
Abschnitt 5 fasst die wichtigsten Ergebnisse, Beiträge und Einschränkungen der drei in dieser
Dissertation enthaltenen Studien zusammen. Anschließend werden Vorschläge für die zukün-
ftige Forschung skizziert.
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1 Introduction
This dissertation contributes with three empirical studies to the existing empirical research of
two branches of applied economic research: the economics of migration and labor economics.
The first two articles study the potential beneficial effects of policy instruments promoting the
socioeconomic integration of immigrants residing in Germany. The third study investigates the
effects of employment protection regulations on the German labor market.
The introductory section of this dissertation is split into two segments separately addressing
the two aforementioned branches of economics. The first segment in Section 1.1 offers a brief
overview of migration economics with a particular focus on immigrant integration in the host
country. The second introductory segment on labor economics in Section 1.2 focuses on the
analysis of employment protection regulations. Both parts of the introduction are structured in a
consistent way. Each part opens with an overview of theoretical considerations in the respective
field (Sections 1.1.1 and 1.2.1). Sections 1.1.2 and 1.2.2 respectively review the existing empir-
ical research and present the main findings of related studies. Finally, Sections 1.1.3 and 1.2.3
provide a summary of the essays included in this dissertation.
The remaining parts of this dissertation are organized as follows: This introductory section
is followed by three main sections of this dissertation consisting of three individual empirical
studies. Sections 2 and 3 contain two studies on migration economics. The first article in Sec-
tion 2 is co-authored with Regina T. Riphahn and studies the effects of an acquisition of German
citizenship on the labor market integration of immigrants in Germany. The single-authored sec-
ond study investigates the potential effects of voting rights in German municipal elections on
the integration of European Union (EU) citizens residing in Germany (Section 3). The single-
authored third study on labor economics in Section 4 investigates the effects of relaxed dismissal
protection on worker flows and hiring quality in small German establishments. Finally, Section
5 concludes with a discussion of the contributions and limitations of the studies included in this
dissertation and closes with suggestions for future research to fill these gaps.
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1.1 Economic Analysis of Immigrant Integration
1.1.1 Theoretical Background
A large section of the migration economics literature1 studies the integration of immigrants
in the host country. Immigrant integration in the destination country is typically measured in
terms of outcome gaps relative to the native population. While contemporary migration theory
considers a wide range of immigrant integration outcomes, the traditional focus lies on the labor
market integration of immigrants.
Theoretical considerations on the labor market integration of immigrants focus on the trans-
fer of immigrant skills to the host country’s labor market and to the production of new human
capital, as well as the concept of immigrant quality (Duleep, 2015). In his pioneering paper,
Chiswick (1978) develops a theoretical model of immigrant adjustment to the host country’s
labor market. His model implies an initial earnings gap between immigrants and natives, as im-
migrants at first lack the necessary host-country specific skill and knowledge to be remunerated
on the same level as similarly skilled natives. In addition, a similar skill level of immigrants at-
tained in their country of origin might not get recognized as such by employers in the country of
destination (Duleep, 2015). An important implication of Chiswick (1978) is that immigrants in-
vest in host-country specific skills, such as language, certificates, formal and informal training,
to increase the value of their initial skills. The extent to which immigrants invest in host-country
specific human capital hinges on various other important factors, e.g., the expected duration of
stay in the host-country (Dustmann et al., 2010).
Besides the transferability of origin-country skills and the extent of investment into host-
country specific human capital, the success of immigrant adjustment to the host-country labor
market relies on a number of additional factors. Important theoretical extensions consider the
role of migration networks (Patel and Vella, 2013), country of origin (Duleep et al., 2019), legal
status (Gathmann and Keller, 2018; Pinotti, 2017), the structure of the labor market (Hudson,
2007) and the business cycle (Dustmann and Mestres, 2010).
Moving beyond the labor market, contemporary migration theory also studies immigrant
integration and assimilation in language (Adserà and Ferrer, 2015), education (Smith, 2015),
1 See Chiswick and Miller (2015a) and Borjas (2008) for detailed surveys of the literature.
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health (Antecol and Bedard, 2015), as well as demographic (Chiswick and Miller, 2015b) out-
comes, e.g., marriage, fertility and divorce. In addition, the seminal study by Dustmann (1996)
investigates the social integration of immigrants, as measured by the feeling of national identity
with the host country.
A part of the migration literature closely related to the studies in Sections 2 and 3 investi-
gates the political integration of immigrants (Bevelander and Spång, 2015). This strand of the
literature investigates the access of immigrants to legal status, citizenship and voting rights.
1.1.2 Existing Empirical Evidence
The migration economics literature has accumulated a vast body of empirical evidence with
a focus on the integration of immigrants. The causal literature studying immigrant integration
in the host country closely related to studies in Sections 2 and 3 can be roughly divided into
two groups of empirical studies based on the determinants under consideration. The first group
comprise studies evaluating the effects of legal barriers to immigrant integration and potential
instruments alleviating them, e.g., citizenship acquisition, non-citizen voting rights acquisition
and legal status. The second collection of studies analyze the effects of miscellaneous one-time
events affecting immigrants in the host country, such as anti-immigrant attitudes of natives,
highly publicized instances of xenophobic violence against minority groups, or terrorist attacks
committed by immigrants.
A majority of the existing research on citizenship acquisition studies its effects on the labor
market integration of immigrants. The earliest studies aim to identify causal effects of natural-
ization on wages by estimating panel fixed effects models for the U.S. (Bratsberg et al., 2002),
Sweden (Ohlson, 2008; Engdahl, 2011), Norway (Bratsberg and Raaum, 2011) and Germany
(Steinhardt, 2012). However, the results of these studies are mixed with only Bratsberg et al.
(2002) and, for male immigrants only, Steinhardt (2012) finding significantly higher wages.
Subsequent studies exploit German citizenship law reforms as a natural experiment to identify
causal effects. Gathmann and Keller (2018) analyze a number of labor market outcomes and
find beneficial effects only for immigrant women, especially in terms of stronger labor market
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attachment, higher working hours and more stable jobs. As discussed in Section 1.1.1, natural-
ization can be perceived as a signal revealing commitment of immigrant employees to the host-
country which increases employers’ incentives to offer on-the-job training. von Haaren-Giebel
and Sandner (2016) study the effects of naturalization on on-the-job training participation of
immigrants in Germany and find a significantly positive effect.
An interesting question is whether there are any socioeconomic and cultural effects of natu-
ralization in addition to labor market benefits to citizenship. Cygan-Rehm (2018) and Felfe and
Saurer (2014) estimate the effects of early-childhood citizenship and find beneficial effects on
educational attainment of immigrant children. Avitabile et al. (2014) study the response of im-
migrants’ fertility decisions to child legal status at birth. Exploiting the introduction of birthright
citizenship in Germany in 2000, they find a reduction in immigrant fertility and positive effects
on socioeconomic outcomes of their children. This finding of a reduction in child quantity asso-
ciated with an increase in child quality is consistent with the quality-quantity model of fertility
by Becker and Lewis (1973). Sajons and Clots-Figueras (2014) contribute to the literature on
birthright citizenship by examining its effects on outmigration of immigrant families in Ger-
many. Their analysis shows that granting German citizenship to immigrant children at birth
reduces their parents’ risk of outmigration.
There is a very scarce empirical literature related to the study in Section 3, namely exam-
ining the causal effects of voting rights acquisition on immigrant integration. These studies use
reforms of election laws as sources of exogenous variation in voting rights. Vernby (2013) stud-
ies the effect of non-citizen voting rights on public policy. This is a potential channel between
immigrant suffrage and immigrant integration identified by previous theoretical work (Dahl,
1971; Hayduk, 2006; Walzer, 2008). Vernby (2013) treats an extension of voting rights to non-
citizens in Swedish municipal elections in 1975 as a natural experiment. He finds a positive
effect of enfranchising non-citizens on public policy spending on education and social services.
Two existing causal studies on voting rights acquisition examine three distinct sets of in-
dividual immigrant outcomes: criminal behavior, naturalization and democratic participation.
Gorinas et al. (2017) study the effects of non-citizen voting rights in Denmark on the num-
ber of legal offenses committed by immigrants. They examine the introduction of non-citizen
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voting rights in Danish municipal elections in 1981 with register data and find a reduction in
convictions of non-Western male immigrants by 60 percent within two years after elections. In
contrast, a recent study by Engdahl et al. (2018) investigates the impact of enfranchising non-
citizens in Sweden on immigrant naturalization and election participation. Their identification
strategy exploits a reform in 1998 extending the length of Swedish election cycles from three
to four years. Since non-citizen voting rights in Swedish municipal elections are conditional
on a minimum residency requirement of 3 years, these rule change creates a variation across
immigrant cohorts in the waiting period until voting eligibility. However, Engdahl et al. (2018)
find that immigrants facing a shorter waiting period are not more likely to acquire Swedish
citizenship or vote in later elections.
A number of existing studies explore the effects of legal immigration status on crime, job
mobility and earnings. Studies for the U.S. examine the effects of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) which legalized a group of 3 million immigrants settled in the U.S. These
studies find evidence for a reduction in criminal behavior (Baker, 2015), an increase in job
mobility (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2000) and earnings (Lozano and Sorensen, 2011) among
previously undocumented immigrants legalized by the reform. Analyzing the effects of a quota
system for residence permits in Italy, Pinotti (2017) also finds that legalization reduces the crime
rate of legalized immigrants.
A different collection of studies analyzes the effects of specific one-time events affecting
immigrant integration and well-being in the host country. For instance, these studies find ad-
verse effects of acts of xenophobic violence on the well-being (Deole, 2019), return intentions
and German language skills (Steinhardt, 2018) of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Moreover,
several papers study the effects of terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the U.S. and in
2004-2005 across Europe on the integration of Muslim immigrants. The findings for the former
attacks point to negative effects on earnings, English proficiency and female labor force partici-
pation of Arab and Muslim immigrants in the U.S (Kaushal et al., 2007; Gould and Klor, 2016).
Elsayed and de Grip (2018) find adverse effects of the European attacks on employment and
return intentions of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands.
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1.1.3 Own Contribution
This dissertation consists of two studies that contribute to the existing research on migration
economics and specifically on the evaluation of policy instruments that foster immigrant inte-
gration in the host country. While the first study contributes to the literature on the integration
effects of citizenship acquisition and immigrant naturalization, the second study contributes to a
scarce empirical literature on the integration effects of non-citizen voting rights and immigrant
democratic participation.
The study in Section 2 is co-authored with Regina T. Riphahn and published in LABOUR:
Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations. This study investigates the effects of
naturalization on labor-market related outcomes of immigrants residing in Germany. We con-
sider three groups of outcomes: indicators of labor market access, outcomes describing labor
market success and measures of investment in host-country specific (human) capital. In order to
identify a causal effect of citizenship acquisition, we exploit two reforms of German citizenship
laws in 1991 and 2000 which defined and changed minimum residency duration requirements
for immigrants becoming eligible for German citizenship. We make use of the exogenous vari-
ation in eligibility created by these two reforms to set up an instrumental variable estimation
approach with the number of years since becoming eligible for naturalization as the instrument.
We use a dataset on individuals with a recent migration background collected by the Institute of
Employment Research (IAB) in cooperation with the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP),
the 2013 wave of the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample. This dataset allows us to track the mi-
gration biographies of immigrants and calculate the exact timing of citizenship eligibility. We
restrict the baseline sample to first-generation immigrants born abroad, aged 17-65, who had
not acquired German citizenship at birth. In a first step, we show that linear regressions yield
positive correlations between naturalization and beneficial labor market outcomes. However,
once we account for the endogeneity of citizenship acquisition with our instrumental variable
identification approach, most of the relationships disappear and lose statistical significance. We
find virtually no benefits from German citizenship for male immigrants, including outcomes
such as employment and wages, confirming prior findings in the literature. In contrast, natural-
ized female immigrants benefit from a reduced risk of unemployment and welfare dependence,
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as well as an increase in employment stability. The findings are robust to a number of sensitivity
tests, including sample composition and different measures and specifications of the instrumen-
tal variable.
The single-authored study in Section 3 investigates the effects of an acquisition of voting
rights on the municipal level on immigrant integration in Germany. I consider five outcomes
as proxies for immigrant integration: subjective well-being, German language skills in writing
and speaking, the intention to stay in Germany permanently and identifying as a German. To
identify a causal effect of voting rights, I exploit the late-1995 extension of voting rights in Ger-
man municipal elections to non-German European Union citizens residing in Germany. This
reform of municipal election laws serves as a source of exogenous variation in voting eligibility
in a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation framework. The treatment group of individuals
acquiring municipal voting rights consists of Greek and Italian immigrants. Due to a shared
migration history as guest workers, Turkish immigrants form the control group. I use data from
the SOEP, a representative yearly survey of households and individuals in Germany provided
by the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) in Berlin. The dataset contains key
information on the migration history of respondents, such as country of birth, citizenship, and
ethnicity. The data allow me to distinguish between different ethnic groups, separate first- from
second-generation immigrants, and identify the primary and secondary citizenship of individu-
als, including naturalized immigrants. I restrict the sample to first-generation immigrants born
outside of Germany, aged 18-65, who reside in West Germany and have not acquired German
citizenship. I consider the 1994-1997 waves of the SOEP in the baseline specification, with two
pre-treatment and two post-treatment years. I find no significant effects of voting rights acqui-
sition on any of the integration outcomes. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests
and across immigrant subgroups by gender, education levels and immigrant cohorts.
1.2 Economic Analysis of Employment Protection
1.2.1 Theoretical Background
There is a large body of existing theoretical work concerning the impacts of employment protec-
tion regulations on the labor market. Among the numerous studied outcomes are worker flows
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(i.e., hirings and dismissals), wages, worker effort and productivity, innovation, temporary em-
ployment, hire quality and the composition of the employed. However, most of the predicted
effect directions are ambiguous (Skedinger, 2010), or dependent on the business cycle (Lind-
beck, 1994) and macroeconomic developments (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).
Employment protection regulations are a form of costs imposed on employers in the case
of a dismissal. Since labor markets are likely imperfect, wage rigidities and the variety and
uncertainty of costs associated with dismissals hinder downward wage adjustments as a direct
compensation from employee to employer (Lazear, 1990; Verick, 2004). Increased dismissal
costs thus have a direct negative impact on the number of dismissals. Similarly, employers
take into account increased future costs of dismissals in their hiring decision (Bertola, 1999).
Higher potential dismissal costs increase the cost of new hires, as the marginal product of labor
is equated to the (constant) wages plus the discounted dismissal costs to be paid in the future
(Bertola, 1999). Thus, higher dismissal costs not only reduce the incentive of employers to
dismiss incumbent workers, but also to hire new ones (Bird and Knopf, 2009). As a result, the
effect on job creation on employment is ambiguous and depends on the effect size on dismissals
and hirings.
Employment protection is also likely to impact worker behavior, such as effort and absen-
teeism. Ichino and Riphahn (2005) develop a formal model of worker absenteeism which pre-
dicts an increase in absence episodes once probation periods end and employment protection
regulations set in.
Theoretical predictions regarding the effect on worker productivity are ambiguous. From
one point of view, tighter employment protection decreases worker effort and increases ab-
senteeism Ichino and Riphahn (2005). From another standpoint, more stringent employment
protection increases the stability of matches, motivating employers to provide more training to
their employees (Pierre and Scarpetta, 2013; Messe and Rouland, 2014).
Theoretical considerations also form inconclusive predictions about the effects of employ-
ment protection regulations on wages. Existing economic theory identifies two countervail-
ing forces on wages arising from employment protection. First, efficient labor markets cover
employment costs caused by employment protection regulations with reduced wages (Lazear,
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1990; Autor et al., 2007). Contrary to that force, employment protections increase wages by
raising the bargaining power of incumbent workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001; Autor et al.,
2006).
Building on the discrepancy between insiders and outsiders, numerous studies anticipate
heterogeneous effects of employment protection regulations on different worker groups on the
labor market, i.e., a change in the composition of the employed (Bertola et al., 2007). These
studies typically predict stronger adverse affects on outsiders and disadvantaged groups with
lower experience, such as the unemployed, women, immigrants, the low-skilled and the youth
(Skedinger, 2010).
Thus, employment protection may directly affect hire quality, i.e., the ability of new hires.
Daniel and Siebert (2005) propose a formal model in which tighter employment protection
increases the educational level of newly hired employees. This is in line with the theoretical
model of Lazear (1995) which implies less risky hires as a result of tightened dismissal pro-
tection. Since risky workers have a higher ability variance, more stringent dismissal protection
reduces the spread of new hires’ ability at the top and the bottom of the distribution (Butschek
and Sauermann, 2019). Likewise, Pries and Rogerson (2005) formally demonstrate that firms
adjust their hiring practices as dismissal costs increase. Their matching model implies an up-
ward shift in firms’ hiring standards, because firms requiring more assurance about the quality
of the match and opening new vacancies become less profitable. Thus, the theoretical predic-
tion of Pries and Rogerson (2005) is that tighter dismissal protection increases the ability at the
bottom of the hires distribution as firm avoid hiring bad workers.
1.2.2 Existing Empirical Evidence
Employment protection regulations of labor markets are historically a major topic in applied
labor economics and the large collection of existing empirical studies serves as proof. The
empirical literature on the effects of employment protection regulations studies a multitude of
outcomes.2
2 For an extensive overview of the accumulated empirical evidence, see Skedinger (2010) and OECD (2013).
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The traditional focus of the early employment protection literature is the effect on the levels
of employment and unemployment. These early studies use primarily aggregate employment
data and various indexes as measures of cross-country variation in the stringency of employ-
ment protection. The findings of these empirical studies are mixed, with some claiming positive
effects of more stringent regulations on aggregate unemployment (e.g., Lazear, 1990; Addi-
son and Teixeira, 2005; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005) and others indicating no such effects
(e.g., Baccaro and Rei, 2007; Griffith et al., 2007). However, as Belot and van Ours (2004) ar-
gue, these studies are unlikely to capture the causal effect of employment protection, as they
primarily rely on cross-sectional variation in employment protection due to a lack of regula-
tory changes within countries. In addition, it is virtually impossible to take into account all
country-specific events affecting employment. Nevertheless, the picture provided by within-
country studies is not much clearer, as they also find mixed results (Miles, 2000; Schivardi and
Torrini, 2008; Bird and Knopf, 2009).
In contrast, there is more robust evidence for the adverse effects of employment protection
on specific groups of participants on the labor market. Existing studies find negative effects on
the employment prospects of various vulnerable worker groups, such as the disabled (Acemoglu
and Angrist, 2001), women (Autor et al., 2006; Bertola et al., 2007; Feldmann, 2009), immi-
grants (Kahn, 2007), the low-skilled (Montenegro and Pagés, 2004; Daniel and Siebert, 2005;
Autor et al., 2006) and the youth (Botero et al., 2004; Montenegro and Pagés, 2004; Kahn,
2007).
A number of studies explore the effects of employment protection on worker behavior. In
particular, they test the predictions of existing theory that tighter employment protection reduces
worker effort and raises absenteeism. Using worker data from a large Italian bank, Ichino and
Riphahn (2005) analyze a provision granting employment protection to workers after 12 weeks
of tenure and find a significant increase in the number of absent days once employment pro-
tection is granted. Riphahn (2004) confirms these findings for Germany. Exploiting a discrete
jump in employment protection rules making public sector workers after 15 years of tenure and
40 years of age essentially impossible to dismiss, she finds an increase in absenteeism by about
3 days per year. Lindbeck et al. (2006) and Olsson (2009) examine the relationship between
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softening employment protection and sickness absence in Sweden. Estimating the effects of a
reform in 2001, which allowed establishments with up to 10 employees to exempt two work-
ers from seniority rule provisions, Lindbeck et al. (2006) and Olsson (2009) find a significant
decrease in sickness absence.
Related to the findings on absenteeism, an important question is whether higher dismissal
costs reduce productivity. Related research exploring such effects (e.g., Autor et al., 2007; Bas-
sanini et al., 2009; Cingano et al., 2016; van Schaik and van de Klundert, 2013) points to an
overall increase in the capital-labor ratio and a decline in total factor productivity in establish-
ments facing tighter dismissal regulations.
Similar to existing theoretical considerations, the empirical evidence on the effects of em-
ployment protection on wages is ambiguous as well. Existing studies for Portugal (Martins,
2009), the U.S. (Bird and Knopf, 2009) and the Netherlands (van der Wiel, 2010) provide evi-
dence for increasing wages as employment regulations tighten. These findings lend support to
the argument of workers benefiting from employment protection through an increase in bar-
gaining power and more on-the-job training. In contrast, Leonardi and Pica (2007) find negative
effects on wages for Italy, lending support to the theoretical prediction of Lazear (1990). In
addition, Bird and Knopf (2009) and Martins (2009) find adverse effects of more stringent em-
ployment protection on firm profitability.
More recent studies on employment protection increasingly consider alternative individual
outcomes, such as workers’ stress and well-being (Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer, 2016), parental
leave take-up (Olsson, 2017) and fertility (Prifti and Vuri, 2013).
A number of studies closely related to the empirical analysis in Section 4 focus on worker
flows in establishments as outcomes, i.e., the effect of employment protection on how many
workers get hired and dismissed. These studies typically use establishment surveys or linked
employer-employee data to evaluate reforms involving a shift in employment protection cov-
erage in Italy (Kugler and Pica, 2008), Portugal (Martins, 2009), Sweden (von Below et al.,
2010) and Germany (Verick, 2004; Bauer et al., 2007; Bauernschuster, 2013; Priesack, 2015).
Applying a difference-in-differences estimation approach, these studies find somewhat mixed
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results3, even among studies within the same country, indicating the importance of institutional
specifics and contextual developments on the labor market.
Finally, a couple of very recent studies analyze the effects of employment protection on
the quality of employer-employee matches, i.e., on the ability of new hires. Marinescu (2009)
studies the effects of a reduction in the minimum required tenure from 24 to 12 months for
dismissal protection coverage in the United Kingdom. She finds a reduced dismissal probability
not only for directly affected employees with 12 to 23 months of tenure, but also for workers
with less than 12 months tenure, suggesting an increase in the quality of new hires. Bjuggren
and Skedinger (2018) study the effects of relaxed dismissal protection on the propensity to hire
workers from unemployment and active labor market programs in Sweden, i.e., employees with
a negative signal of lower productivity. They find an increase in the share of employees hired
from unemployment and active labor market programs.
Butschek and Sauermann (2019) use a similar approach to the empirical analysis in Section
4 and estimate the effects of less stringent dismissal protection on the ability of new hires in
small Swedish establishments. Using estimated individual fixed effects as a measure for worker
ability, they find a significant reduction of firms’ hiring standards at the bottom of the hire ability
distribution. This finding confirms the theoretical prediction of Pries and Rogerson (2005).
1.2.3 Own Contribution
This dissertation includes one study that contributes to the existing body of literature on labor
economics and specifically on the labor market effects of employment protection regulations.
The single-authored study in Section 4 analyzes the effects of dismissal protection regula-
tions on worker flows and hire quality in small German establishments. I take advantage of a
change in German dismissal protection law in 2004 which raised the establishment size thresh-
old determining the coverage of dismissal regulations from more than five to more than 10
full-time equivalent (FTE) workers. I use this exogenous variation in dismissal protection cov-
erage over time and establishment groups created by the 2004 reform to identify a causal effect
in a difference-in differences framework. I construct a treatment group of establishments with
3 A more detailed description of the results is available in Section 4.1.
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5.75 to 9.25 FTE workers, while establishments with 10.75 to 20 FTE employees form the con-
trol group. I consider the number of hirings and separations within a given year, including the
respective hiring and separation rates as worker flow outcomes. For measures of hire quality
outcomes, I analyze the effects on the minimum and maximum ability, as well as the 90/50
ability percentile ratio of all hires within a given year.
The dataset used in my analysis is the Longitudinal Model of the Linked-Employer-Employee-
Data 1993-2010 (LIAB LM 9310) provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB)
of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). This dataset provides
crucial establishment characteristics linked with data on their employees subject to social insur-
ance, including register employment spells and individual employee characteristics. The pro-
vided data allow me to track all individual hires and separations within an establishment over
a calendar year and calculate FTE establishment size at any given point in time. As a proxy
for the ability of hired employees, I use the estimated individual fixed effects from Card et al.
(2013), which are available for linkage with the LIAB dataset. I exclude employees not subject
to dismissal protection regulations from my sample, such as apprentices. Likewise, I do not
consider establishments from unique or separately regulated industries, such as the the public
administration, nonprofit, agricultural, mining and shipment sectors. I consider the 2002-2005
period in the baseline specification, with two pre-treatment and two post-treatment years.
I find a positive significant effect on both hirings and separations in establishments enjoying
relaxed dismissal protection regulations, providing evidence to theoretical predictions (Bertola,
1999; Verick, 2004) and confirming previous international evidence (Kugler and Pica, 2008;
Martins, 2009). The increase in separations is comparatively lower and associated with a time
lag, possibly due to incumbent workers maintaining their protections after the reform. In con-
trast, I do not find any effects of relaxed dismissal protection on the minimum or the spread of
hire quality. These findings do not confirm various theories on the effects of reduced dismissal
costs on establishments, including a reduction in hiring standards and incentives to hire more
risky workers. On the supply side of the labor market, these findings do not provide evidence
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for negative self-selection of employees as a result of jobs losing dismissal protection becom-
ing less attractive to potential employees. The results are robust to a number of different model
specifications.
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2 Naturalization and Labor Market Performance of Immi-
grants in Germany
with Regina T. Riphahn
Abstract
Naturalization may be a relevant policy instrument affecting immigrant integration in host-
country labor markets. We study the effect of naturalization on labor market outcomes of immi-
grants in Germany. We apply recent survey data and exploit a reform of naturalization rules in an
instrumental variable estimation. In our sample of recent immigrants, linear regression yields
positive correlations between naturalization and beneficial labor market outcomes. Once we
account for the endogeneity of naturalization most coefficients decline in magnitude and lose
statistical significance: male immigrants’ labor market outcomes do not benefit significantly
from naturalization. Naturalization reduces the risks of unemployment and welfare dependence
for female immigrants. For males and females, the propensity to hold a permanent contract in-
crease as a consequence of naturalization. The results are robust to modifications of samples
and the instrument.
JEL classification: J61, J15, C26
Keywords: migration, naturalization, labor market outcomes, instrumental variables
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2.1 Introduction
It is generally in the mutual interest of immigrants and host countries to integrate immigrants
in host-country labor markets. A relevant but not yet well understood policy instrument is natu-
ralization and its regulation (Liebig, 2011). Liebig and von Haaren (2011, p. 48) point out that
"having the host-country nationality is generally associated with better labor market outcomes
for immigrants". However, it is still unresolved to what extent this positive association is due to
immigrant selection into naturalization or to potential causal effects of naturalization.
The literature distinguishes three potential effects of naturalization: reduced labor market
barriers, changes in immigrant behavior, and changes in employer behavior. First, labor market
barriers may consist of regulations that limit access to public sector jobs or that restrict the em-
ployment of immigrants to situations where no appropriate native candidate is available (priority
tests). Here, naturalization can clearly improve the labor market opportunities of immigrants.
Similarly, citizenship may affect access to higher education, to financial support for education
(e.g., scholarships), or to loans and housing which is of particular importance to young immi-
grants. Second, immigrant behavior might respond to the opportunity of naturalization (ex ante
and ex post) by increased investments in host-country specific human capital such as language
and educational or occupational certificates, as well as by providing extra effort to avoid public
transfer dependence.4 Third, employers’ hiring costs may decline if a worker is naturalized thus
reducing what Fougère and Mirna Safi (2011) label ’rational discrimination.’ Also, naturaliza-
tion may serve as a signal to employers that an individual intends to stay in the host-country.
The expectation of long-run employment relationships may additionally encourage job offers
and employer investments in immigrants’ human capital.5
Our study addresses the causal effect of naturalization for recent immigrants to Germany
using the newly available 2013 wave of the IAB-SOEP migration sample exploiting reforms to
German naturalization laws in an instrumental variables strategy.6 The data show immigrants’
4 Similar to other countries, German naturalization law requires immigrants to be able to support themselves
without social assistance or means-tested unemployment benefits (Liebig et al., 2010; Guimezanes, 2011).
5 For a survey on implications of citizenship acquisition see, e.g., DeVoretz and Irastorza (2017).
6 IAB-SOEP stands for Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in cooperation with the German Socio-
economic Panel (SOEP).
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naturalization status as observed in 2013. We contribute to a small international literature on the
causal effects of naturalization.
To identify the causal effects of naturalization the literature has applied three methods: fol-
lowing the seminal paper by Bratsberg et al. (2002), most analyses apply longitudinal data and
aim to identify causal effects conditional on person-specific fixed effects or study wage growth
before and after naturalization. Bratsberg et al. (2002) find positive effects of naturalization on
wage growth for the United States; in their sample of foreign-born youth first interviewed in
1979 taken from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) they find 2.6 percentage
points higher wage returns to experience per year after naturalization. However, these results
are not confirmed in studies using similar methods for Sweden (Ohlson, 2008; Engdahl, 2011)
and Norway (Bratsberg and Raaum, 2011): none of these studies finds significantly positive nat-
uralization effects once individual fixed effects are considered. Steinhardt (2012) applies panel
estimations to determine causal naturalization effects on wages for Germany. He considers the
administrative data for individuals who initially appeared in the data with a foreign nationality
and compares the labor market outcomes of those who did and did not naturalize during the
observation period. After accounting for individual fixed effects, Steinhardt (2012) finds that
wages for males grow 0.49 percent faster per year after naturalization. This effect is statistically
significant but smaller than the one found for the U.S. by Bratsberg et al. (2002). He does not
obtain significant wage effects for females after controlling for individual fixed effects.
Gathmann and Keller (2018) pursue a different approach to characterize the effects of nat-
uralization for the German case. They exploit two reforms of the naturalization law as a quasi-
experiment and estimate reduced form equations. They correlate the required number of years
of residency for citizenship eligibility with labor market outcomes.7 Based on Mikrozensus
(2005-2010) and SOEP (1984-2009) data, they study outcomes for immigrants who arrived in
Germany prior to age 23 between 1975 and 2002. Similar to Steinhardt (2012), Gathmann and
Keller (2018) find positive selection into citizenship for a pooled sample of males and females.
7 For other studies using the German citizenship law reform as a natural experiment see, e.g., Felfe and Saurer
(2014) and Sajons and Clots-Figueras (2014) on child education outcomes, Avitabile et al. (2013, 2014) on
immigrant fertility and integration, and Sajons (2016) on outmigration. For other contributions applying instru-
mental variable estimation to determine the causal effects of naturalization see, e.g., Bevelander and Pendakur
(2011) on voting participation and Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) on employment in Sweden, and Fougère
and Mirna Safi (2011) on employment in France.
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The authors find that reduced residency requirements and thus easier access to citizenship go
along with hardly any employment and earnings effects for men and with significantly stronger
labor force attachment in terms of hours worked, full-time employment, tenure, and white collar
employment as well as significantly higher net incomes for females. A one year reduction in
residency requirements increases female earnings by about 1.6 percent.
Finally, von Haaren-Giebel and Sandner (2016) use propensity score matching to identify
naturalization effects. They study on-the-job training of first generation immigrants in Germany.
Based on survey data from the SOEP for 1986-1993 and 1997-2008, the authors find a signifi-
cant positive average treatment effect of naturalization.
We contribute to the literature in four ways. First, we offer an up-to-date analysis, which
covers recent immigration cohorts that have not been investigated so far; in our data, the me-
dian immigration year is 1999 for men and 2000 for women. Steinhardt (2012) used data for
the naturalization period 1974-2004 (with no information on the year of immigration) and Gath-
mann and Keller (2018) focus on individuals arriving on average in 1985/6 (SOEP) and 1989/90
(Mikrozensus). Given that the country of origin of immigrants to Germany varies over time,
naturalization effects may differ across cohorts. Second, we can use more outcomes than prior
studies. For example, gross monthly earnings and gross hourly wages are not available in the
Mikrozensus data and employment status and further job characteristics, could not be studied
by Steinhardt (2012). Third, as our data provide substantial detail on past in- and out-migration
spells in addition to relevant biographical features, such as age, marriage, and refugee status,
we can describe the timing of individual eligibility for naturalization more precisely than other
studies. We contribute to the literature by testing the sensitivity of estimates to alternative and
commonly used specifications of the instrument. Finally, prior studies on Germany leave some
issues unanswered: Steinhardt (2012) finds positive naturalization effects only for men while,
Gathmann and Keller (2018) find a stronger benefit for women.8 We offer new evidence. Over-
all, we study labor market access, labor market success, and host-country investments to better
understand the causal effects of naturalization and the underlying mechanisms.
8 The income measure applied by Gathmann and Keller (2018) describes net monthly personal income, which
combines labor earnings, income from self-employment and capital, as well as private pensions, and public
transfers.
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We find positive correlations between naturalization and labor market success. Once we
account for the endogeneity of naturalization most coefficients decline in magnitude and lose
statistical significance. While males’ labor market outcomes do not benefit significantly from
naturalization, naturalization reduces the risks of unemployment and welfare dependence for
female immigrants. This reflects that the character of German citizenship status matters more for
female than for male immigrants. For both groups, the propensity to hold a permanent contract
increases as a consequence of naturalization. The results are robust to modifications of samples
and the instrument. Thus, our findings confirm the findings of Gathmann and Keller (2018),
in that naturalization as an integration policy may be more effective for female than for male
immigrants. This gender-specific aspect so far has not been considered in German debates of
integration policy and deserves additional attention in future research.
Next, we summarize the institutional background of naturalization in Germany. Also, we
discuss how naturalization may affect different outcomes. Section 2.3 describes our data and
sections 2.4 and 2.5 cover methods and results. We conclude in section 2.6.
2.2 Institutional Background and Mechanisms
2.2.1 Naturalization in Germany and Its Reforms
Our analysis exploits reforms to German citizenship law, which became effective in 1991 and
2000 (for the historical background see, e.g., Morjé Howard, 2008). Prior to the 1991 reform,
the Nationality Act (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, RuStAG) of 1913 regulated Ger-
man citizenship acquisition. This law stipulated a principle of jus sanguinis (right of blood):
German ancestry, i.e., being born to a parent with German citizenship rather than place of birth,
determined eligibility for German citizenship. The law neither defined an entitlement to ac-
quire German citizenship for foreign nationals nor did it specify clear requirements regarding
duration of residency. For decades, foreign applicants for German citizenship had to rely on
ad hoc decisions of public authorities; applications could be rejected even if all legally spec-
ified requirements were met. Among these specified requirements were legal age, economic
self-sufficiency, ability to support relatives, no criminal record, and the renouncement of any
previous citizenship.
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A reform of the Alien Act (Ausländergesetz, AuslG), which came into effect on January
1, 1991, considerably changed the nature of German citizenship law. The new legal situation
curbed the power of public authorities and established the right to acquire German citizenship
for foreign nationals if they met clearly defined conditions. Among these, the new law intro-
duced a minimum residency requirement for eligibility. Immigrants aged 16-22 became eligible
for citizenship after 8 years of residence in Germany, while immigrants above age 22 faced a
residency requirement of at least 15 years in Germany. All immigrants had to renounce their
previous citizenship and had to have no criminal record. Immigrants above age 22 had to prove
economic self-sufficiency and the ability to provide for their relatives without receiving public
transfers. Adolescent immigrants (aged 16-22) had to demonstrate 6 years of completed school-
ing in Germany. The spouse and minor children of applicants could be naturalized with the
applicant, even if they did not meet the 15 years residency requirement.
The second substantial reform of German citizenship law came into effect on January 1,
2000. It was passed by a socialdemocrat-green coalition government with more liberal views
on citizenship than the previous conservative government. This reform changed and renamed
the old Nationality Act (from RuStAG to Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG), and updated the
Alien Act (AuslG). It harmonized the minimum residency requirement to 8 years regardless of
an immigrant’s age. The reform newly required applicants to demonstrate sufficient German
language skills and to profess their loyalty to the free and democratic constitutional order in
Germany. The previous requirements remained in place. Interestingly, elements of the jus soli
(right of the soil) principle were introduced into German citizenship law, allowing children of
immigrants to acquire German citizenship if they were born in Germany to parents living in
Germany for at least 8 years.
More recently, the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz, AufenthG) replaced the Alien Act
(AuslG), on January 1, 2005. Among other things, it introduced integration courses for non-
citizens to improve their language skills and to provide them with basic knowledge about Ger-
man society (in part these courses are mandatory). Successful participation in the course short-
ens the residency requirement for citizenship eligibility from 8 to 7 years.
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In Figure 2.1, we depict the development of the absolute number of naturalizations and in
Figure 2.2 of the share of naturalizations in the stock of foreign residents in Germany. While
we see a peak in naturalization early in the 1990s, the share in the stock of immigrants always
remains below 5 percent, which is low by international comparison.9 Therefore, selection into
naturalization may follow different patterns in Germany compared to other countries.
2.2.2 Mechanisms of Naturalization Effects
Although the literature points to the dual nature of naturalization as both a determinant and
a consequence of immigrant integration, we concentrate on the former relationship: we are
interested in the correlation between naturalization and immigrant outcomes and in the causal
effects of naturalization.
Naturalization can affect labor market outcomes through various channels and mechanisms.
Although most contributions to the literature focus on employment and wage outcomes, we
take a broader perspective. We study the mechanisms behind these developments, as well, and
investigate three groups of outcomes: indicators of labor market access, of labor market success,
and of investment behaviors.
In a first set of measures, we consider indicators of labor market access. Labor market ac-
cess may be affected by citizenship through hiring costs, discrimination, and formal employ-
ment restrictions; the latter may vary across countries of origins of immigrants. Also, formal
restrictions such as priority tests can limit non-naturalized workers’ access to certain occupa-
tions. We investigate labor market participation at the extensive and intensive margin and focus
on overall employment, full-time employment, and unemployment. The international literature
generally finds beneficial naturalization effects on labor market outcomes (see, e.g., the survey
by Liebig and von Haaren, 2011). For Germany, Gathmann and Keller (2018) find a positive
correlation between citizenship and employment for males and females. However, in their re-
duce form results which account for the selectivity of naturalizations, the positive employment
effect disappears for men.
9 For international comparisons see, e.g., Steinhardt (2012), Morjé Howard (2008), or Gathmann and Keller
(2018).
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Our second group of outcomes describes labor market success. These outcomes result from
bargaining and individual negotiations, which may respond to citizenship. Employers could be
hesitant to hire immigrants for employment tracks with steep age earnings profiles or to incur
costly investments in firm specific human capital if it is uncertain whether and for how long
a worker will stay in the country. We investigate whether citizenship is associated with gross
hourly wages, gross monthly earnings, holding a permanent contract, and a white collar job.
Finally, we consider welfare dependence and its duration as indicators of low household income.
Although Steinhardt (2012) finds that males’ wage growth increased after naturalization with
no causal effects for females, Gathmann and Keller (2018) find a higher personal income for
women but not for men among immigrants with easier access to naturalization. Here, we offer
additional evidence. These authors also present findings for white collar and permanent contract
employment. Their results are suggestive of positive citizenship effects on white collar (women)
and permanent contract (women) employment.
Finally, we inspect the effect of citizenship on investments in host-country specific (human)
capital. These investments may reflect the mechanisms, which connect labor market access and
labor market success with behavioral choices related to naturalization. As outcomes of interest,
we consider whether immigrants attained an educational degree in Germany. We study their
self-reported language skills, in particular, speaking, writing, and reading on 1-5 scale, as well
as an average measure. These indicators reflect host-country specific investments. Additionally,
we capture whether an immigrant purchased property in Germany. Given the substantial fixed
costs of property transactions in Germany this measure indicates a "durable tie to the host-
country", which may respond to naturalization. We consider tenure with the current employer
as an indicator of investments in firm specific human capital, which may respond to the acqui-
sition of citizenship. Finally, we look at whether the individual found a German partner after
migration suggesting intensive investment in host-country culture and traditions. Unfortunately,
the data do not offer specific information on individual or employer investments in worker hu-
man capital. As the relevance of different mechanisms may vary for subgroups, e.g., for EU-15
or ethnic German immigrants these groups we offer robustness tests without these subsamples.
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2.3 Data
The 2013 wave of the IAB-SOEP Migration sample describes recent immigrants to Germany. It
uses administrative register data of the Federal Employment Agency as a frame to draw a sample
of potential immigrants to be surveyed subsequently.10 The data cover individuals who first
appeared in the administrative data in 1995 or later and who are either first or second generation
immigrants. In addition, members of their households aged 17 and above are interviewed. The
survey covers 4,964 individuals from 2,723 households. We focus on first generation immigrants
born abroad, aged 17-65, and who had not obtained German citizenship at birth. Our sample
contains 3,359 observations. On average, immigrants spent 14 years in Germany, 85 percent are
eligible for naturalization, and 37.5 percent are naturalized.11
Our dependent variables describe labor market and investment outcomes. In particular, we
describe labor market access using indicators of being employed, full-time employed, and reg-
istered unemployed. We describe labor market success using gross hourly wages, gross monthly
earnings, holding a permanent contract and a white collar job. In addition, we consider welfare
dependence (i.e., unemployment benefit II receipt) and the duration of benefit receipt during
the past calendar year. As indicators of investment in host-country (human) capital, we consider
whether an individual invested in an educational degree in Germany (completed and ongoing),
German language skills, purchased property in Germany, tenure with the current employer, and
having found a native German partner.12
Table 2.1 presents sample means of our dependent variables for naturalized and not natu-
ralized male and female immigrants. In Panel A, we observe higher employment rates among
males than among females, and among naturalized than non-naturalized individuals. Full-time
employment rates (conditional on employment) are significantly higher for naturalized than for
non-naturalized females with almost no difference by citizenship among men. Unemployment
is significantly lower among naturalized individuals. In Panel B, we find higher wages and earn-
ings for men than for women. Here, naturalized men are worse off and naturalized females are
better off than their not naturalized peers. In additional categories of labor market success the
10 For details on the data, see Brücker et al. (2014), Kroh et al. (2015) and Trübswetter and Fendel (2016).
11 Of those 1,261 naturalized individuals, 399 hold a dual citizenship.
12 The last measure is coded only for those immigrants who entered the country without having a partner already.
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jobs of naturalized immigrants are significantly more likely permanent and both gender groups
are significantly less likely to receive welfare benefits (UB2) compared to non-naturalized peers.
Finally, Panel C describes the groups’ investments: except for the indicator of having a German
born partner, all indicators suggest that naturalization is correlated with significantly higher
investments in human and physical capital in the host-country, for both men and women.
The data offer information on naturalization and the calendar year of naturalization. In order
to address the potential endogeneity of naturalization with respect to labor market outcomes we
use an instrumental variables approach. Similar to Bevelander and Pendakur (2011, 2012), we
consider ’years since first eligible for naturalization’ as an instrument for naturalization, which
we can calculate rather precisely. In addition - and going beyond Bevelander and Pendakur
(2011, 2012) - we can take advantage of reform-induced changes in eligibility rules. We exploit
two major reforms (1991, 2000), which exogenously affected the minimum residency require-
ment for eligibility in Germany: prior to 1991, there was no defined right to acquire German
citizenship based on explicit criteria. The Alien Act (AuslG) of January 1, 1991 introduced a
minimum residency requirement of 8 years for immigrants aged 16-22 and a requirement of
at least 15 years in Germany for immigrants aged above 22. The reform of January 1, 2000
reduced this latter residency requirement to 8 years regardless of an immigrant’s age. Our data
provide monthly information on immigrants’ migration biographies: for every immigrant we
know the start and the end date of residence spells in Germany. This allows us to compute
the exact duration of residence. We use this information to determine the precise time of first
eligibility for citizenship.
The detailed nature of the data allows us to control for potential interruptions in residence in
Germany and to incorporate the rules handling interruptions into our eligibility variable. Based
on the Alien Act (AuslG) of January 1, 1991 stays abroad for up to 6 months are not consid-
ered as residence interruptions and thus count towards the residency duration requirements for
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citizenship. Stays abroad for more than 6 months, however, are considered as residence inter-
ruptions; any previous residence in Germany counts towards the requirements for citizenship
only up to a maximum period of five years.13
Finally, we can use relevant biographical features, such as marriage to a German native,
ethnic German status, refugee status, and naturalization of parents to account for numerous
exceptions in the residency duration requirements for ethnic Germans, refugees, spouses of nat-
uralized individuals, and children of naturalized parents. In our robustness checks we evaluate
the impact of these refinements.
An important issue in coding the instrument "years since eligibility" is the treatment of
individuals who are not yet eligible. We could (i) omit these observations from the analysis, (ii)
include them and code the years since eligibility as zero, or (iii) include them and code negative
values if eligibility will be established in the future. The literature uses different approaches.
Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) code their instrument to be zero for all who have not yet
attained eligibility. This might upward bias the first stage coefficients, with both positive and
negative slopes being overestimated. In contrast, Bevelander and Pendakur (2011, p. 76) appear
to use negative values, "subtracting the number of years since migrating to Sweden from the
number of years to eligibility". In order to reflect the exogenous difference in the eligibility to
naturalize between those who entered before and after a reform and between those who spent
long and short periods in the host-country, we consider negative values in our instrument of
"years since eligibility" in our baseline analyses. We inspect the relevance of coding years since
eligible for non-eligible individuals in our robustness tests. Our instrument therefore covers
values in the interval from -8 to +53 years.14
In our sample, 40.1 percent of male and 35.3 percent of female immigrants are naturalized.
On average, naturalization occurred after 1.46 (0.98) years of eligibility for males (females).
These figures vary substantially by country of origin with the highest naturalization rates among
immigrants from the former Soviet Union countries (65.1 percent) and the lowest rates among
13 In our sample, 242 individuals interrupted their stay in Germany after their first arrival, 209 individuals inter-
rupted their stay for at least 6 months, and in 64 cases accounting for these interruptions reduced their relevant
duration of stay to five years.
14 Immigrants arriving in 2013 would be eligible for naturalization after 8 years, yielding the value of -8 for the
indicator "years since eligible". At least one individual, who arrived decades earlier became eligible 53 years
ago, e.g. via marriage to a native.
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immigrants from the original EU-15 member states (4.1 percent). In robustness tests we will
compare the estimation results for various subsamples.
In addition to naturalization, we consider individual age, years in Germany, indicators for
low, medium and high skill, federal state of residence, and region of origin as control variables
in our estimations. Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of these individual characteristics.
About 30 percent of the sample originate in countries of the former Soviet Union, 30 percent
are from EU member states, and 12 percent are from Turkey. In our sample, men are slightly
older and have a longer duration of stay in Germany than females, while female immigrants are
slightly better educated (please see Appendix Tables A.1-A.3 for variable definitions).
2.4 Empirical Method
Our objective is to describe the relationship between naturalization and labor market outcomes
and to identify the causal effect of naturalization. We follow the literature (e.g., Gathmann
and Keller, 2018) and first regress labor market outcomes (Y ) on naturalization to describe
overall correlation patterns and to compare it to prior studies. This estimation generates biased
estimates of causal naturalization effects if naturalization is endogenous. Several reasons may
generate such an endogeneity. First, omitted variables may cause a correlation of naturalization
with the error term; examples of such omitted variables are the individual taste for the host-
country culture, language skills, or unobserved strength of home country ties. Second, reverse
causality may induce individuals to naturalize because of their labor market outcomes. Finally,
our survey based naturalization indicator may be measured with error.
In order to account for these issues we pursue an instrumental variable strategy in the second
step of our analysis. We exploit heterogeneity in naturalization outcomes generated by our in-
strument, i.e., years since first eligible for naturalization. We assume that the instrument ceteris
paribus affects labor market outcomes only by means of naturalization because immigrants
cannot naturalize before they are eligible and the probability of naturalization increases with
time since eligibility. The instrument should be highly relevant for naturalization. The exclu-
sion restriction implies that for individuals of given age and years since migration, the number
of years since eligibility affects outcomes only via naturalization. The instrument identifies the
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effect of naturalization on labor market outcomes based on a comparison of immigrants under
heterogeneous naturalization regulations but with identical age, years since migration and other
characteristics: the regulatory differences allowed one person to naturalize while the other had
to accumulate additional years of residence.
We apply a standard two stage least squares estimator (2SLS), separately for males and
females.15 First, we model whether an individual i has naturalized (Ni) as a function of years
since first eligibility (Y rsEligi):
Ni = θ0 + θ1Y rsEligi + θ2Agei + θ3Age
2
i + θ4Y SMi + θ5Y SM
2
i + τXi + i. (1)
We account for individual age (Agei), age squared (Age2i ), years in Germany (Y SMi) and
its square (Y SM2i ), and a set of other covariates Xi (two education indicators, federal state of
residence, and region or country of origin). We evaluate the relevance of our instrument using
an F-test of the statistical significance of the θ1 estimate. Then, we consider a broad set of labor
market outcomes (Yi) as dependent variable and estimate:
Yi = α + βN̂i + γ1Agei + γ2Age
2
i + δ1Y SMi + δ2Y SM
2
i + piXi + µi. (2)
In addition to the assumptions of instrument exogeneity and relevance, we assume mono-
tonicity, i.e., that nobody refused to naturalize due to the onset of eligibility, which appears
plausible. If our identifying assumptions hold, the estimate of β provides the causal effect of
naturalization for compliers, i.e., for those individuals who naturalized because they became
eligible.
15 In additional estimations, we tested and confirmed the robustness of our findings when applying bivariate probit
estimators, instead.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Linear Regression Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes
In step one of our analysis, we regress the outcomes of interest on the naturalization indicator
to describe the overall correlation patterns conditional on a set of covariates. Table 2.3 shows
the estimated coefficients of the naturalization indicator.16
With respect to the outcomes describing labor market access (see Panel A), we find a positive
correlation of naturalization with employment and a negative correlation with unemployment.
Naturalized men are more likely to be employed, full-time employed conditional on employ-
ment, and less likely to be unemployed compared to non-citizen first generation immigrants;
however, these estimates are not statistically significant. Among women, the employment and
unemployment coefficients are larger than for men and statistically significant.
The indicators of labor market success in Panel B generally show the expected patterns with
large and at times highly significant coefficient estimates. Hourly wages, monthly earnings,
permanent contract, and white collar employment, are positively correlated with naturalization,
whereas welfare dependence (UB2-last year) and its intensity are significantly lower among
naturalized individuals. In most cases, the coefficient estimates are larger for females than for
males. As an example, females with German citizenship have roughly 11 and 17 percent higher
wages and earnings than non-citizens compared to 7 and 9 percent differences for males. The
gender differences in correlation patterns agree with the findings of Gathmann and Keller (2018)
who find larger employment and income correlations for females than males.
Finally, in Panel C, we describe some indicators of investments in (human) capital. In almost
all cases, the naturalization indicator is positively and significantly correlated with the invest-
ment measures. Naturalized individuals are about 7 percentage points more likely to invest in
German educational degrees, they score higher on all measures of language skills, are more
likely to own property and they have a longer tenure with their current employers. We do not
find positive correlations between naturalization and having a native partner.
Whereas in Panels A and B, our coefficient estimates are more significant and of larger mag-
nitude for the female than for the male subsample, this pattern is reversed in Panel C. Overall,
16 To improve readability of results tables, we do not show standard errors. They are provided upon request.
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our findings confirm results reported by Gathmann and Keller (2018) based on Mikrozensus
data for earlier immigrant cohorts.
2.5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimations
In step two of our analysis, we investigate whether the endogeneity of naturalization biases
the linear regression results in Table 2.3. We apply an instrumental variables estimator with
’years since eligibility for naturalization’ as our instrument. Table 2.4 shows the estimation
results for the instrumented effect of naturalization.17 We again show three panels, describing
labor market access, labor market success, and immigrant investment outcomes with separate
estimates for male and female immigrants. For each outcome, the table first presents evidence
on the relevance of our instrument in the first stage regression. Following the rule of thumb that
the F-statistic must yield a value of at least 10, our instrument is strongly associated with the
naturalization outcome (see columns labelled "F-Stat"): in all cases, we obtained statistically
significant positive first stage coefficient estimates suggesting that the number of years since
eligible for naturalization significantly increases the probability of naturalization. In the next
column (see columns labelled ’N’), we show the number of observations for each outcome; the
numbers vary because some outcomes are only observed conditional on employment or family
status and due to missing values in the data.
The coefficient estimates show the causal effect of naturalization on the considered out-
comes for those immigrants who complied with the treatment, i.e., who naturalized because
they became eligible. The results for the outcomes in Panel A are comparable to those pre-
viously discussed in the literature. For males, the estimates regarding labor market access in
Table 2.4 hardly differ from those presented in Table 2.3: we find positive effects of naturaliza-
tion on employment and full-time employment, and negative effects on unemployment. As in
Table 2.3, none of these estimates is statistically significant. Therefore, we find no evidence in
support of significant causal effects of citizenship acquisition on labor market participation for
male immigrants. Similarly, the Panel A results for females hardly differ between the IV and
17 As an example, Appendix Table A.4 shows the results of the first stage regression for the full sample. The results
suggest a positive selection into naturalization by education. In the presentation of IV estimates (e.g., Table 2.4)
we routinely present the value of the F-statistic on the relevance of the instrument in the first stage regression.
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the OLS regressions in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The previously marginally significant coefficient in
the employment equation increases in size but loses statistical significance in the IV estimation
compared to OLS (see Table 2.3). The positive full-time employment effect about halves in size.
Only the negative effect on unemployment remains statistically significant and almost doubles
in magnitude. This suggests that we find benefits of naturalization for women in terms of sig-
nificantly reduced unemployment risks. Our findings agree with Gathmann and Keller (2018):
their reduced form estimates based on residency requirements for naturalization yield signifi-
cant effects on employment for females but not for males. Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) find
for Sweden substantial positive and significant naturalization effects on employment. Ohlson
(2008) confirms the correlation of citizenship with employment for Sweden but does not find
support for the hypothesis that becoming Swedish increases the probability of finding employ-
ment.
Panel B of Table 2.4 shows the effects on indicators of labor market success. The first two
rows show the naturalization effects on hourly wages and on gross monthly labor earnings.
For both outcomes, the OLS estimates in Table 2.3 yielded positive and statistically significant
associations with naturalization for men and women. These estimates respond strongly to en-
dogeneity controls: for men, we find no positive causal effects of naturalization on wages and
earnings, which suggests that the correlations in Table 2.3 were due to positive selection into
citizenship. For females, the IV estimates continue to yield large positive coefficient estimates.
However, these are marginally statistically significant only for monthly earnings and not for
hourly wages. This suggests that the response relates to the number of hours worked in addi-
tion to workers’ wages and productivity as is evidenced by the positive though insignificant
effect on full-time employment in Panel A. Overall, we confirm much of the international liter-
ature, which finds no significant effect of naturalization on wages (e.g., Bratsberg and Raaum,
2011).18 Also, we confirm Gathmann and Keller (2018) who use different income measures but
similarly obtain significant income effects at best for females but not for males in their reduced
form estimations.
18 Given the large number of hypothesis tests performed, we emphasize only significance at the 1 percent level.
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As one of the strongest results in Panel B of Table 2.4, we find positive effects of natural-
ization on the propensity to hold a permanent employment contract for both males and females.
This agrees with the correlations in Table 2.3 and the reduced form results for females in Gath-
mann and Keller (2018). In contrast, we do not find the expected positive naturalization effects
for white collar employment. The significant negative effect of naturalization on white collar
employment for men and women is counter to intuition and differs from the literature. The es-
timates become much smaller in magnitude and lose statistical significance, when we focus on
white collar workers who perform at least somewhat demanding tasks.19
Finally, we inspect as an indirect outcome of labor market activities whether naturalization
causally affects welfare dependence. Least squares results showed negative correlation patterns,
which were statistically significant in three of four cases. The instrumental variables estimations
confirm negative effects. They are, however, no longer statistically significant for men, yet large
and significant for females. Overall, the results in Panel B confirm that naturalization may ben-
efit female immigrants, whereas we find only few beneficial effects for the male sample.
In Panel C of Table 2.4, we inspect the relevance of naturalization for host-country related
investments. In almost all cases, the least squares estimates in Table 2.3 yielded significant
positive coefficient estimates. After accounting for the endogeneity of naturalization, the results
change substantially. We obtain an unexpected negative effect for female investments in German
educational degrees. This finding emphasizes that the OLS results were affected by positive
female selection into naturalization. Among the compliers in our sample the negative education
effect is possibly related to the positive increase in labor force participation, which excludes
simultaneous investments in education. The gender difference agrees with Gathmann and Keller
(2018) who find substantially higher additions to education investments among men than among
women in response to reduced residency requirements.
There is no significant average language effect for either subsample, which suggests again
that a large part of the positive language coefficients in Table 2.3 was - at least for females -
19 We limited the group of white collar workers to those reporting that they perform more than simple basic
tasks, i.e., we considered only those performing at least qualified tasks. After re-coding the 180 male and 272
female white collar observations who report that they perform simple tasks (mostly without formal training),
the coefficients for males and females change to -0.148 and -0.057, respectively, and are no longer statistically
significant. Thus, we do not find a significant negative effect of naturalization on the propensity to work on
qualified white collar jobs.
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driven by selection into naturalization. Interestingly, the positive causal effects on owning prop-
erty in Germany hold up to endogeneity corrections as does the tenure effect for the female
subsample. This suggests that naturalization not only increases the probability of holding a per-
manent contract but also facilitates the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and stable
employment relationships, particularly for women. For the subsample of male immigrants who
entered the country without a partner, we find a significant positive causal effect of natural-
ization on the propensity to choose a German partner. The effect for females is smaller and
insignificant.
Overall, we find some positive labor market effects of naturalization for females that do not
appear to be determined by selection into citizenship. For men, however, neither employment
nor earnings respond to naturalization. Males and females benefit from citizenship in terms of
access to permanent employment contracts and appear to invest in property more after natu-
ralization, suggesting stronger connection to the host-country. A potential explanation for the
gender differences in the effects of naturalization with respect to labor market access and labor
market success (see Panels A and B) may relate to the relative change in status and indepen-
dence that naturalization implies for males and females. If a larger share of females immigrates
as tied movers, family members, or - which is often reported for females of Turkish origin -
in order to marry, whereas males independently migrate by their own volition, then taking up
German citizenship might contain an empowering element for females that males cannot ex-
perience. The effect of this empowerment might be reflected in female labor market behavior.
Next, we offer a variety of robustness tests to evaluate our findings.
2.5.3 Robustness and Heterogeneity
We offer five sets of robustness tests.20 First, we modify the definition of the instrumental vari-
able. Second, we adjust the sample of immigrants excluding immigrants from the original EU-
15 countries and ethnic Germans who benefit from special regulations. Third, we exclude those
20 In an additional test, we considered a sample selection model for the outcomes that are observed conditional
on employment. Using the number and age structure of children in the household as exclusion restrictions,
we find no evidence for endogenous sample selection for men. For women, the inverse Mills ratio generates
statistically significant coefficient estimates on some of the outcomes. However, the coefficient estimates of the
naturalization outcome hardly change when sample selection corrections are considered.
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observations who benefited from special family-based regulations in becoming eligible for natu-
ralization, fourth we exclude the most recent immigrants because they did not yet have a chance
to meet minimum residency requirements for naturalization, and finally we omit observations
of immigrants arriving within ten years prior to the survey to reduce the potential impact of
endogenous return migration.21
In Tables 2.5 and 2.6 we present the results of instrumental variables regressions after the
instrument was modified. First, we replaced negative values in the instrument ’number of years
since eligible for naturalization’ with a value of zero, as has been done in prior contributions
to the literature. This affects those observations (i.e., 216 male and 291 female immigrants) for
whom the required number of years of residence for eligibility had not yet been reached (see
Table 2.5). For the results in Table 2.6, we instead omit all observations on immigrants who
were not yet eligible for naturalization and coded only the actually observed positive number of
years since eligible for naturalization.
Overall, our results are rather robust to these modifications. The first stage F-statistic re-
mains large confirming the relevance of the instrument in both settings. Tables 2.5 and 2.6
confirm the results for Panel A: we obtain no significant naturalization effects for men and
significantly reduced unemployment risks for women. Similarly, the patterns regarding hourly
wages and monthly earnings hold up to the modifications: only female earnings increase sig-
nificantly due to naturalization. As before, the propensity to hold a permanent contract goes up
and we continue to find surprisingly negative effects for white collar employment. For female
immigrants, the risk and duration of welfare receipt continue to decline after naturalization.
Similarly, we find no substantive differences in the results in Panel C when we compare Tables
2.5 and 2.6 to Table 2.4. Overall, our results are thus robust to changes in the definition of the
instrument.22
In a second set of robustness tests, we investigate whether specific subsamples affect our
findings. We repeat the analyses presented in Table 2.4 after omitting immigrants from the core
21 In an additional test we modified the set of control variables by adding indicators of marital status and children
in the household. Almost all results are robust to this modification; for females the estimates of unemployment
and property ownership lose statistical significance once controls are added.
22 In separate estimations, we tested the robustness to alternative specifications of the instrument, e.g., quadratic
and cubic versus categorical representations. Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6 present the results which overall
confirm our findings.
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EU-15 countries, who enjoy particular freedom of international movement. Also, as ethnic Ger-
man immigrants enjoy permanent residence rights and immediate access to citizenship without
residency requirements, their ex ante and ex post response to naturalization may differ from
other immigrants. In particular, one might expect less positive effects of citizenship for this
subsample. We test whether omitting this group from the sample affects our estimates. In Ta-
ble 2.7, we show the estimates of the 2SLS estimation after omitting 188 male and 181 female
immigrants from the original EU-15 countries. The results show slightly reduced values for the
F-statistics, which, however, continue to strongly support the relevance of the instrument. The
estimates presented in Panel A hardly change with the restricted sample. In Panel B, some of the
estimates for females gain in magnitude and statistical significance, in Panel C some estimates
for males are smaller in size and less statistically significant. Overall, however, our findings
hold up to omitting immigrants from EU-15 countries from the sample.23
In Table 2.8, we show the estimation results after omitting the group of ethnic German immi-
grants. Dropping ethnic German observations, we lose 355 male and 371 female immigrants.24
The substantial change in the number of eligible immigrants likely drives the decline in the
value of the F-statistics reported in Table 2.8. However, our instrument continues to be relevant
by common standards. A comparison of the estimates in Panel A in Tables 2.8 and 2.4 suggests
that the employment effects gain in magnitude for employment among females and for full-time
employment among males. This matches expectations even though the effects remain statisti-
cally insignificant. Similarly, the negative effect on unemployment for females almost doubles
in size. This suggests that our baseline results present lower bounds to the actual effects on labor
market access for non-ethnic German immigrants. For the sample without ethnic Germans, the
significantly positive earnings effect for women disappears in Panel B and the effects for males
remain insignificant. The education effect for females grows in magnitude. At the same time,
the other effects for job characteristics in Panel B are robust to the change in sample. We see
positive and significant citizenship effects on permanent contracts and again negative effects
on white collar employment. Also, the previously observed effects on welfare receipt and the
23 In a separate test, we attempted to determine the effects of naturalization for the subsample of EU-15 immi-
grants only. However, due to the small number of only 15 naturalization events in this group, we did not obtain
statistically significant first stage results.
24 Ethnic German immigrants are identifiable in the data as information on their status is provided.
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outcomes in Panel C are confirmed. Interestingly, the naturalization effects on finding a German
partner increase for both males and females and become statistically significant. This suggests
that the ethnic German subsample differs from other immigrants in the effects of naturaliza-
tion on partnerships. Overall, however, the different subsamples do not call forth substantially
different results regarding labor market outcomes of naturalization.
In our third test, we reconsider our instrument. The instrumental variable reflects the indi-
vidually observed number of years since becoming eligible for naturalization. In order to avoid
measurement errors in the calculation of the number of years we considered special regulations
for children and spouses of naturalizing immigrants: they can naturalize jointly with their parent
or spouse and without meeting residency requirements if the latter meets the residency require-
ments and naturalizes. As such family related naturalization opportunities may be endogenous,
we test for the relevance of observations with reduced required years of residency (or increased
years of eligibility for naturalization) due to family issues. Table 2.9 presents the estimation
results when we omit these observations; we lose 180 male and 240 female observations. The
results in Panels A and B are basically unaffected and robust. In Panel C, the negative female
education effect loses significance and effects on property ownership remain positive but lose
statistical significance. Once we omit family based eligibility, the positive naturalization effects
on finding a German partner for males disappear and even turn negative for females. Thus,
our prior findings for this outcome are not robust. The naturalization effects on partner choice
identified on duration of residence, only, are insignificant for men and negative for women.
Our previous findings of positive significant effects for men are driven by observations whose
instrument was affected by specific family regulations.25 Overall, however, our results are not
determined by considering the full set of rules in the definition of the instrument.
In our fourth test, we reduce our sample by omitting all those observations who arrived after
2008 and therefore may not have had an opportunity to fulfill formal residency requirements.
Table 2.10 shows the estimation results obtained after omitting 158 male and 195 female recent
25 In further estimations, we additionally drop ethnic German observations from the sample used in Table 2.9.
Now, the negative effects amount to -0.133 for both males and females and turn insignificant. When, instead, we
change the specification in Table 2.9 to only omit observations whose eligibility was affected by being a spouse
(leaving children in the sample), the effect for males stays insignificant at a value of -0.052 and the female effect
drops to -0.0937 and remains significant at the 5 percent level.
35
immigrant observations. Again, the results in Panel A are confirmed. In Panel B, the effects on
white collar employment lose statistical significance and in Panel C some of the positive effects
for men become statistically significant. Overall, this corroborates our previous findings.
Finally, any analysis of first generation immigrants’ whereabouts in the destination country
may be subject to endogenous sample selection due to return migration. If the decisions to leave
Germany after immigration is correlated with the outcomes of interest then the estimates may
biased. This was tested in the studies by Steinhardt (2012) and Gathmann and Keller (2018)
neither of whom found evidence supporting endogenous sample selection. We apply one of the
tests performed by Gathmann and Keller (2018) who argue that a large share of return migra-
tion happens within the first ten years. When we drop those immigrants from the sample who
immigrated within ten years prior to the survey, we obtain the results presented in Table 2.11.
The sample size declined by about 30 percent but the overall patterns of the results are robust to
this modification. Therefore, we are optimistic that our results are not due to endogenous return
migration.
2.6 Conclusions
This study investigates the causal effect of naturalization on labor market outcomes for recent
immigrants to Germany. We take advantage of new data, which provide detailed information
on recent immigrants, and apply an instrumental variables strategy. Our estimation approach
accounts for the potential endogeneity of naturalization by exploiting exogenous variation gen-
erated by recent reforms in naturalization regulations.
We study outcomes describing access to the labor market, success in the labor market, and
indicators of immigrant investments in host-country (human) capital. Naturalization may affect
all of these outcomes. Linear regressions confirm large and statistically significant correlations
of these outcomes with naturalization even conditional on years since migration, i.e., assimila-
tion in the host-country. However, once we account for endogenous selection into naturalization,
most of the correlation patterns disappear. Instead, we confirm prior findings in the literature,
which show that, e.g., male immigrants’ labor market outcomes such as employment, wages,
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and earnings do not benefit from naturalization. For female immigrants, we find that natural-
ization reduces the risks of unemployment and welfare dependence. The positive response of
female immigrants’ earnings to citizenship acquisition is driven by the group of ethnic Germans
and does not result for the remaining immigrant sample. We observe for males and females that
the propensity to hold a permanent contract and - for females only - tenure, i.e., potential invest-
ments in firm-specific human capital and employment stability, increase due to naturalization.
The gender difference in naturalization effects reflects that the character of German citizen-
ship status matters more for female than for male immigrants. Possibly, it provides a sense of
independence and empowerment.
Given that we test numerous hypotheses, we need to caution against the risk of type-II
errors, i.e., erroneous indications of statistical significance. However, as one of our main results
is the finding that male immigrants’ labor market success does not respond to naturalization
and as the findings confirming naturalization effects are corroborated with various samples and
specifications, we are confident that our core conclusions are robust.
Overall, our results for men do not yield positive causal effects of naturalization on labor
market integration or - vice versa - that the labor market discriminates against workers based on
their citizenship. Among women, naturalization appears to enhance employment prospects. In
addition, naturalization may affect immigrant investments in host-country specific capital. This
suggests that the value of naturalization policies as an instrument to support overall immigrant
integration may be limited and its effects may differ by gender. Future research should pay spe-
cific attention to gender differences. Our results do not support the use of access to citizenship
as an instrument to assist the integration of, e.g., the predominantly male refugee population.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Annual Number of Naturalizations
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Note: Ethnic Germans are included in this figure.
Source: German Federal Statistical Office (2016)
Figure 2.2: Annual Share of Naturalizations in All Foreign Residents
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Individual Characteristics
Males Females
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 39.573 11.585 38.383 10.988
Years in Germany 15.033 8.463 13.733 7.370
Low-skilled or missing 0.336 0.473 0.343 0.475
Medium-skilled 0.478 0.500 0.427 0.495
High-skilled 0.186 0.389 0.229 0.421
Federal state (0/1)
Baden-Württemberg 0.143 0.351 0.153 0.360
Bavaria 0.160 0.367 0.172 0.377
Berlin 0.036 0.186 0.041 0.199
Brandenburg 0.029 0.167 0.022 0.147
Bremen 0.013 0.113 0.013 0.112
Hamburg 0.030 0.170 0.032 0.176
Hesse 0.090 0.286 0.089 0.285
Lower Saxony 0.096 0.295 0.090 0.286
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.003 0.057 0.003 0.057
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.250 0.433 0.244 0.429
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.058 0.235 0.050 0.217
Saarland 0.016 0.124 0.011 0.104
Saxony 0.010 0.098 0.019 0.136
Saxony-Anhalt 0.024 0.153 0.021 0.143
Schleswig-Holstein 0.036 0.186 0.030 0.171
Thuringia 0.007 0.084 0.012 0.107
Region of origin (0/1)
Former Soviet Union 0.304 0.460 0.318 0.466
New EU 12 0.179 0.384 0.229 0.420
Turkey 0.131 0.338 0.102 0.302
Original EU 15 0.122 0.327 0.100 0.299
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.120 0.325 0.114 0.318
Middle East 0.060 0.237 0.055 0.228
Africa 0.043 0.204 0.029 0.167
Asia 0.023 0.149 0.034 0.180
North America 0.014 0.119 0.012 0.109
South America 0.008 0.088 0.009 0.096
Other 0.006 0.076 0.003 0.052
Observations 1,541 1,818
Note: The table presents sample means of individual characteristics for male and female immigrants in the final
sample. For further details on the definition of each variable, please see Appendix Tables A.1-A.3.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table 2.3: Linear Regression of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Male Female
Dependent Variable N Coeff. N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 1,541 0.0267 1,818 0.0468 *
Full-time employed (0/1) 1,168 0.0352 1075 0.0490
Registered unemployed (0/1) 1,541 -0.0316 1,818 -0.0626 ***
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 1,039 0.0680 * 977 0.1132 ***
ln(gross monthly earnings) 1,048 0.0952 * 987 0.1692 **
Permanent contract (0/1) 1,168 0.0836 ** 1,073 0.0950 ***
White collar job (0/1) 1,168 0.0445 1,075 0.0067
UB2-last year (0/1) 1,541 -0.0313 1,818 -0.0748 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 1,540 -0.4502 * 1,818 -0.8596 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 1,539 0.0756 *** 1,818 0.0735 ***
Language skills (1=low, 5=high)
Average score (1-5) 1,537 0.2609 *** 1,815 0.2335 ***
Speaking (1-5) 1,537 0.2127 *** 1,815 0.2058 ***
Writing (1-5) 1,537 0.3366 *** 1,815 0.2693 ***
Reading (1-5) 1,537 0.2333 *** 1,815 0.2254 ***
Property owner (0/1) 1,541 0.1220 *** 1,818 0.0847 ***
Tenure (number of years) 1,165 0.9119 ** 1,071 0.6547 **
German partner (0/1) 844 -0.0154 948 -0.0098
Note: The table presents the coefficient estimates of the naturalization indicator in regressions of varying
dependent variables. The control variables are age, age squared, two education indicators, years since migration
and its square, indicators of federal state of residence, and region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table 2.4: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. S.E. F-Stat N Coeff. S.E.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 134.9 1,541 0.0566 0.0799 243.4 1,818 0.0595 0.0722
Full-time employed (0/1) 102.6 1,168 0.0336 0.0743 169.9 1,075 0.0223 0.0882
Registered unemployed (0/1) 134.9 1,541 -0.0703 0.0654 243.4 1,818 -0.1212 ** 0.0569
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 117.5 1,039 -0.0521 0.1138 148.6 977 0.1429 0.0951
ln(gross monthly earnings) 119.3 1,048 -0.0204 0.1573 151.2 987 0.2805 * 0.1580
Permanent contract (0/1) 102.6 1,168 0.2350 ** 0.1057 169.9 1,073 0.3024 *** 0.0815
White collar job (0/1) 102.6 1,168 -0.2546 ** 0.1087 169.9 1,075 -0.2457 *** 0.0853
UB2-last year (0/1) 134.9 1,541 -0.0200 0.0574 243.4 1,818 -0.2047 *** 0.0510
UB2-last year (number of months) 134.8 1,540 -0.2972 0.6665 243.4 1,818 -2.2357 *** 0.5849
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 134.6 1,539 0.0755 0.0746 243.4 1,818 -0.1433 ** 0.0619
Language skills (1=low, 5=high)
Average score (1-5) 135.4 1,537 0.2139 0.1314 242.6 1,815 0.0179 0.1144
Speaking (1-5) 135.4 1,537 0.2333 * 0.1236 242.6 1,815 -0.0024 0.1159
Writing (1-5) 135.4 1,537 0.2496 0.1641 242.6 1,815 0.0632 0.1313
Reading (1-5) 135.4 1,537 0.1590 0.1472 242.6 1,815 -0.0070 0.1212
Property owner (0/1) 134.9 1,541 0.1575 ** 0.0738 243.4 1,818 0.1438 ** 0.0609
Tenure (number of years) 101.3 1,165 0.8674 1.1886 171.5 1,071 2.4799 *** 0.8650
German partner (0/1) 66.0 844 0.1544 ** 0.0728 148.2 948 0.0320 0.0572
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instrument ’years since
eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the
coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table 2.5: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility Coded Zero for Those Not Eligible
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 147.4 1,541 0.0299 268.7 1,818 0.0332
Full-time employed (0/1) 114.4 1,168 0.1061 187.8 1,075 0.0768
Registered unemployed (0/1) 147.4 1,541 -0.0557 268.7 1,818 -0.1601 ***
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 124.0 1,039 -0.0387 165.6 977 0.1093
ln(gross monthly earnings) 125.2 1,048 0.0751 171.4 987 0.3454 **
Permanent contract (0/1) 114.4 1,168 0.2175 ** 187.9 1,073 0.3361 ***
White collar job (0/1) 114.4 1,168 -0.2266 ** 187.8 1,075 -0.2306 ***
UB2-last year (0/1) 147.4 1,541 -0.0183 268.7 1,818 -0.2094 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 147.3 1,540 -0.2654 268.7 1,818 -2.3659 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 146.8 1,539 0.0959 268.7 1,818 -0.1164 *
Language skills (1=low, 5=high)
Average score (1-5) 147.9 1,537 0.0917 267.2 1,815 -0.1390
Speaking (1-5) 147.9 1,537 0.1731 267.2 1,815 -0.1278
Writing (1-5) 147.9 1,537 0.0826 267.2 1,815 -0.0785
Reading (1-5) 147.9 1,537 0.0193 267.2 1,815 -0.2105 *
Property owner (0/1) 147.4 1,541 0.1604 ** 268.7 1,818 0.1241 **
Tenure (number of years) 113.1 1,165 0.7617 190.9 1,071 2.7926 ***
German partner (0/1) 71.8 844 0.1045 154.2 948 -0.0161
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instrument ’years since
eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the
coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table 2.6: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility Coded Only for the Eligible
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 116.9 1,325 0.0154 216.1 1,527 0.0291
Full-time employed (0/1) 93.6 1,005 0.0616 153.6 928 0.0900
Registered unemployed (0/1) 116.9 1,325 -0.0525 216.1 1,527 -0.1483 **
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 101.3 892 -0.0578 132.4 837 0.1219
ln(gross monthly earnings) 102.3 900 -0.0208 137.2 846 0.4122 **
Permanent contract (0/1) 93.6 1,005 0.1979 * 153.7 927 0.3462 ***
White collar job (0/1) 93.6 1,005 -0.2748 ** 153.6 928 -0.2633 ***
UB2-last year (0/1) 116.9 1,325 -0.0295 216.1 1,527 -0.2130 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 116.9 1,324 -0.4210 216.1 1,527 -2.3253 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 116.3 1,323 0.0650 216.1 1,527 -0.1062 *
Language skills (1=low, 5=high)
Average score (1-5) 117.2 1,322 0.1092 215.0 1,525 -0.0470
Speaking (1-5) 117.2 1,322 0.1936 215.0 1,525 -0.0669
Writing (1-5) 117.2 1,322 0.0722 215.0 1,525 0.0154
Reading (1-5) 117.2 1,322 0.0618 215.0 1,525 -0.0893
Property owner (0/1) 116.9 1,325 0.1472 * 216.1 1,527 0.1275 *
Tenure (number of years) 92.7 1,002 0.6657 155.5 926 2.9218 ***
German partner (0/1) 63.9 755 0.1128 131.1 835 0.0192
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instrument ’years since
eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the
coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table 2.7: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility - Omitting EU 15 Immigrants
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 122.9 1,353 0.0407 222.7 1,637 0.0928
Full-time employed (0/1) 90.9 1,018 0.0248 149.5 946 0.0440
Registered unemployed (0/1) 122.9 1,353 -0.0556 222.7 1,637 -0.1248 **
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 97.2 908 -0.1421 131.3 860 0.1573 *
ln(gross monthly earnings) 99.3 915 -0.0707 132.7 867 0.2698 *
Permanent contract (0/1) 90.9 1,018 0.2339 ** 149.5 945 0.2795 ***
White collar job (0/1) 90.9 1,018 -0.3016 *** 149.5 946 -0.2938 ***
UB2-last year (0/1) 122.9 1,353 -0.0102 222.7 1,637 -0.2095 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 122.8 1,352 -0.1884 222.7 1,637 -2.2643 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 122.6 1,352 0.0495 222.7 1,637 -0.1228 **
Language skills (1=low, 5=high)
Average score (1-5) 123.6 1,349 0.1112 222.1 1,634 0.0194
Speaking (1-5) 123.6 1,349 0.1352 222.1 1,634 -0.0090
Writing (1-5) 123.6 1,349 0.1545 222.1 1,634 0.0702
Reading (1-5) 123.6 1,349 0.0439 222.1 1,634 -0.0029
Property owner (0/1) 122.9 1,353 0.1437 * 222.7 1,637 0.1617 ***
Tenure (number of years) 90.6 1,016 1.3911 149.2 943 1.9496 **
German partner (0/1) 65.9 723 0.0729 132.2 846 -0.0058
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instrument ’years since
eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the
coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table 2.8: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility - Omitting Ethnic German Immigrants
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 28.2 1,186 0.0682 65.7 1,447 0.1414
Full-time employed (0/1) 15.4 893 0.2461 53.6 838 0.0227
Registered unemployed (0/1) 28.2 1,186 -0.0227 65.7 1,447 -0.2361 **
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 24.2 794 0.0303 48.5 758 0.1705
ln(gross monthly earnings) 25.1 800 0.0051 49.1 765 -0.1846
Permanent contract (0/1) 15.4 893 0.4936 * 53.6 836 0.3823 **
White collar job (0/1) 15.4 893 -0.4972 53.6 838 -0.2953 *
UB2-last year (0/1) 28.2 1,186 -0.0018 65.7 1,447 -0.2965 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 28.2 1,185 -0.3124 65.7 1,447 -3.2785 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 28.1 1,184 0.0244 65.7 1,447 -0.2773 **
Language skills (1=low, 5=high)
Average score (1-5) 28.7 1,183 0.0918 66.0 1,444 0.1486
Speaking (1-5) 28.7 1,183 0.0636 66.0 1,444 0.2692
Writing (1-5) 28.7 1,183 0.0761 66.0 1,444 0.0118
Reading (1-5) 28.7 1,183 0.1356 66.0 1,444 0.1647
Property owner (0/1) 28.2 1,186 0.1842 65.7 1,447 0.3538 ***
Tenure (number of years) 15.2 890 1.2204 56.0 835 3.2534 **
German partner (0/1) 17.4 672 0.4964 ** 64.1 779 0.4596 ***
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instrument ’years since
eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the
coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table 2.9: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility - Omitting Individuals Who Benefited from Fam-
ily Rules in Becoming Eligible for Naturalization
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 147.5 1,361 0.0272 212.5 1,578 0.0390
Full-time employed (0/1) 128.5 1,029 -0.0255 137.9 922 0.0244
Registered unemployed (0/1) 147.5 1,361 -0.0233 212.5 1,578 -0.1028 *
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 108.9 917 -0.0711 117.2 836 0.1484
ln(gross monthly earnings) 110.5 925 -0.0279 119.3 846 0.3645 **
Permanent contract (0/1) 128.5 1,029 0.1978 * 138.0 920 0.3024 ***
White collar job (0/1) 128.5 1,029 -0.2245 ** 137.9 922 -0.2266 **
UB2-last year (0/1) 147.5 1,361 0.0245 212.5 1,578 -0.1572 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 147.4 1,360 0.2161 212.5 1,578 -1.7310 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 147.3 1,359 0.0871 212.5 1,578 -0.0798
Language:
Average score (1-5) 148.9 1,357 0.1980 211.1 1,576 0.0257
Speaking (1-5) 148.9 1,357 0.2333 * 211.1 1,576 -0.0203
Writing (1-5) 148.9 1,357 0.2528 211.1 1,576 0.0996
Reading (1-5) 148.9 1,357 0.1078 211.1 1,576 -0.0023
Property owner (0/1) 147.5 1,361 0.0736 212.5 1,578 0.0736
Tenure (number of years) 127.3 1,027 -0.0936 137.7 919 2.3602 **
German partner (0/1) 74.2 750 -0.0440 120.6 855 -0.1509 ***
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instrument ’years since
eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the
coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
47
Table 2.10: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility - Omitting Individuals Who Arrived in Germany
After 2008
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 103.8 1,383 0.0611 209.4 1,623 0.0634
Full-time employed (0/1) 85.2 1,050 0.0667 154.6 981 0.0455
Registered unemployed (0/1) 103.8 1,383 -0.0645 209.4 1,623 -0.1587 ***
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 96.4 931 -0.0407 133.2 889 0.1275
ln(gross monthly earnings) 98.3 939 0.0047 137.1 898 0.3441 **
Permanent contract (0/1) 85.2 1,050 0.2977 *** 154.6 979 0.3048 ***
White collar job (0/1) 85.2 1,050 -0.1049 154.6 981 0.0562
UB2-last year (0/1) 103.8 1,383 -0.0375 209.4 1,623 -0.2203 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 103.8 1,382 -0.4759 209.4 1,623 -2.3817 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 103.8 1,381 0.0816 209.4 1,623 -0.1267 *
Language:
Average score (1-5) 104.2 1,379 0.2781 ** 208.7 1,621 0.0281
Speaking (1-5) 104.2 1,379 0.2975 ** 208.7 1,621 0.0355
Writing (1-5) 104.2 1,379 0.3066 * 208.7 1,621 0.0889
Reading (1-5) 104.2 1,379 0.2302 208.7 1,621 -0.0401
Property owner (0/1) 103.8 1,383 0.1426 * 209.4 1,623 0.1460 **
Tenure (number of years) 84.2 1,047 0.7018 156.3 978 2.6594 ***
German partner (0/1) 54.5 787 0.1820 ** 125.9 890 0.0410
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instrument ’years since
eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the
coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table 2.11: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility - Omitting Individuals Who Arrived in Germany
After 2003
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 77.1 1,084 0.0460 148.2 1,217 0.0585
Full-time employed (0/1) 63.3 833 0.0530 105.8 747 0.0651
Registered unemployed (0/1) 77.1 1,084 -0.0403 148.2 1,217 -0.1129 *
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 84.0 739 -0.0610 89.6 675 0.1643
ln(gross monthly earnings) 86.3 747 -0.0427 91.0 682 0.4199 **
Permanent contract (0/1) 63.3 833 0.2780 ** 105.7 746 0.3794 ***
White collar job (0/1) 63.3 833 -0.2309 * 105.8 747 -0.2481 **
UB2-last year (0/1) 77.1 1,084 -0.0223 148.2 1,217 -0.2165 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 77.0 1,083 -0.1746 148.2 1,217 -2.3246 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 77.1 1,083 0.1069 148.2 1,217 -0.0258
Language:
Average score (1-5) 77.1 1,084 0.1659 147.0 1,216 0.1393
Speaking (1-5) 77.1 1,084 0.1964 147.0 1,216 0.1358
Writing (1-5) 77.1 1,084 0.1899 147.0 1,216 0.1874
Reading (1-5) 77.1 1,084 0.1115 147.0 1,216 0.0946
Property owner (0/1) 77.1 1,084 0.1309 148.2 1,217 0.1479 *
Tenure (number of years) 62.9 830 0.7325 107.5 745 3.9500 ***
German-born partner (0/1) 46.9 645 0.1319 83.2 705 -0.0357
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instrument ’years since
eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the
coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Appendix
Table A.1: Variables Used in Analysis - Variables of Central Interest
Variable Definition
Variables of central interest
Naturalization (0/1) Takes the value one if an individual is naturalized at the date of survey,
in 2013
Years spent in Germany (YSM) Computed from monthly spell data on migration biographies, adding up
all periods of residence in Germany up to the date of survey, in 2013.
Interruptions in residence for up to 6 months count towards the resi-
dency requirement for citizenship. Interruptions in residence for more
than 6 months do not count towards the total years spent in Germany.
Any period of prior residence in Germany is capped at five years after
an individual left the country for more than 6 months.
Year of first eligibility The year in which an individual becomes eligible for German citizen-
ship for the first time. It is based on our own computations of the in-
dividual years of residency in Germany (Years spent in Germany). We
take into account changes in the German law with respect to residency
requirements for citizenship and exceptions in these requirements for
ethnic Germans, refugees, spouses of German (naturalizing) citizens
and children of naturalizing parents.
Years since eligibility Measured by counting the number of years since the year of becoming
eligible for German citizenship for the first time up to the survey date
in 2013.
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Table A.2: Variables Used in Analysis - Other Control Variables
Variable Definition
Other control variables
Education Based on the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED) we distinguish between low-skilled (pre-primary, primary and
lower secondary education, ISCED levels 0-2), medium-skilled (upper
secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education, ISCED levels 3-
4) and high-skilled immigrants (first and second stages of tertiary edu-
cation, ISCED levels 5-6). The few cases (N=77) with missing informa-
tion are added to the reference group of low-skilled workers. Without
these additional cases, the share of low-skilled males and females is
slightly lower at 0.319 and 0.316, respectively.
Region of origin We distinguish between immigrants from the original EU-15 member
states, immigrants from the so-called new EU-12 countries that became
part of the European Union later (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Poland, Malta, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Cyprus, Bulgaria,
Romania), immigrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavia (except Slove-
nia), the former Soviet Union (except the Baltic States), immigrants
from other regions of origin (Asia, Africa, the Middle East, North and
South America), and immigrants without citizenship (other).
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Table A.3: Variables Used in Analysis - Dependent Variables
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
Employed (0/1) Takes the value one for all individuals who are in employment, whether
they are employed full-time, part-time, marginally, or in an apprentice-
ship
Full-time employed (0/1) An indicator coded only for individuals in employment (employed = 1)
that takes the value one for individuals who are employed full-time.
Registered unemployed (0/1) Takes the value one for all individuals who are registered as unemployed
with the Federal Employment Agency.
Gross monthly earnings Self-reported individual earnings from work in the last month before
the date of the survey. These are gross earnings, i.e., before deduction
of taxes and social security.
Gross hourly wages Computed from gross monthly earnings and working hours per week
as stipulated in the individual’s contract. We impute missing values in
contracted working hours per week with reported actual working hours
per week.
White-collar job (0/1) An indicator for individuals in employment (employed = 1) that
takes the value one for individuals who are industry or factory fore-
men/forewomen, salaried employees engaged in unskilled, skilled, or
highly skilled activities, salaried employees with extensive managerial
duties, civil servants, or trainees in trade or commerce.
UB2-last year (0/1) An indicator that takes the value one if an individual/household received
the means-tested unemployment benefit II at any time in the calendar
year prior to the survey, i.e. in 2012.
UB2-last year (number of months) The number of months in 2012 during which an individual/household
received the means-tested unemployment benefit II.
Education in Germany (0/1) An indicator for being in education or having completed education (at-
tending a school or institution of higher education, completing an ap-
prenticeship or vocational training, or participating in further education
or training) in Germany at the date of the survey in 2013.
German language proficiency Measures of self-reported assessments of speaking, writing and reading
abilities on a five-point scale (1=not at all, 2=badly, 3=okay, 4=well,
5=very well) as of the date of the survey in 2013. The "average score"
outcome is a measure of overall German language skills and is com-
puted for every individual as the mean of the scores in speaking, writing,
and reading.
Property owner (0/1) An indicator that takes the value one if an individual is the owner of
their place of residence in Germany.
Tenure (number of years) Defined for individuals in employment (employed = 1) and repre-
sents the duration of current employment measured in years. For self-
employed individuals it is the duration of self-employed work.
German partner (0/1) An indicator that is coded for those individuals who did not have a part-
ner at the time of immigration. The indicators takes the value one if an
individual found a native (German-born and German citizenship) part-
ner after immigration. It takes on the value zero if the person either re-
mained single or found a non-native (not German-born or not German
citizenship) partner.
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Table A.4: Linear Regression of The Naturalization Outcome (First Stage)
Male Female
Coeff. Coeff.
Years since eligibility 0.0409 *** 0.0475 ***
Age -0.0257 *** -0.0354 ***
Age squared 0.0003 *** 0.0004 ***
Years in Germany -0.0038 -0.0145 **
Years in Germany squared -0.0003 *** -0.0001
High-skilled 0.1148 *** 0.0759 ***
Medium-skilled 0.0539 ** 0.0915 ***
R2 0.416 0.392
Observations 1,541 1,818
Note: All estimations include a constant, 15 state indicators and 10 indicators for region of origin. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.5: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Years Since Eligibility, as well as the Quadratic and Cubic of Years Since
Eligibility
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 50.3 1,541 0.0530 92.4 1,818 0.0353
Full-time employed (0/1) 35.3 1,168 0.0748 66.0 1,075 0.0568
Registered unemployed (0/1) 50.3 1,541 -0.0652 92.4 1,818 -0.1352 **
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 42.6 1,039 -0.0051 58.4 977 0.1293
ln(gross monthly earnings) 42.9 1,048 0.0548 59.8 987 0.2492
Permanent contract (0/1) 35.3 1,168 0.2629 *** 66.0 1,073 0.3043 ***
White collar job (0/1) 35.3 1,168 -0.2172 ** 66.0 1,075 -0.2313 ***
UB2-last year (0/1) 50.3 1,541 -0.0166 92.4 1,818 -0.2143 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 50.3 1,540 -0.2364 92.4 1,818 -2.3660 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 50.2 1,539 0.0858 92.4 1,818 -0.1280 **
Language skills (1=low, 5=high)
Average score (1-5) 50.6 1,537 0.1475 92.1 1,815 -0.0189
Speaking (1-5) 50.6 1,537 0.2102 * 92.1 1,815 -0.0300
Writing (1-5) 50.6 1,537 0.1648 92.1 1,815 0.0254
Reading (1-5) 50.6 1,537 0.0676 92.1 1,815 -0.0520
Property owner (0/1) 50.3 1,541 0.1887 *** 92.4 1,818 0.1491 **
Tenure (number of years) 34.9 1,165 1.5694 66.9 1,071 2.5733 ***
German partner (0/1) 23.8 844 0.1501 ** 64.2 948 0.0332
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization with the instruments ’years
since eligibility’ as well as the quadratic and cubic of ’years since eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number
of observations as presented in the column labelled N, and the coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in
the second stage regression. Note that 8 years are added to the values of the instrument ’years since eligibility’ to
account for negative values before the quadratic and cubic terms are computed. The control variables are age, age
squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators federal state of residence, and
region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.6: IV Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes on Naturalization (0/1)
Instrumented by Categories of Years Since Eligibility
Male Female
Dependent Variable F-Stat N Coeff. F-Stat N Coeff.
A. Labor Market Access
Employed (0/1) 34.9 1,541 0.0432 56.7 1,818 0.0180
Full-time employed (0/1) 22.5 1,168 0.1206 35.6 1,075 0.0600
Registered unemployed (0/1) 34.9 1,541 -0.0457 56.7 1,818 -0.1336 **
B. Labor Market Success
ln(gross hourly wage) 21.6 1,039 -0.0589 30.6 977 0.0319
ln(gross monthly earnings) 21.7 1,048 0.0373 31.7 987 0.1040
Permanent contract (0/1) 22.5 1,168 0.2251 ** 35.6 1,073 0.3123 ***
White collar job (0/1) 22.5 1,168 -0.1737 35.6 1,075 -0.2568 ***
UB2-last year (0/1) 34.9 1,541 -0.0591 56.7 1,818 -0.1694 ***
UB2-last year (number of months) 34.8 1,540 -0.7432 56.7 1,818 -1.8862 ***
C. Investment
Education in Germany (0/1) 34.8 1,539 0.1215 56.7 1,818 -0.1223 *
Language skills (1=low, 5=high)
Average score (1-5) 35.4 1,537 -0.0060 56.5 1,815 -0.2643 **
Speaking (1-5) 35.4 1,537 0.1231 56.5 1,815 -0.1939
Writing (1-5) 35.4 1,537 -0.0337 56.5 1,815 -0.2653 *
Reading (1-5) 35.4 1,537 -0.1074 56.5 1,815 -0.3337 **
Property owner (0/1) 34.9 1,541 0.0944 56.7 1,818 0.0918
Tenure (number of years) 22.4 1,165 1.2176 35.7 1,071 2.3341 ***
German partner (0/1) 21.9 844 0.1391 ** 34.0 948 -0.0256
Note: The table presents the F-statistic of the first stage regression (naturalization instrumented by indicators
representing categories of ’years since eligibility’), estimated for the relevant number of observations as presented
in the column labelled N, and the coefficient estimate of the naturalization effect in the second stage regression.
Values of the instrument ’years since eligibility’ are categorized into following intervals: [-8, 0], [1, 5], [6, 10],
[11, 18], [19, 53]. The indicator for the [-8, 0] interval is the reference category in the first stage regression. The
control variables are age, age squared, two education indicators, years since migration and its square, indicators
federal state of residence, and region or country of origin. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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3 Integration Through Participation: The Effect of Non-Citizen
Voting Rights
Abstract
I study the causal effects of non-citizen voting rights in municipal elections on the integration
of EU immigrants in Germany. To identify a causal effect of voting rights, I exploit a reform
granting municipal voting rights to EU citizens residing in another EU member state. The pro-
visions of this reform were implemented into municipal election laws of individual German
federal states by the end of 1995. I treat the reform as a source of exogenous variation in voting
eligibility in a difference-in-differences estimation framework. Using a large and representative
longitudinal survey dataset, I find no significant effects of extending municipal voting rights to
EU immigrants residing in Germany on their German language skills, intentions to permanently
stay in Germany, or subjective well-being. Evidence from contemporary representative surveys
suggests that EU citizens had low knowledge of their new voting rights immediately after their
acquisition, potentially explaining the insignificant results. The results are robust across differ-
ent immigrant subgroups.
JEL classification: J15, J61, K16
Keywords: migration, voting rights, immigrant integration, difference-in-differences
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3.1 Introduction
Evaluating the impact of institutions and public policies on the integration of immigrants in
host countries is of particular interest due to the benefits of successful integration on social
cohesion, the fiscal state and on immigrants themselves. Notably, immigrants comprise a sub-
stantial share of the population across member states of the European Union (EU). Figures 3.1
and 3.2 report the total non-citizen population and the share of non-citizens for individual EU
countries in 2017. The total number of individuals residing in the EU without the citizenship
of the host country exceeds a total of 38 million, which represents roughly 7.5 percent of the
EU’s total population. The biggest host among EU states is Germany with more than 9 million
individuals residing in Germany without a German citizenship, amounting to 11 percent of its
total population. Turning to within-EU migration of EU citizens, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present a
significant number of EU citizens living in a different member state of the EU in 2017. Germany
hosts the biggest stock of EU citizens with a total number of almost 4 Million, i.e., 5 percent of
Germany’s population.
Despite the large numbers of non-citizen immigrants living in individual EU states, includ-
ing Germany, a significant portion is excluded from participation in the democratic process.
The notable exception are EU citizens, who are eligible to participate in municipal elections of
the EU member state of their residence even without a citizenship of that country. EU citizens
gained these municipal voting rights through the EU Council Directive 94/80/EC from Decem-
ber 9th, 1994, which obliged individual EU member states to implement its provisions into
national law before January 1st, 1996. Several EU countries go beyond that and grant munic-
ipal voting rights to non-EU immigrants as well.26 In particular, Scandinavian countries, such
as Sweden and Denmark27, extended municipal voting rights to all immigrants in the 1970s
and 1980s, i.e., around two decades before the establishment of EU citizen voting rights in
municipal elections.
The applicability of voting rights in Germany, however, is strictly attached to German citi-
zenship, and only in the case of municipal elections extended to immigrants with a citizenship of
26 This group of countries includes Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland,
Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia.
27 Immigrants in Sweden and Denmark are eligible to vote in local elections after 3 years of residency.
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a EU member state. This leads to cases, in which long-term or even permanent residents without
EU citizenship are not eligible to influence German public policy through election participation.
Despite this status quo, available representative surveys among the German population suggest
an openness to immigrant enfranchisement in Germany. In a survey from 2008, 34 percent of
respondents expressed that all immigrant groups should have the right to vote in German mu-
nicipal elections (see Figure 3.5). This share increased to 59 percent in a subsequent poll from
2015 (Figure 3.6). Interestingly, 59 percent of respondents also agreed that municipal voting
rights are a capable instrument for promoting the integration of non-EU immigrants (Figure
3.7).
At the same time, the political enfranchisement channel lies outside the main focus of eco-
nomic studies on migration and immigrant integration. A small strand of the literature evaluates
the effects of naturalization on immigrant outcomes (for German studies, see Steinhardt, 2012;
Gathmann and Keller, 2018; Riphahn and Saif, 2018), which also includes the acquisition of
political rights beyond the municipal level. However, these studies do not discuss or isolate the
enfranchisement channel of citizenship from other beneficial channels of naturalization, as they
almost entirely focus on labor market effects of naturalization.
Democratic inclusion and political participation have been studied for decades by modern
political science and political economy as an institution that fosters the integration of individuals
into a society and promotes a sense of belonging. These beneficial effects can be generated
through political participation in itself, as participatory political institutions foster cooperation
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013) and civic virtue (Frey, 1997). Alternatively, individuals can
directly improve their relative situation and well-being (Brubaker, 1990; Hayduk, 2006) through
participation in the political process by aligning public policies to their interests and achieving
representation of their preferences (Dahl, 1971; Walzer, 2008; Vernby, 2013).
Furthermore, the social and political integration of immigrants has a positive impact on their
adjustment to host-country labor markets. Intentions to remain in the host country are proven
to impact investments of immigrants in host-country specific human capital, such as language
skills, training and educational or occupational certificates (Dustmann et al., 2010). In particular
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the host-country language is an important skill for the economic and social integration of im-
migrants (Chiswick, 1991; Bleakley and Chin, 2010). Thus, the enfranchisement of immigrants
is a potential policy instrument fostering immigrant integration with far-reaching benefits.
I estimate the causal effect of an extension of municipal voting rights to EU immigrants
residing in Germany, which was adopted into election legislation by German federal states at
the end of 1995.28 I consider five outcomes of immigrant integration. The five outcomes include
subjective well-being, intentions to remain in Germany permanently, identifying as a German
and German language skills in speaking and writing. To identify a causal effect, I exploit the
reforms of election laws adopted by most German federal states as a source of exogenous varia-
tion in municipal voting rights across time and immigrant groups. I treat the reform as a natural
experiment. A clearly-defined treatment group of immigrants acquiring voting rights allows me
to adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation framework. This approach builds on com-
paring immigrants with and without municipal voting rights before and after acquiring the right
to participate in municipal elections. Under the premise that the acquisition of political rights
in the host country fosters immigrant integration and reinforces their position and sense of be-
longing in the host country, the theoretical prediction is a positive effect of voting rights on the
four investigated outcomes.
My analysis expands on a scarce empirical literature on the causal effects of non-citizen vot-
ing rights acquisition. To the best of my knowledge, there are no existing studies investigating
the effects of immigrant voting rights acquisition in Germany. Turning to international studies,
two recent studies analyze the effects on individual immigrants outcomes. Gorinas et al. (2017)
study the effect of first time voting eligibility in Danish municipal elections on the number
of legal offenses committed by immigrants. They exploit a reform of Danish election laws in
1981, which introduced non-citizen voting rights in municipal elections to all immigrants after
3 years of residency. Applying a regression discontinuity design to register data from Statistics
Denmark, they find a reduction in convictions of non-Western male immigrants by around 60
percent.
28 The exception was the federal state of Bremen, which adopted the necessary provisions in October 1996.
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The second existing study by Engdahl et al. (2018) estimates the impact of non-citizens
enfranchisement on immigrant naturalization and election participation in Sweden. Foreign cit-
izens residing in Sweden have had the right to participate in municipal elections since 1971.
However, Engdahl et al. (2018) do not directly analyze the effects of this introduction of non-
citizen voting rights. Their identification strategy exploits a reform in 1998 extending the length
of Swedish election cycles from three to four years. Since non-citizen voting rights in Swedish
municipal elections are conditional on a minimum residency requirement of 3 years, this reform
creates a variation across immigrant cohorts in the duration until immigrants become eligible to
vote after arrival. Engdahl et al. (2018) conduct their analysis with population register data from
Statistics Sweden. Applying a difference-in-discontinuities design (see Grembi et al., 2016) they
find that immigrants facing a shorter waiting period between arrival and voting eligibility are
not more likely to naturalize or vote in subsequent elections.
A different strand of existing research on political enfranchisement, albeit mostly descrip-
tive, estimates the effects of immigrant voting rights on public policy. Public policy changes
are a potential channel between immigrant suffrage and immigrant integration identified by
previous theoretical work (Dahl, 1971; Hayduk, 2006; Walzer, 2008). Some of the rare causal
evidence is provided by Vernby (2013). Making use of a reform in Sweden in 1975, which
granted voting rights in municipal elections to foreign citizens with 3 years of residency, Vernby
(2013) estimates the effect of enfranchising non-citizens on public policy spending. Employ-
ing a difference-in-differences approach to data from Statistics Sweden, he finds an increase in
public policy spending on educational, social and family services as a result of the reform.
This study contributes to the scarce existing literature in five ways. First, to my best knowl-
edge, I conduct the first causal evaluation of the EU-wide reform granting EU citizens voting
rights at municipal level in a different EU country of their residence. Second, this is the first
study analyzing the effects of non-citizen voting rights acquisition in Germany and its potential
contribution to immigrant integration in Germany. Germany is a particularly interesting country
to study due to its high population of immigrants. Third, I study the integration of an inter-
esting immigrant group consisting of intra-EU immigrants. Intra-EU migration is an increasing
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phenomenon and freedom of migration within the EU a much debated topic (Wachter and Fleis-
chmann, 2018). Fourth, I use a representative longitudinal dataset, with detailed biographical
information on individual migration history, citizenship and residency, which allows a precise
construction of the treatment and control group of immigrants. Fifth, I consider a set of immi-
grant outcomes not analyzed in previous studies. The analyzed outcomes include measures of
individual well-being and identifying as a German. In addition, I analyze outcomes closely re-
lated to the labor market integration of immigrants, such as the intention to remain permanently
in the host country and host-country language skills.
In the next section, I summarize the institutional background of election laws in Germany
and its amendments with respect to voting rights for non-citizens. Section 3.4 explains the iden-
tification strategy and Section 3.3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 3.5 presents
the empirical results. In Section 3.6, I conduct additional robustness tests and investigate hetero-
geneous effects across immigrant subgroups by gender, education levels and cohorts. I conclude
in Section 3.7.
3.2 Institutional Background
The path to voting rights for citizens of one European Union (EU) member state in municipal
elections of a different EU member state of residence started with the signature of the Maas-
tricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty, officially the Treaty on European Union, was signed on
February 7th, 1992 and entered into force on November 1st, 1993. It was a founding document
which established the European Union and later led to the creation of the European Monetary
Union and its currency, the Euro. The treaty is widely known for its designation of economic
convergence criteria, the Maastricht Criteria. These criteria include a set of fiscal, inflation and
exchange rate targets for EU member states to enter the single currency area and adopt the
Euro. In addition, the Maastricht Treaty introduced for the first time the concept of a European
citizenship. The European citizenship is associated with a bundle of economic, civic and polit-
ical rights, including the right to vote and stand for election in municipal elections in the EU
member state of residence, regardless of being a national of that country.
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The EU-wide voting rights in municipal election were further specified and codified by
the EU Council Directive 94/80/EC issued on December 9th, 1994. This directive layed down
detailed arrangements for the exercise of municipal voting rights by EU citizens at their EU
country of residence. The directive obliged EU member states to implement its provisions into
national election laws before January 1st, 1996. However, national governments of EU member
states retain to this day the option to enforce a couple of restrictions to the voting rights of other
EU nationals. First, they may restrict electable leading positions of municipal governments,
such as mayors and heads of municipal authorities, to their own nationals. Second, they may
require a minimum residency duration requirement for EU citizen participation in municipal
elections if more than 20 percent of the voting population are non-nationals.
Since municipal elections in Germany are subject to the authority of the individual federal
states, the provisions of EU Council Directive 94/80/EC were implemented into election laws
by the respective German federal states. Most federal states amended their election laws by the
end of 1995. The only exception was the federal state of Bremen, which adopted the necessary
provisions in October 1996. All German federal states enforce two formal requirements for
voting eligibility. First, a primary residency requirement in the respective constituency for at
least 3 months before an election. Second, a minimum age requirement of either 16 or 18 years,
which varies among German federal states.29 Both formal requirements apply the same to EU
immigrants and German citizens. The only exceptions are the states of Bavaria and Saxony,
which made use of the option to restrict electable positions of mayors and heads of municipal
authorities to German citizens and thus prohibit non-German EU citizens from running for these
positions in municipal elections.
3.3 Data
I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provided by the Deutsches Institut
für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) in Berlin. The SOEP is a large and representative longitudinal
29 Nowadays, individuals from the age of 16 are entitled to vote in municipal elections in a majority of German
federal states- This group of federal states includes Baden-Wurttemberg, Brandenburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Lowe Saxony, Northrhein-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia. The
right to stand for election is subject to an age restriction of 18 years in all federal states.
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survey of households and individuals residing in Germany.30 The following analysis is based on
the SOEP version 33 covering the years 1984-2016.
For the purpose of the baseline analysis, I first restrict the sample to the 1994-1997 period.
This period includes two observation years prior to the reform of municipal election laws in
late 1995, and two years after. For this observation period, there are on average around 13,000
individuals per year in the SOEP data with roughly 17 percent of these individuals without a
German citizenship.
The possession of a German citizenship is fundamentally accompanied with a bundle of
civic and political rights, including voting rights. Naturalized immigrants and dual-citizenship
holders with a German citizenship are therefore already eligible to vote in municipal elections
prior to the reform, regardless of their immigrant background. Thus, immigrants with a German
citizenship clearly do not belong into the treatment group of individuals. Likewise, naturalized
immigrants are not suitable for the control group, as they might fundamentally differ in time-
varying unobservable characteristics from non-naturalized immigrants in the treatment group.
As a result, I exclude individuals with a German citizenship from my sample.
Similarly, I further restrict the sample to immigrants born outside of Germany, i.e., first-
generation immigrants. Since I am interested in the effects of the reform on labor market related
integration outcomes, I only include individuals of age between 18 and 65. In addition, age
restrictions on voting eligibility in municipal elections prohibited individuals below the age
of 18 from political participation at the time of the reform.31 Lastly, the final sample includes
only federal states from West Germany including Berlin to prevent potential contamination by
a previous treatment, since foreign residents were allowed to participate in the 1989 and 1990
municipal elections in the communist German Democratic Republic.
Since Turkey is not a member state of the EU, Turkish immigrants residing in Germany
were not affected by the reform granting voting rights to EU citizens. In addition, immigrants
of Turkish nationality represent the largest group of foreigners in Germany and amount to 6
percent of yearly individual observations in the data of the SOEP around the time of the reform.
30 For more details on the dataset, see the available documentation (Kroh et al., 2015).
31 As described in Section 3.2, a majority of federal states have lowered the minimum age requirement to 16 ever
since.
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As a consequence, Turkish immigrant make up the control group in my difference-in-differences
analysis.
On the other hand, the choice of the treatment group is more straightforward. The treatment
group should include individuals who are granted municipal voting rights as a result of the
evaluated reform. All resident non-German citizens of an EU member state are in principle
suitable candidates. Ultimately, the treatment group in my analysis includes Greek and Italian
immigrants, two sizable nationality groups among foreigners living in Germany. Both Greece
and Italy were member states of the EU prior to the 1995 reform in question. In addition, Turkish
immigrants represent a suitable control group to Greeks and Italians due to their shared history
as guest workers and several existing studies use these nationalities as comparison groups. This
is vital due to the identifying assumption of parallel trends in integration outcomes between
treatment and control group.
After constructing the treatment and control groups and creating a balanced panel of indi-
viduals over the 1994-1997 period, there are 447 individuals assigned to the treatment group
and 515 individuals in the control group. The outcome variables include subjective well-being
measured on an 11 point scale, an indicator for the intention to remain in Germany permanently,
an indicator for completely or mostly identifying as a German and two separate indicators for
very good or good German language skills in speaking and writing. The last three outcomes are
constructed out of original variables measured on a five point scale very bad to very good. Infor-
mation on language skills and identifying as a German is available only once every two years.
Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables are reported in Table 3.1. The table presents
mean outcomes for treatment and control group at the pre-treatment year of 1995. The con-
trol and treatment groups do not differ substantially in German writing skills, the intention to
permanently remain in Germany and identifying themselves as Germans. However, Greek and
Italian immigrants report a significantly higher level of well-being and German speaking skills
than Turkish immigrants in the control group.
The observable individual characteristics in my analysis include indicators for females, be-
ing married, the presence of children under the age of 16 in the household, indicators for high,
medium and low education. In addition, I consider the log of real household income, age and
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years since migration and their quadratic. Sample means of individual characteristics for the
treatment and control group are reported in Table 3.2. There are no visible mean-differences
across the groups in gender, education level and marriage. Turkish immigrants are on average
more likely to have children under the age of 16 in the household. In contrast, Greeks and Ital-
ians are on average 5 years older and have migrated to Germany 5.5 years earlier. They also
report a higher level of household income by around 8 percent.
3.4 Empirical Method
To estimate the causal effects of voting rights acquisition on immigrant integration outcomes,
I employ a difference-in-differences estimation approach in which I compare the treatment
and control groups before and after the treatment occurs. I estimate the following model on
yearly individual-level data for the 1994-1997 period, i.e., with two pre-treatment and two post-
treatment years:
Yit = α + βPostt + γTreati + δ(Postt × Treati) + ηXit + it. (3)
The outcome variable Yit takes on four different measures of immigrant integration for im-
migrant i in year t. These measures include indicators for very good or good German language
skills and completely or mostly identifying as a German, an indicator for the intention to remain
in Germany permanently and, finally, subjective well-being measured on an 11 point scale. The
outcomes are regressed on a constant α and other explanatory variables. Postt is an indica-
tor variable for the post-treatment period, which takes on the value one after the extension of
municipal voting rights to non-German residents with EU citizenship, i.e., from the year 1996
onward. Treati is an indicator for the treatment group of immigrants, who acquired voting
rights in municipal elections after the reform. This indicator takes on the value one for residents
in Germany with Greek and Italian citizenship and the value zero for Turkish immigrants. The
interaction term between the post-treatment period indicator and the treatment group indicator,
Postt × Treati, is the variable of interest in a difference-in-differences framework capturing
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the treatment effect. Xit represents observable characteristics of immigrants and includes in-
dicators for females, marital status, children under the age of 16 in the household, education
and federal state of residence, as well as the log of real household income, age and years since
migration and their quadratic. Consequently, the parameter β quantifies common time effects
for treatment and control group and γ measures level-differences in the five outcomes between
treatment and control group. The difference-in-differences parameter δ represents the treatment
effect of interest. it is an idiosyncratic error term clustered at the household level to account for
potential correlation of correlated errors of individual error terms within a household over time.
Unaccounted correlation in error terms can overstate estimator precision (Cameron and Miller,
2015). The difference-in-differences model is estimated with ordinary least squares.
A causal interpretation of the difference-in-differences parameter measuring the treatment
effect requires a set of identifying assumptions to apply (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). First,
the common trends assumption needs to hold. This assumption requires the same trend in mean
outcomes (e.g., subjective well-being or language-skills) in the absence of the treatment for both
establishment groups (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The development of all five outcomes over
the years surrounding the reform is depicted in Figure 3.8. The red line represents the treated
group of Greek and Italian immigrants and the blue line shows the trend for Turkish immigrants
in the control group. The five integration outcomes in both immigrant groups move roughly in
parallel until the introduction of municipal voting rights to EU citizens in 1996. Overall, the
figure seems to lend support to the common trend assumption.
The second assumption to apply is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA).
This assumption rules out any spillover effects from the treatment to the control group of immi-
grants based on their group status. Another required condition is the exogeneity of the treatment,
which prohibits any anticipation effects. In particular, immigrants anticipating the change in vot-
ing rights could self-select into treatment by changing their group status beforehand. While it
is true that the reform took time to implement, and there was a considerable time lag between
the EU Council Directive 94/80/EC and the implementation of its provisions by German fed-
eral states, the change of group status based on Turkish immigrants acquiring Greek or Italian
citizenship seems unrealistic. In addition, I essentially rule out any citizenship changes within
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the estimation sample since 1994, i.e., two years prior to the reform. Fourth, it is necessary to
rule out any confounding factors happening simultaneously with the reform of interest. German
citizenship laws were subject to a reform in 1991, 5 years prior to the extension of municipal
voting rights to EU immigrants. This might have, in principle, changed the composition of the
sample at hand, since I exclude naturalized immigrants. The potential caveats of the sample are
discussed further in Section 3.6. Another candidate for a confounding factor are the Yugoslav
wars, which broke out in 1991 and the resulting influx of war refugees from ex-Yugoslavia to
Germany. The early 1990s also witnessed the return of ethnic Germans to Germany. However,
any confounding factor is only a threat for identification strategy if it affects immigrants in the
treatment group differently than immigrants in the control group.
3.5 Estimation Results
Following the difference-in-differences identification strategy illustrated in Section 3.4, I esti-
mate Equation 3 with ordinary least squares for the period including two pre-treatment years
(1994-1995) and two post-treatment years (1996-1997). The five columns of Table 3.3 show the
main estimation results from difference-in-differences regressions on five different outcomes of
immigrant integration in Germany. All estimations include the full set of controls described in
Section 3.3. The treatment group includes both Greek and Italian immigrants, while Turkish
immigrants constitute the control group.
The third row of Table 3.3 shows the coefficients for the post-treatment period indicator,
capturing common time effects for the treatment and control groups. The positive significant
coefficients in the fourth and fifth column point to a common positive time trend in the proba-
bility to completely or mostly identify as German and for the intention to remain in Germany
permanently. The second row includes the coefficients for the treatment group indicator measur-
ing level-differences in the outcome variables between treatment and control group. The point
estimates indicate that the treatment group of Greek and Italian immigrants report on average
a higher subjective well-being by 0.5 points on an 11 point scale and are by more than 8 per-
centage points more probable to have very good or good German speaking skills compared
to Turkish immigrants. Finally, the difference-in-differences coefficients indicate no significant
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effect of extending voting rights in municipal elections to EU immigrants on any of the five
analyzed immigrant integration outcomes. The robustness of these results is tested with several
alternative approaches in the next section. Potential explanations for these findings and limita-
tions are discussed in Section 3.7.
3.6 Robustness and Heterogeneity
To test the robustness of the main estimation findings presented in Section 3.5, I offer several
complementary analyses within the difference-in-differences estimation framework. First, I re-
strict the estimation sample to federal states with a municipal election taking place within two
years after the reform. This allows me to estimate the response to a first municipal election with
EU-citizen participation. Second, I test whether immigrant outcomes respond to the EU Coun-
cil Directive 94/80/EC from December 9th, 1994 rather than legislative changes of individual
German federal states at the end of 1995. Accordingly, I move the timing of the first treatment
year from 1996 to 1995. Third, I analyze heterogeneous effects within immigrant subgroups
based on gender, educational level and year of arrival to Germany.
The main estimation conducted in Section 3.5 includes all federal states in West Germany,
regardless of a municipal election taking place in the post-treatment period. Consequently, the
estimated effect may be interpreted as the response of treated immigrants to the change in voting
laws and to voting rights acquisition rather than the effect of the first municipal election with
non-citizen eligibility taking place. In order to estimate the response to an actual election taking
place, I estimate the same model specification for the same period of 1994-1997 as in Table 3.3
with one key difference. I restrict the sample to immigrants living in West German federal states
where a municipal election with EU-citizen participation took place in the post-treatment period
of 1996-1997. Table 3.4 presents for each German federal state the timing of the first municipal
election with EU-citizen participation, i.e., after EU citizens acquired municipal voting rights.
Table 3.4 shows that municipal elections took place in four West German federal states within
two years after the reform: Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Hesse and Hamburg. Table 3.5 illustrates,
again, no significant effects of extending municipal voting rights to EU immigrants on any of
the five analyzed immigrant integration outcomes. The interpretation requires some caution, due
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to low statistical power as a result of a sizable reduction in sample size. In addition, the signs
of the coefficients are often of opposite direction to theoretical predictions. Thus, it appears that
the main specification results are robust to restricting the sample to the four federal states with
municipal elections within two years after the reform.
As a second robustness test, I change the timing of the reform from 1995 to 1994 in order
to evaluate whether a potential effect on integration outcomes is driven by the prior EU Council
Directive 94/80/EC issued on December 9th, 1994 rather then the implementation of its provi-
sions by individual German federal states at the end of 1995. I estimate the model in Equation 3
using a post-treatment period of 1995-1996 with the 1993-1994 as the pre-treatment period. Ta-
ble 3.6 reports the coefficients from these estimations. Again, the coefficients of interest remain
insignificant for all five outcome variables.
Finally, I analyze potential heterogeneous effects within different immigrant subgroups
based on gender, educational level and the year of arrival to Germany.
The results may differ by gender if males have fundamentally different preferences with
respect to voting eligibility than women and react differently to the acquisition of voting rights
over time. Table 3.7 presents the results from estimations conducted separately for males and fe-
males. These two gender subgroups are comparable in terms of size, as women comprise around
45 percent of my estimation sample. The estimates from these regressions do not indicate any
effects of voting rights acquisition for males or females.
Likewise, I examine whether estimated treatment effects differ by the educational level of
immigrants. The skill composition of the estimation sample reported in Table 3.2 shows that
low-skilled individuals with up to elementary education comprise around two thirds of the sam-
ple. This points to a relative unskilled selection of immigrants in the baseline sample. Separate
estimations for low-skilled immigrants are presented in Table 3.8. A second estimation group
includes the remaining medium and high-skilled individuals. Once more, the results in Table
3.8 show no significant effects of the reform for either skill group.
One common characteristic of the immigrant sample used in this analysis is the relatively
long residency duration in Germany (see Table 3.2). The average year of arrival in Germany
within my baseline sample is 1973, more than 20 years before the introduction of non-citizen
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voting rights. In addition, since I condition my sample on immigrants without a German cit-
izenship, I might have a highly selected sample of non-naturalized long-term immigrants in
Germany. In other words, the available sample consists of immigrants who have decided not
to take up German citizenship despite their long duration of stay and presumed completion of
minimum residency duration criteria for naturalization. I counteract this issue by considering
immigrants who arrived in Germany in 1980 or later. Unfortunately, due to data limitations it
is not possible to restrict the sample any further to more recent immigration cohorts. Immi-
grants eligible for citizenship at the time of the reform cannot be completely ruled out. Table
3.9 reports the estimated effects for immigration arriving since 1980. There is no evidence for
a benefit of non-citizen voting rights on the considered outcomes of EU immigrants.
Overall, the results of the robustness analysis conducted in this section confirm the findings
of the main estimation results presented in Section 3.5.
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This study investigates the causal effects of extending voting rights in German municipal elec-
tions to non-citizen EU immigrants on their integration in Germany.
I use representative survey data, which provide detailed records on citizenship, residency
and several immigrant integration outcomes, to identify the group of treated immigrants and
construct an appropriate control group of immigrants unaffected by the reform. I apply a difference-
in-differences estimation approach to exploit the exogenous variation generated by reforms of
German election laws at the end of 1995.
I find no significant effects of voting rights acquisition in German municipal elections on the
intention to remain in Germany permanently, German language skills, identifying as a German
or subjective well-being of Greek and Italian immigrants in Germany. Additional results from
supplementary estimations presented in Section 3.6 confirm this result. Overall, the findings
do not support theoretical predictions of political enfranchisement fostering the integration of
immigrants.
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The finding of this study that the acquisition of municipal voting rights has no effect on
the integration of EU immigrants in Germany might be attributed to three potential explana-
tions. The first two explanations are general, while the third one is specific to the sample of
immigrants under consideration. First, EU citizens might assign low importance to their vot-
ing rights in municipal elections in another EU country of residence. Alternatively, EU citizens
might have little knowledge or understanding of their own municipal voting rights in another
EU country. Both explanations seem to find some support in representative surveys among EU
citizens conducted at the time of the reform. Results from the 1996 Eurobarometer depicted in
Figure 3.9 confirm that only 56 percent of respondents valued municipal voting rights as impor-
tant, the lowest number among all EU citizen rights listed in the survey. In addition, Figure 3.10
demonstrates poor knowledge of EU citizens of their municipal voting rights in any EU country
of residence. This holds especially compared to other basic EU-citizen rights, e.g., the freedom
to study and work in any EU member state. Only 38 percent of respondents had the correct
understanding of their municipal voting rights within the EU. Unfortunately, voter turnout of
EU citizens in German municipal elections is not being recorded by public authorities in most
German federal states. The only publicly available data are for the city-state Bremen. Table
3.10 confirms the picture painted by the Eurobarometer surveys. Election participation, and by
extension the interest of EU-citizens in the municipal election of Bremen is low, with a turnout
of generally less than 20 percent.
Despite the arguably reliable finding of no effects of municipal voting rights acquisition on
the integration of EU citizens in Germany, it is recommended to proceed carefully when drawing
general conclusions from this result about the effects of enfranchisement on immigrant integra-
tion. As discussed in Section 3.6, the results might be driven by the specific characteristics of the
sample at hand. The group of EU immigrants in my estimation sample consists of low-skilled
Greek and Italian guest workers who immigrated to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, more than
20 years prior to the acquisition of municipal voting rights. This group arguably represents a
selected sample of long-term immigrants who do not take up German citizenship. If the treated
individuals in the sample are never-takers with respect to citizenship and, by extension, election
participation, this might explain the findings.
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More research is needed to add more clarity to the findings of this study. An analysis of
younger cohorts of EU immigrants in Germany would answer some question marks about the
sample at hand. Data on individual voter turnout or political interest would shed more light on
the first-stage effects of the reform. Finally, future research can study the effects of the reform
across different EU member states of that time and explore potential heterogeneous effects on
immigrant integration.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Total Number of Foreigners in EU Countries in 2017
 
Note: Composition as of January 2017. Foreigners refer to residents without a citizenship of the reporting country.
Source: Eurostat (2018). Own illustration.
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Figure 3.2: Percentage Share of Foreigners in EU Countries in 2017
 
Note: Shares are calculated as the total number of foreigners divided by total population. Composition as of
January 2017. Foreigners refer to residents without a citizenship of the reporting country.
Source: Eurostat (2018). Own illustration.
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Figure 3.3: Total Number of EU-28 Foreigners in EU Countries in 2017
 
Note: Composition as of January 2017. EU-28 foreigners refer to residents with a citizenship of an EU member
state with the exception of citizens of the reporting country.
Source: Eurostat (2018). Own illustration.
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Figure 3.4: Percentage Share of EU-28 Foreigners in EU Countries in 2017
 
Note: Shares are calculated as the total number of EU-28 foreigners divided by total population. Composition as
of January 2017. EU-28 foreigners refer to residents with a citizenship of an EU member state with the exception
of citizens of the reporting country.
Source: Eurostat (2018). Own illustration.
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Figure 3.5: Opinion on Non-Citizen Voting Rights in Germany in 2008
 
Note: Survey conducted in 2008 by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen with 2,002 adult respondents.
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Statista (2018). Own illustration.
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Figure 3.6: Opinion on Non-Citizen Voting Rights in Germany in 2015
 
Note: Survey conducted in 2015 by Infratest Dimap with 1,014 adult respondents.
Source: Infratest Dimap (2019). Own illustration.
Figure 3.7: Opinion on Integration Effects of Voting Rights in 2015
 
Note: Survey conducted in 2015 by Infratest Dimap with 1,014 adult respondents.
Source: Infratest Dimap (2019). Own illustration.
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Figure 3.8: Development of Immigrant Integration Outcomes, 1991-1997
 
Note: Development of integration outcomes in control and treatment group of immigrants. The treatment group
includes individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while the control group comprises Turkish individuals. The
outcome variables include indicators for very good or good German language skills and completely or mostly
identifying as a German (both constructed out of original variables measured on a five point scale), an indicator
for the intention to remain in Germany permanently and, finally, subjective well-being measured on a 11 point
scale. Information on language skills and identifying as a German is available only once every two years.
Source: SOEP v.33. Own illustration.
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Figure 3.9: Eurobarometer 1996: Importance of EU-Citizen Rights to EU Citizens
 
Note: Percentage of ’don’t know’ answers are not shown.
Source: Survey no. 45.1 - Fieldwork Apr-May 1996, Standard Eurobarometer 45 - Fig. 7.6. Own illustration.
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Figure 3.10: Eurobarometer 1996: EU Citizens’ Knowledge of EU-Citizen Rights
 
Note: Percentage of ’don’t know’ answers are not shown.
Source: Survey no. 46 - Fieldwork Oct-Nov 1996, Standard Eurobarometer 46 - Fig. 5.6. Own illustration.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Individual Outcomes, 1995
(1) (2) (3)
Description Treatment group Control group (1)-(2)
Mean Mean
Subjective Well-Being (0-10) 7.023 6.758 0.265 **
(0.076) (0.091) (0.119)
Speaking German - very good or good (0/1) 0.505 0.411 0.094 ***
(0.026) (0.021) (0.033)
Writing German - very good or good (0/1) 0.255 0.258 0.002
(0.023) (0.019) (0.029)
Remain in Germany Permanently (0/1) 0.405 0.437 -0.032
(0.025) (0.021) (0.033)
Feeling German - completely or mostly (0/1) 0.090 0.062 0.029
(0.015) (0.010) (0.018)
N 447 515
Note: The table presents sample means for the treatment and control group of immigrants in the final sample. The
treatment group includes individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while the control group comprises Turkish
individuals. The outcome variables include indicators for very good or good German language skills and
completely or mostly identifying as a German (both constructed out of original variables measured on a five point
scale), an indicator for the intention to remain in Germany permanently and, finally, subjective well-being
measured on a 11 point scale. Information on language skills and identifying as a German is available only once
every two years. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels.
Source: SOEP v.33.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Individual Characteristics, 1995
(1) (2) (3)
Description Treatment group Control group (1)-(2)
Mean Mean
Female 0.444 0.465 -0.021
(0.497) (0.499) (0.033)
Age 45.136 39.396 5.740 ***
(12.105) (12.998) (0.838)
YSM 24.501 19.099 5.402 ***
(7.312) (7.413) (0.488)
Low-skilled 0.658 0.634 0.024
(0.475) (0.482) (0.032)
Medium-skilled 0.316 0.341 -0.025
(0.465) (0.474) (0.031)
High-skilled 0.026 0.025 0.001
(0.160) (0.156) (0.010)
Married 0.862 0.881 -0.019
(0.346) (0.324) (0.022)
Children 0.480 0.677 -0.196 ***
(0.500) (0.468) (0.032)
log(HH income) 7.536 7.457 0.079 ***
(0.413) (0.472) (0.030)
N 447 515
Note: The table presents sample means of individual characteristics for the treatment and control group of
immigrants in the final sample. The treatment group includes individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while
the control group comprises Turkish individuals. The individual characteristics include indicators for females,
being married, children under the age of 16 in the household, indicators for high, medium and low education, the
log of real household income, age and years since migration and their quadratic. Low education refers to
individuals with inadequate or general elementary education. Medium education includes individuals with middle
vocational and vocational degree with Abitur. High education includes higher vocational and higher education
degrees. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: SOEP v.33.
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Table 3.3: DiD Estimates on Immigrant Integration Outcomes: Main Specification
Subjective Speaking Writing Remain Feeling
Well-being German German Permanently German
0-10 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
DiD Post×Treat -0.112 -0.036 0.023 -0.059 -0.021
(0.114) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038) (0.029)
Treatment Group 0.498 *** 0.087 ** 0.028 -0.073 0.042
(0.132) (0.042) (0.033) (0.044) (0.026)
Post -0.161 ** -0.033 -0.014 0.052 ** 0.044 **
(0.029) (0.126) (0.476) (0.045) (0.012)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,774 1,365 1,360 2,739 1,345
R2 0.090 0.302 0.332 0.070 0.103
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions over the 1994-1997 period
on indicators for very good or good German language skills, completely or mostly identifying as a German, an
indicator for the intention to remain in Germany permanently and subjective well-being measured on a 11 point
scale. Information on language skills and identifying as a German is available only once every two years. The
controls include indicators for years, federal states, females, being married, children under the age of 16 in the
household, indicators for high and medium education, the log of real household income, age and years since
migration and their quadratic. The treatment group includes individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while
the control group comprises Turkish individuals. The sample includes first-generation immigrants aged 18-65
living in West German federal states. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at household level.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: SOEP v.33.
84
Table 3.4: Timing of First Municipal Election with EU-Citizen Participation across Ger-
man Federal States
First Election with EU-Citizen Voters
Federal State Year
Bavaria 1996
Lower Saxony 1996
Hesse 1997
Hamburg 1997
Brandenburg 1998
Schleswig-Holstein 1998
Bremen 1999
Northrhine-Westfalia 1999
Baden-Wuerttemberg 1999
Saarland 1999
Berlin 1999
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 1999
Saxony 1999
Saxony-Anhalt 1999
Thuringia 1999
Rhineland-Palatinate 1999
Note: The table presents the year of the first municipal election in a given German federal state in which EU
citizens were eligible to participate, i.e., the first municipal election after EU citizens were granted voting rights in
German municipal elections.
Source: Own illustration.
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Table 3.5: DiD Estimates on Immigrant Integration Outcomes: Restricted Federal States
Subjective Speaking Writing Remain Feeling
Well-being German German Permanently German
0-10 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
DiD Post×Treat -0.589 *** -0.027 -0.061 -0.082 -0.081
(0.204) (0.076) (0.067) (0.067) (0.057)
Treatment Group 0.447 * -0.034 -0.010 -0.076 0.024
(0.232) (0.081) (0.069) (0.082) (0.043)
Post -0.028 -0.013 -0.001 0.013 0.066 *
(0.116) (0.047) (0.038) (0.047) (0.035)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 887 438 436 872 436
R2 0.104 0.304 0.331 0.079 0.097
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions over the 1994-1997
period. The sample is restricted to German federal states with a municipal election taking place in the
post-treatment period (1996-1997), i.e., Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Hesse and Hamburg. The dependent variables
include indicators for very good or good German language skills, completely or mostly identifying as a German,
an indicator for the intention to remain in Germany permanently and subjective well-being measured on a 11
point scale. Information on language skills and identifying as a German is available only once every two years.
The controls include indicators for years, federal states, females, being married, children under the age of 16 in
the household, indicators for high and medium education, the log of real household income, age and years since
migration and their quadratic. The treatment group includes individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while
the control group comprises Turkish individuals. The sample includes first-generation immigrants aged 18-65
living in Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Hesse or Hamburg. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
household level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: SOEP v.33.
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Table 3.6: DiD Estimates on Immigrant Integration Outcomes: Alternative Treatment
Year
Subjective Speaking Writing Remain Feeling
Well-being German German Permanently German
0-10 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
DiD Post×Treat -0.184 -0.009 0.002 -0.027 0.028
(0.116) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) (0.025)
Treatment Group 0.553 *** 0.114 *** 0.028 -0.056 * 0.007
(0.138) (0.043) (0.034) (0.044) (0.023)
Post -0.7075 0.162 0.018 -0.007 -0.029
(0.706) (0.150) (0.037) (0.045) (0.035)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,794 1,387 1,380 2,760 1,336
R2 0.090 0.277 0.322 0.079 0.105
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions over the 1993-1996 period
with 1995 as the first treatment year. The dependent variables include indicators for very good or good German
language skills, completely or mostly identifying as a German, an indicator for the intention to remain in
Germany permanently and subjective well-being measured on a 11 point scale. Information on language skills
and identifying as a German is available only once every two years. The controls include indicators for years,
federal states, females, being married, children under the age of 16 in the household, indicators for high and
medium education, the log of real household income, age and years since migration and their quadratic. The
treatment group includes individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while the control group comprises Turkish
individuals. The sample includes first-generation immigrants aged 18-65 living in West German federal states.
Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at household level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the
1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: SOEP v.33.
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Table 3.7: DiD Estimates on Immigrant Integration Outcomes: By Gender
Subjective Speaking Writing Remain Feeling
Well-being German German Permanently German
0-10 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
Males
DiD Post×Treat -0.203 -0.108 0.064 -0.038 0.026
(0.345) (0.088) (0.070) (0.093) (0.046)
N 1,487 732 728 531 264
R2 0.112 0.401 0.385 0.109 0.062
Females
DiD Post×Treat 0.080 -0.164 0.003 -0.018 0.024
(0.150) (0.053) (0.042) (0.049) (0.040)
N 1,287 633 632 1,271 623
R2 0.101 0.315 0.363 0.083 0.148
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions by gender over the
1993-1996 period. The dependent variables include indicators for very good or good German language skills,
completely or mostly identifying as a German, an indicator for the intention to remain in Germany permanently
and subjective well-being measured on a 11 point scale. Information on language skills and identifying as a
German is available only once every two years. The controls include indicators for years, federal states, females,
being married, children under the age of 16 in the household, indicators for high and medium education, the log
of real household income, age and years since migration and their quadratic. The treatment group includes
individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while the control group comprises Turkish individuals. The sample
includes first-generation immigrants aged 18-65 living in West German federal states. Standard errors reported in
parentheses are clustered at household level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: SOEP v.33.
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Table 3.8: DiD Estimates on Immigrant Integration Outcomes: By Education Level
Subjective Speaking Writing Remain Feeling
Well-being German German Permanently German
0-10 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
Low Education
DiD Post×Treat -0.087 -0.063 0.012 -0.035 0.003
(0.147) (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) (0.033)
N 1,805 887 884 1,786 873
R2 0.087 0.252 0.315 0.061 0.089
Medium and High Education
DiD Post×Treat -0.188 -0.023 -0.077 -0.101 * -0.061
(0.168) (0.059) (0.058) (0.053) (0.053)
N 969 478 476 953 472
R2 0.127 0.305 0.307 0.100 0.168
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions by education level over
the 1993-1996 period. Low education refers to individuals with inadequate or general elementary education.
Medium education includes individuals with middle vocational and vocational degree with Abitur. High
education includes higher vocational and higher education degrees. The dependent variables include indicators for
very good or good German language skills, completely or mostly identifying as a German, an indicator for the
intention to remain in Germany permanently and subjective well-being measured on a 11 point scale. Information
on language skills and identifying as a German is available only once every two years. The controls include
indicators for years, federal states, females, being married, children under the age of 16 in the household,
indicators for high and medium education, the log of real household income, age and years since migration and
their quadratic. The treatment group includes individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while the control
group comprises Turkish individuals. The sample includes first-generation immigrants aged 18-65 living in West
German federal states. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at household level. ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: SOEP v.33.
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Table 3.9: DiD Estimates on Immigrant Integration Outcomes: Recent Cohorts
Subjective Speaking Writing Remain Feeling
Well-being German German Permanently German
0-10 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
DiD Post×Treat -0.203 -0.108 0.064 -0.038 0.026
(0.345) (0.088) (0.070) (0.093) (0.046)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 536 268 268 531 264
R2 0.112 0.401 0.385 0.109 0.062
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions over the 1993-1996 period
for the restricted sample of immigrants who arrived in Germany since 1980. The dependent variables include
indicators for very good or good German language skills, completely or mostly identifying as a German, an
indicator for the intention to remain in Germany permanently and subjective well-being measured on a 11 point
scale. Information on language skills and identifying as a German is available only once every two years. The
controls include indicators for years, federal states, females, being married, children under the age of 16 in the
household, indicators for high and medium education, the log of real household income, age and years since
migration and their quadratic. The treatment group includes individuals with Greek or Italian citizenship, while
the control group comprises Turkish individuals. The sample includes first-generation immigrants aged 18-65
living in West German federal states. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at household level.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: SOEP v.33.
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Table 3.10: Voter Turnout of EU-Citizens in Municipal Elections in Bremen
Stadtbuergerschaft Bremen - Local Parliament of the City of Bremen
Election Date Voter Group Eligible to vote Voters Voter Turnout (%)
06.06.1999 (EU-15) 7,683 1,305 17.0
25.05.2003 (EU-15) 7,109 1,886 26.5
13.05.2007 (EU-27) 15,290 2,461 16.1
22.05.2011 (EU-27) 16,942 2,410 14.2
10.05.2015 (EU-28) 20,831 2,594 12.5
Note: The table reports the voter turnout of non-German EU citizens in municipal election of the city of Bremen,
Germany.
Source: Own illustration.
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4 The Effect of Relaxed Dismissal Protection on Small Ger-
man Establishments
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of dismissal protection deregulation on worker flows and worker
sorting patterns in small German establishments. I take advantage of a reform of dismissal pro-
tection regulation coverage rules from 2004 in setting up a difference-in-differences estimation
framework. Using linked employer-employee administrative data, I find significant positive ef-
fects on hirings and separations in treated establishments, although smaller in magnitude for
the latter. Additionally, I observe that employees newly hired by treated establishments in the
first year after the reform are of lower-ability than employees hired in the year preceeding to the
reform, as measured by pre-reform residual wages.
JEL classification: J21, J23, J38, J63, K31
Keywords: dismissal protection, worker flows, difference-in-differences, employee sorting
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4.1 Introduction
Evaluating the impact of labor market policies on small establishments is of particular interest,
because they comprise a substantial part of the economy and employ a considerable part of the
workforce. According to data of the German Federal Statistical Office32, as of 2015, establish-
ments with up to 9 employees subject to social insurance amount to 88% of all registered Ger-
man establishments and around 16% of all employees subject to social insurance are employed
in such establishments. Thus, small establishments are important in terms of employment cre-
ation, even though these jobs are typically less remunerated and stable than employment in large
establishments (van Praag and Versloot, 2007). In addition, small establishments are important
drivers of innovation, e.g., due to being able to implement innovations more flexibly than bigger
establishments (Baumol, 2002; Falck, 2008).
Dismissal protection legislation in several European countries - including Germany - de-
fines a certain establishment size threshold determining which establishments are covered by its
regulations. Establishments with a number of employees exceeding this threshold are subject to
dismissal protection regulations, whereas employees in establishments of a size equal or smaller
than the threshold are not protected by dismissal protection legislation. German establishments
are subject to dismissal protection regulations when they employ more than 10 full-time equiv-
alent employees since January 2004, when it was raised from a previous threshold of 5 full-time
equivalent employees.
Interestingly, the establishment size threshold regulating dismissal protection coverage in
Germany changed a total of three times. Two previous changes preceded the last reform of Jan-
uary 2004: an increase in the threshold in October 1996 from 5 to 10 employees was followed
by a decrease in the threshold from 10 to 5 employees in January 1999 (see Figure 4.1). Both
increases in the threshold in 1996 and 2004 - representing a deregulation of dismissal protec-
tion for affected establishments - were justified by policy makers by a desire to combat high
unemployment, to reduce barriers to hiring and an expected high employment potential in small
establishments.
32 Statistisches Bundesamt (2017b): Statistisches Jahrbuch 2017.
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The scope and coverage of dismissal protection in Germany is regulated by the Protection
Against Dismissal Act (PADA), or Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KschG). The German PADA re-
stricts dismissals to specific situations and stipulates the conditions under which these situations
occur. Moreover, dismissed employees might challenge their dismissal at a labor court. In case
a labor court rules a dismissal to be in violation with dismissal protection regulations, an an-
nulment of the dismissal takes place and the dismissed employee gains a claim to be reinstated.
Alternatively, the dismissed employee can be compensated monetarily with a severance pay-
ment of up to twelve monthly earnings. Data from German labor courts33 show for the duration
of 2016 a total of 180,886 lawsuits related to dismissals filed in that year or inherited from
previous years, with 11 percent of the court trials lasting longer than 6 months. Dismissal pro-
tection legislation therefore increases actual and potential costs of dismissals for employers by
restricting their scope of action, introducing sanctions in cases of infringement and increasing
uncertainty over the costs through the risk of potentially lengthy court trials.
As Lazear (1990) demonstrates in his theoretical model, government-mandated dismissal
protection in the form of a severance pay does not necessarily lead to reduced firing and hiring.
In a perfectly competitive labor market a severance pay can be offset by an optimal contract
that includes an equivalent transfer from the worker to the employer, i.e., a reduction in wages.
However, as discussed by Verick (2004), labor markets are likely to be imperfect and wages
rigid, hindering such adjustments. Moreover, dismissal protection regulations include a variety
of dismissal costs in addition to severance payments, such as legal and administrative costs,
and lost revenue from production disruptions (Verick, 2004). These costs are associated with
a degree of uncertainty and thus difficult to write into labor contracts. The effects of dismissal
costs can be offset only if workers are willing and able to make upfront payments to the firm in
the form of an optimal contract. Imperfections on the capital market and a lack of worker trust
towards the firm may prevent such contracts (Lazear, 1990).
33 Statistisches Bundesamt (2017a): Arbeitsgerichte. Fachserie 10, Reihe 2.8, 2016.
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Thus, increased firing costs in the form of dismissal protection regulations should ceteris
paribus have a direct negative effect on dismissal decisions. Similarly, employers take into ac-
count increased future costs of dismissals in their hiring decision (Bertola, 1999). Higher po-
tential dismissal costs increase the cost of new hires, as the marginal product of labor is equated
to the (constant) wages plus the discounted dismissal costs to be paid in the future, negatively
influencing the number of hirings (Bertola, 1999).
With respect to the effects of dismissal protection onwho gets hired, Bjuggren and Skedinger
(2018) argue that higher dismissal protection causes firms to be more cautious in their hiring de-
cisions, decreasing the employment prospects of vulnerable worker groups. A sizable strand of
the literature provides empirical evidence for adverse effects on the employment of immigrants
(Kahn, 2007), women (Autor et al., 2006; Bertola et al., 2007; Feldmann, 2009), the unem-
ployed, the low-skilled (Montenegro and Pagés, 2004; Daniel and Siebert, 2005; Autor et al.,
2006) and the youth (Botero et al., 2004; Montenegro and Pagés, 2004; Daniel and Siebert,
2005; Bertola et al., 2007; Kahn, 2007; Feldmann, 2009).
The above mentioned worker groups might be perceived by employers as risky workers.
This is in line with the theoretical model of Lazear (1995), which predicts firms hiring less risky
workers as a result of tightened dismissal protection. In the framework of Lazear (1995), firms
like hiring risky workers, because they can fire the bad ones and keep the ones that turned out
to be better than expected. Since risky workers have a higher ability variance, tighter dismissal
protection thus reduces the spread of new hires’ ability at the top and the bottom of the distribu-
tion (Butschek and Sauermann, 2019). Likewise, Pries and Rogerson (2005) show analytically
that firms adjust their hiring practices as a reaction to dismissal costs. However, as dismissal
costs increase, their matching model implies an upward shift in firms’ hiring standards, because
firms require more assurance about the quality of the match and opening new vacancies be-
comes less profitable. Thus, the theoretical implication of Pries and Rogerson (2005) is that
tighter dismissal protection increases the ability at the bottom of the hires distribution as firm
avoid hiring bad workers.
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In a first step, I revisit traditional outcomes of the employment protection literature to esti-
mate the causal effect of the 2004 deregulation of dismissal protection on hirings and separa-
tions in small German establishments. With respect to the 2004 reform, which exempts a group
of small establishments from dismissal protection regulations and thus decreases potential costs
associated with dismissals for these establishments, I expect a positive effect on both hirings
and separations.
As a secondary analysis, I examine the impact of dismissal protection deregulation on the
quality of new hires in establishments affected by the reform. More precisely, based on Card
et al. (2013) individual fixed effects estimated from prior employment, I compare the ability of
individuals hired prior to the PADA deregulation with the ability of new hires over the course
of the post-reform period. I estimate the effects of the reform on the minimum and maximum
ability, as well as the 90/10 ability percentile ratio of a firm’s hire in a given year. In accordance
with Pries and Rogerson (2005), I expect a downward shift in hiring standards, i.e., a decrease
in the minimum ability of new hires as a result of relaxed dismissal regulations. In contrast, the
risky hires model by Lazear (1995) implies a decrease in the minimum hire quality accompanied
with an increase in the maximum hire quality. The 90/10 ability percentile ratio will grow, as
the spread of new hires’ ability widens. I follow Butschek and Sauermann (2019) in analyzing
these two testable predictions. On the supply side of the labor market, jobs in establishments
affected by the reform may become less attractive to potential employees due to lost protection
against dismissals, leading to a reduction in the ability of job applicants and hires.
In order to estimate the causal effects of relaxed dismissal protection, I take advantage of the
properties of the 2004 reform of the German PADA, which shifts the establishment size thresh-
old determining the coverage of dismissal protection from establishments with more than five
to establishments with more than ten full-time equivalent workers. Since the shift of the estab-
lishment size threshold regulating the application of dismissal protection is arguably exogenous
and its preceding political debate rules out anticipatory effects, I can treat the 2004 reform as
a quasi-experiment and a source of exogenous variation in dismissal protection over time and
establishment groups. The nature of the reform allows me to set up a difference-in-differences
framework with a well-defined treatment group of establishments.
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My approach builds on previous literature on the effects of dismissal protection on worker
flows. To identify the causal effects of dismissal protection most studies (e.g., Verick, 2004;
Bauer et al., 2007; Martins, 2009; Kugler and Pica, 2008; Bauernschuster, 2013; Priesack,
2015) exploit reforms of dismissal protection legislation as a quasi-experiment and estimate
difference-in-differences models. With regards to German studies, these evaluate previous shifts
in the application threshold of the German PADA. Using the IAB Establishment Panel, Verick
(2004) studies the effects of the January 1999 reform on the probability of establishments grow-
ing and downsizing, and finds a lower probability of growth. Bauer et al. (2007) estimate the ef-
fects of both the October 1996 deregulation and January 1999 tightening of dismissal protection
coverage on a sample of three cross-sections of establishments tracked for twelve month time
intervals between these two reforms. Analyzing a sample of West German establishments from
the German Employment Statistics Register, an employer-employee dataset, they surprisingly
find no significant effects of both reforms on hiring, separation or job flow rates in the affected
establishments. Bauernschuster (2013) finds positive effects of the German PADA deregulation
from January 2004 on hirings. Using the survey-based IAB Establishment Panel (2001-2007)
that provides self-reported information on establishment hirings for the first half of a respec-
tive year, he finds an increase in hiring rates by 2 percentage points in German establishments
with more than 5 and up to 10 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees. Priesack (2015) finds
positive short-run effects of the January 2004 reform on both hirings and separations in Ger-
man establishments with six to nine FTE employees. Using the Cross-sectional Model 2 of the
Linked-Employer-Employee-Data (LIAB QM2 9310) provided by the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB) for the period of 2001-2007, his estimates point to a significant increase in the
hiring rate by 3.2 percentage points and a 2.9 percentage points increase in the separation rate
for the first post-reform year of 2004.
Turning to international studies, these results are not confirmed by Martins (2009) for Portu-
gal. Based on linked employer-employee data from the Portuguese Quadros de Pessoal (1986-
1999), he reports no significant effects on hirings or separations of reduced administrative
restrictions regarding dismissals for cause from 1989 for Portuguese firms employing 20 or
fewer employees. Using a similar approach for data from the Italian Social Security Institute
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Employer-Employee Panel (1997-2001), Kugler and Pica (2008) evaluate the effects of a 1990
increase in dismissal costs for Italian establishments with less than 15 employees and find a
decrease in hirings and separations in treated establishments by around 13 and 15 percent re-
spectively.
Contributing to the existing research on dismissal protection affecting worker-firm match-
ing, Marinescu (2009) studies the effects of a legislative change in the United Kingdom low-
ering the required tenure to qualify for dismissal protection from 24 to 12 months. Using a
difference-in-differences approach and data from the British Labour Force Survey, she finds
a reduced firing hazard not only for the directly affected employees with 12 to 23 months of
tenure, but also a 19 percent decrease for workers with less than 12 months tenure, suggesting
an increase in the quality of new hires as a result of increased dismissal protection. Marinescu
(2009) attributes this result to firms increasing the screening of hires to avoid potential dismissal
costs after new hires exceed the tenure threshold. However, Marinescu (2009) does not directly
observe the ability of hires.
Using matched employer-employee register data from Statistics Sweden and the Integrated
Database for Labour Market Research, Bjuggren and Skedinger (2018) study the effect of low-
ered dismissal protection on the propensity to hire workers from unemployment and active labor
market programs in Sweden. Swedish dismissal protection legislation includes a seniority clause
which stipulates that in case of a dismissal for economic reasons the lowest tenured employee
in an establishment is laid off first. Bjuggren and Skedinger (2018) evaluate a 2001 reform
of the seniority clause, which allowed establishments with up to 10 employees to exempt two
workers from its provisions. This change in the rule allows establishments to keep less tenured
employees, if they are more able than their more senior co-workers. As a result of reduced dis-
missal protection regulations, Bjuggren and Skedinger (2018) find an increase in the share of
employees hired from unemployment and active labor market programs, i.e., employees with a
negative signal of lower productivity. Analogously, Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) find that U.S.
firms are less likely to hire unemployed workers with more stringent dismissal protection regu-
lations. They analyze the dismissal protection regulations across U.S. states using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.
98
Studying the same reform as Bjuggren and Skedinger (2018), Butschek and Sauermann
(2019) estimate the effects of weaker dismissal protection on the ability of new hires in small
Swedish establishments. Using estimated individual fixed effects of the Abowd et al. (1999)
type for worker ability, they find a significant decrease in a firm’s minimum hire quality, i.e., the
ability of the least productive hire a firm makes in a year. Adopting the number of new hires’
past links with incumbent employees as a screening proxy, Butschek and Sauermann (2019)
successfully link this reduction of firm’s hiring standards at the bottom of the hire ability distri-
bution with a reduction of pre-hire screening of applicants, empirically confirming the theoret-
ical prediction of Pries and Rogerson (2005). They use register data on workers’ employment
spells from Statistics Sweden.
I contribute to the existing literature in four ways. First, I take advantage of a large longi-
tudinal matched employer-employee dataset for Germany, which has not been yet exploited to
study effects of dismissal protection on worker flows and worker selection. The Longitudinal
Model of the Linked-Employer-Employee-Data 1993-2010 (LIAB LM 9310) provided by the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) links survey-based yearly establishment data of the
IAB Establishment Panel with longitudinal administrative employment spell data on all em-
ployees subject to social contribution payments. The register data on employment biographies
are considered to be more reliable than self-reported survey data on establishments used by pre-
vious German studies (e.g., Verick, 2004; Bauernschuster, 2013), due to plausibility checks and
sanctions in case of misreporting carried out and levied by social security institutions. In addi-
tion to a number of employee characteristics used in the analysis, I utilize the employee register
data in particular to calculate full-time equivalent establishment sizes and identify hirings and
separations.
Second, a precise calculation of full-time equivalent establishment sizes is of particular
importance, since the PADA applicability refers to establishment sizes in full-time equivalent
units. In particular, the PADA recognizes two unique groups of part-time employees with dis-
tinct full-time equivalent weights of 0.5 or 0.75, based on their working hours exceeding 20
hours per week. However, previous studies based on German survey data (e.g., Verick, 2004;
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Bauernschuster, 2013) lack information on working hours of part-time employees. These stud-
ies weight all part-time employees as 0.5 full-time equivalent employees regardless of their
exact weekly working hours, relying on a potentially inappropriate and strong assumption to
compute full-time equivalent establishment sizes. Thus, these studies are likely to suffer from
measurement error and attenuation bias. The LIAB LM dataset used in this study offsets to
some extent this issue by additionally distinguishing whether a part-time employee works more
or less than 18 hours per week.
Third, previous studies based on the IAB Establishment Panel (e.g., Verick, 2004; Bauern-
schuster, 2013) have survey data on hirings and separations only for the first 6 months of a
calendar year, while Priesack (2015) using the cross-sectional LIAB QM2 dataset observes em-
ployees of an establishment only at one point in time per year without identifying all worker
flows in-between. In contrast, the longitudinal nature of my data allows for identifying worker
flows over the course of a whole calendar year.
Fourth, this is the first study for Germany looking into the potential effects of dismissal
protection deregulation on the quality of new hires, using estimated individual fixed effects to
compare the ability of employees hired prior to the reform with new hires after the reform.
In the next section, I summarize the institutional background of dismissal protection legis-
lation in Germany and its reforms. Section 4.3 describes the data used in this analysis. Section
4.4 explains the identification approach and Section 4.5 presents the empirical results. I conduct
additional robustness tests in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 discusses the findings and concludes.
4.2 Institutional Background
The scope and coverage of dismissal protection in Germany is regulated by the Protection
Against Dismissal Act (PADA), or Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KschG). The German PADA re-
stricts dismissals to situations where there is a just cause. Dismissals on a just cause basis
have to be justified either based on personal incapability, personal misconduct, or redundancy.
The most common case for dismissals based on personal incapability is illness. For a dismissal
based on personal misconduct reasons, an employee has to break her contractual obligations in
a serious manner, such as coming late to work, unjustified absenteeism, or theft. For dismissals
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based on redundancy the law stipulates that a firm has to be restructuring or downsizing. Dis-
missed workers can appeal their dismissal to labor courts. If a dismissal is ruled as unwarranted,
employees gain a claim for a severance payment, increasing expected dismissal costs for em-
ployers.
The coverage threshold of the German PADA refers to a full-time equivalent number of
employees in an establishment. An employee working more than 30 hours per week counts as
one full-time equivalent unit. Part-time employees working up to 20 hours per week count as
0.5 full-time equivalent employees while part-time employees working more than 20 hours up
to 30 hours per week are assigned a weight of 0.75 full-time equivalent units (§23 (1) KSchG).
The establishment size threshold determining the coverage of the PADA was shifted a total of
three times over the period from 1996 to 2004. First, citing the need to combat a high unem-
ployment rate by reducing barriers to employment creation through a more flexible labor mar-
ket, the centre-right coalition of Helmut Kohl raised the threshold from five to ten employees
in October 1996, effectively exempting establishments in-between from dismissal protection
regulations. Later, in January 1999, Gerhardt Schröder’s first socialdemocrat-green coalition
tightened dismissal protection regulations by moving the threshold back to five employees. One
of the justifications for lowering the threshold was that the previous deregulation had not met
expectations. Finally, in January 2004, Schröder’s second Social Democrat-Green Party rul-
ing coalition raised the threshold back to 10 employees, again referring to high unemployment
levels and unused employment potential in small establishments as a motive. The shift of the
establishment size threshold was added to the bill on December 16, 2003 and the bill passed on
December 24, 2003, only a week before it came into effect on January 1, 2004.
There are a few specifics and exemptions to the application of the PADA that need to be
considered. The PADA coverage threshold refers to small independent establishments. Orga-
nizationally dependent branches of larger companies with 10 or less FTE employees are thus
not exempted from dismissal protection regulations. The regulations also do not cover estab-
lishments from the public administration, nonprofit, agricultural, mining and shipment sectors.
In addition, apprentices, working owners and unpaid family workers are not taken into account
towards the size of an establishment. All incumbent employees covered by the PADA before
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December 31, 2003 did not lose their employment protection as a result of the 2004 reform, as
long as the size of their respective establishment did not fall to five FTE employees or below.
The 2004 change in regulations thus affected only newly hired employees after December 31,
2003 in establishments with more than five and up to ten FTE employees. Finally, an employee
is not covered by the PADA during the first six months of employment at a new employer (§1
(1) KSchG).
4.3 Data
The LIAB LM 9310 dataset provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the
German Federal Employment Agency is a longitudinal matched employee-employer dataset
for the years 1993-2010 which links survey-based establishment data from annual waves of
the IAB Establishment Panel with administrative spell data on employees from the Integrated
Employment Biographies (IEB) of the IAB.34 For the investigated period of 2002-2005 in this
analysis there are on average 1.5 million individuals in around 350.000 establishments per year
in the administrative data part of the LIAB LM 9310 dataset. However, linkage with the survey
data from the IAB Establishment Panel is available only for approximately 10.000 establish-
ments per year. It should be mentioned that the establishment definition in the administrative
data (based on economic activity and municipality) does not necessarily correspond to the in-
terpretation of the establishment definition in the PADA (based on the management of personal
matters, with courts having a margin of discretion). The administrative data on individuals en-
compass all employees covered by social security. This includes white- and blue-collar work-
ers, employees in marginal part-time employment, paid family workers, as well as apprentices.
On the other hand, self-employed individuals and civil servants (so called Beamte in German)
who are exempt from social security contributions are not included in the data. The individual
data provide information on socio-demographic and employment-related characteristics, such
as gender, year of birth, nationality, educational attainment, as well as the start and end date of
employment, gross daily wages, profession and occupational status among others. These data
are considered highly reliable as employers are required to report all of their employees to social
34 The data report by Klosterhuber et al. (2013) provides a full description of the dataset, including the sampling
procedure and variable description.
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security agencies at least once a year and risk sanctions in case of misreporting. The survey data
from the IAB Establishment Panel provide annual data on establishment characteristics includ-
ing the structure of the workforce, business figures and policies (Fischer et al., 2008; Ellguth
et al., 2014).
In a first step, I restrict the individual spell data to employees in establishments that can be
linked to survey data of the IAB Establishment Panel. Due to the detailed spell nature of the
employment biography data, I am able to observe on a day-to-day basis whether an individual
is employed at an establishment. I utilize this degree of detail to identify every new hiring and
each separation in a given establishment. The timing of a new hire is identified as the beginning
date of a first spell at a new establishment. A separation35 is defined to occur on the day after
the last day of the last spell at a given establishment. Both hirings and separations are therefore
identified to an exact day. I deal with interruptions in employment at the same establishment
in the following manner. Resumed employment at the same establishment after an interruption
is considered a new job in two cases. First, if the notification of the last employment record
before the interruption indicates the end of the last job and the interruption exceeds 92 days.
Second, if the notification of the last employment record does not indicate the end of the last
job, the interruption needs to exceed 366 days. I obtain full-time equivalent (FTE) worker flows
by weighting all hirings and separations according to the FTE weights of the PADA. In the end,
full-time equivalent worker flows are counted over the course of a calendar year and aggregated
to the establishment level. I calculate conventional flow rates by dividing the number of FTE
hirings (separations) over the course of a calendar year by the initial number of FTE employees
at the beginning of the year.
Since the German PADA refers to a full-time equivalent number of employees at an estab-
lishment to determine its coverage, it is crucial to correctly measure the size of an establishment
in full-time equivalent employee units. The dataset does not provide me with specific informa-
tion on weekly working hours, however, the data distinguish between full-time and part-time
workers, and for part-time workers I further observe whether they work more or less than 18
hours per week. The German PADA, however, weights employees working up to 20 hours per
35 The term separation is used as the data do not distinguish between layoffs and voluntary quits.
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week as 0.5 full-time equivalent employees and assigns a weight of 0.75 FTE units to employees
working more than 20 hours and up to 30 hours per week. Table 4.1 presents the assignment of
weights according to the PADA in contrast to the assignment allowed by the available data. This
might lead to potential measurement error, especially for employees working between 18 and
20 hours per week. Nevertheless, this approach allows me to calculate PADA-relevant estab-
lishment size in a sufficiently precise manner and more accurately than previous studies based
on data without any information on working times of part-time employees. These studies (e.g.,
Bauernschuster, 2013) assume a weight of 0.5 full-time equivalent units to all part-time employ-
ees and are thus at higher risk of suffering from a strong attenuation bias due to measurement
error.
Apprentices, owners and family members working in a family business are not covered by
the PADA and are thus not counted towards the PADA-relevant establishment size. Therefore,
I exclude these individuals from the calculation and subsequent analysis. Establishments from
the public administration, nonprofit, agricultural, mining and shipment sectors are not subject to
the German PADA. I drop these establishments from the sample. After that, I create a balanced
panel of establishments over the 2002-2005 period. Finally, I exclude establishments exhibiting
excessive growth or shrinkage to make sure the results are not driven by outliers. I drop estab-
lishments with more than 15 hirings (separations) or with hiring (separation) rates higher than
2 at any given year over the observed period and end up with a total of 977 establishments.
The treatment group consists of 165 establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 full-time equivalent
employees. The 186 establishments with 10.75 up to 20 full-time equivalent employees are as-
signed to the control group. Figure 4.2 presents the size distribution of all establishments in the
estimation sample.
Descriptive statistics for the worker flow variables in the pre-treatment year of 2003 are
reported in Table 4.2. Unsurprisingly, establishments in the control group exhibit on average
more FTE hirings and separations per year than their smaller counterparts in the treatment
group. However, in contrast to the control group, treated establishments experience an increase
across all worker flow measures in the post treatment period. Additional descriptive statistics
for establishment characteristics in the pre-treatment year of 2003 are reported in Tables 4.3 and
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4.4. Table 4.3 contains the first set of establishment characteristics with the exception of federal
state and industry sector. The control and treatment groups do not differ substantially in the
founding year, the existence of a works council, the adopted type of collective labor agreement
and foreign ownership. On the other hand, the two establishment groups differ somewhat in the
legal type. The second set of controls is presented in Table 4.4 and includes the share of female
and foreign employees, the apprentice-to-employee ratio, the mean schooling36 and experience
levels of employees, the mean real daily wage37 and log surplus per employee.38 Establishments
in the control group display a significantly lower surplus per worker. There are no significant
differences between the two groups of establishments in the remaining characteristics.
The individual fixed effects used as measures of individual ability in the analysis of hire
quality stem from Card et al. (2013). The wage estimations of Card et al. (2013, henceforth
CHK) are based on large administrative data on German employees, the Integrated Employment
Biographies (IEB) of the IAB and the resulting CHK effect estimates are therefore available for
linkage with the employee part of the LIAB dataset, which also originate from the IEB data.39
Combining the estimated individual CHK effects with individual hires of an establishment iden-
tified in the data allows me to approximate the individual ability of a newly hired employee. To
get a measure for the spread of the ability distribution of all hires at a given establishment-year
pair, I proceed to calculate the minimum and maximum ability of establishment j’s hires in
year t, as well as the yearly 90/10 ability percentile ratio, i.e. the ability of a hire at the 90th
percentile in relation to the ability at the 10th percentile of the distribution of an establishment
j’s hires in a given year. Table 4.5 provides some descriptive statistics for the treatment and
control group of establishments on the minimum, maximum and the 90/10 percentile ratio of
the ability distribution of hired employees.
36 The schooling variable is measured on a 6 point scale of attained degrees: no degree, vocational training, high-
school degree, high-school degree with vocational training, technical college and university. The imputation
procedure for missing and inconsistent values in schooling is described in Appendix C.
37 Wages in the IEB data are censored at the social security contribution limit due to the reporting mechanism. The
imputation procedure for censored values is described in Appendix C.
38 Surplus per employee is computed as the difference between yearly revenue and the yearly wage bill, divided
by the number of employees in an establishment. Wages and revenues are deflated using the CPI index.
39 The data report by Card et al. (2015) offers a detailed description of the CHK effects. Data linkage was provided
by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
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4.4 Empirical Method
4.4.1 Worker Flows
The 2004 reform of the German PADA allows for a clean identification of a treatment group of
establishments. The reform shifted the establishment size threshold determining the coverage
of dismissal protection from more than five to more than ten full-time equivalent workers, ef-
fectively exempting establishments in-between these two thresholds from dismissal protection
regulations. These establishments are therefore treated by the 2004 reform. I exclude estab-
lishments in the immediate proximity to these two size thresholds from the treatment group to
account for potential measurement error in the computed establishment size and strategic be-
havior by establishments to select into treatment, i.e., bunching just under the threshold. The
treatment group consists of establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 full-time equivalent employees.
Establishments with 10.75 up to 20 full-time equivalent employees are considered for the con-
trol group.40 In addition, I follow previous studies in defining the group of treated establishments
based on establishment size over three years preceding the reform, i.e., the 2001-2003 period.
This approach accounts for strategic selection of establishments into treatment and potential
mean reversion effects influencing the estimation results.
After constructing the treatment and control groups, I employ a difference-in-differences
estimation approach to estimate the causal effects of relaxed dismissal protection on hirings and
separations. I estimate the following model on yearly establishment-level data for the 2002-2005
period, i.e., with two pre-treatment and two post-treatment years:
Yjt = α + βpostt + γtreatj + δ(postt × treatj) + ηXjt + jt. (4)
Yjt denotes the outcome variable - hirings (hiring rates) or separations (separation rates) in
establishment i over the course of year t. The indicator variable for the post-treatment period,
postt, takes on the value one from the year 2004 onward. treatj is an indicator for the treatment
group of establishments exempted from dismissal protection regulations by the 2004 reform.
Xjt includes time-variant observable characteristics of establishments. The coefficient α is the
40 The estimation results are robust to an alternative definition of the control group with a narrower size range of
10.75 to 15 FTE employees (see Tables B.1 and B.2
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constant term, β accounts for common time effects between treatment and control group and γ
captures level differences in outcomes between treatment and control group. The parameter of
interest on the interaction term between post-treatment and treatment group indicators, δ, is the
difference-in-differences parameter measuring the treatment effect. jt is an idiosyncratic error
term. The model is estimated with ordinary least squares.
In the case of correlated errors within establishments over time default standard errors can
overstate estimator precision (Cameron and Miller, 2015). I run all estimations with standard
errors clustered at the establishment level to account for this.
Several identifying assumptions need to hold for causal interpretation of the difference-
in-differences parameter measuring the treatment effect (Lechner, 2010; Angrist and Pischke,
2015). The key identifying assumption is the common trends assumption. This assumption im-
plies the same trend in mean outcomes (i.e., hirings and separations) in the absence of the treat-
ment for both establishment groups (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the
development of hirings and separations in both establishment groups over the years surrounding
the reform. In both figures, the red line represents the treated group of establishments and the
blue line depicts the trend for establishments in the control group. The bigger establishments in
the control group exhibit a higher number of hirings and separations over the whole depicted
period. Clearly, until the deregulation of dismissal protection in 2004, the number of hirings
and separations in both establishment groups moves in parallel. After 2004, there is a visible
convergence in trends for the number of hirings in Figure 4.3. In contrast, the convergence for
separations is difficult to distinguish by the naked eye in Figure 4.4. Overall, both figures lend
some support to the common trend assumption. This assumption is tested more formally using
placebo treatment years in Section 4.6.
The second required assumption is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA).
This assumption rules out any spillover effects from the treatment to the control group of es-
tablishments based on their group status. Another necessary condition is the exogeneity of the
treatment, which prohibits any anticipation effects. In particular, firms anticipating the change
in dismissal regulations could self-select into treatment by changing their group status before-
hand. However, as discussed in Section 4.2, the shift in the size threshold regulating dismissal
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protection was added to the bill on short notice and its short-lived preceding political debate
arguably rules out anticipatory effects. In addition, the classification of establishments based on
their size in each of the three years prior to the reform arguably deals with this issue. Fourth, it
is necessary to rule out any confounding factors, such as other reforms being introduced con-
temporaneously with the reform of interest. Indeed, the German labor market was subject to
several reforms in the mid-2000s, reducing the scope of unemployment insurance and increas-
ing flexibility at the margin of the labour markets (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). However, any
confounding reform is only a threat for identification if it affects establishments just below the
size threshold in the treatment group differently than establishments above the threshold in the
control group. As a robustness check in Section 4.6, I estimate the effects of the 1996 reform,
which, in principle, has similar properties to the 2004 deregulation of dismissal protection, but
is not associated with any obvious contemporaneous reforms. Overall, the results are fairly
comparable and lending support to this identifying assumption.
4.4.2 Hire Quality
As a secondary analysis, I examine the effect of dismissal protection deregulation on hire qual-
ity in establishments treated by the 2004 reform. More precisely, based on estimated individual
fixed effects from previous employment periods (1996-2002), I compare the ability of individ-
uals hired over the pre-treatment period of 2002-2003 with individuals hired over the course of
the post-treatment period of 2004-2005.
As described above, the individual fixed effects used in the this analysis stem from wage
estimations conducted by Card et al. (2013). Card et al. (2013, henceforth CHK) estimate linear
wage models with additive individual and establishment fixed effects, as in Abowd et al. (1999,
henceforth AKM). Based on a sample of full-time non-marginal employees aged 20-60, CHK
estimate the following AKM-style equation separately for men and women:
lnwijt = αi + ψj + γt + x
′
itβ + rijt. (5)
The dependent variable lnwijt is the log real daily wage of employee i at establishment j and
year t. The equation includes individual fixed effects αi, firm fixed effects ψj and year dummies
108
γt. The time-varying observable employee characteristics, x′it include quadratic and cubic terms
in age fully interacted with 6 categories of educational attainment. rijt is the error term. Within
this framework, AKM and CHK interpret ψj as the wage premium an establishment j pays
equally to all employees. Notably, αi can be interpreted as a proxy for an individual i’s ability
rewarded equally by all employers.
I adopt this interpretation and use the CHK individual effect estimates α̂i in a difference-in-
differences framework to estimate the causal effect of relaxed dismissal protection on the ability
of new hires. In particular, I estimate for the 2002-2005 period the following equation of the
same type as equation 4 on yearly establishment-level data:
Yjt = α + βpostt + γtreatj + δ(postt × treatj) + ηXjt + jt. (6)
Here, the outcome variable Yjt represents either the minimum hire quality of establish-
ment j in year t, minjt{α̂i}, the maximum quality of a new hire, maxjt{α̂i}, or the 90/10
hire quality percentile ratio. Indicators for the treatment group of establishments (treatj) and
the post-treatment period (postt) are defined as previously. Xjt includes the same time-variant
observable characteristics of establishments as in the analysis on worker flows.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show support for the crucial common trends assumption in the outcomes
of hire quality.
4.5 Estimation Results
4.5.1 Worker Flows
I follow the difference-in-differences (DiD) identification strategy described in Section 4.4.1
and estimate equation 4 with ordinary least squares for the period including two pre-treatment
(2002-2003) and two post-treatment years (2004-2005). Table 4.6 presents the baseline esti-
mation results from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings and hiring rates. The left
panel of Table 4.6 shows the estimates for regressions on hirings and the right panel on hiring
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rates. I first consider three different baseline model specifications. The first specification pre-
sented in columns 1 and 4 does not include any control variables beyond the three difference-in-
differences parameters. The second specification reported in columns 2 and 5 extends the basic
specification by a first set of controls including establishment characteristics, such as indicators
for establishment age, type of collective labor agreement, works council, foreign ownership,
legal form, industry and federal state. In columns 3 and 6, I further add a second set of con-
trols. Control set 2 includes the ratio of female employees, ratio of foreign employees, the
apprentices-to-employees ratio, the mean schooling and mean experience level of employees
at an establishment, as well as the yearly lagged values of mean real log wage and surplus per
employee.
The negative and significant coefficients for the post-treatment period indicator point to a
common negative time trend in hirings and hiring rates. The coefficients for the treatment group
indicator show that the treated group of establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees
has on average fewer hirings per year than the control group of establishments with 10.75 up
to 20 FTE employees. The reverse holds for the hiring rate, although the mean difference be-
tween establishment groups is not significant. Finally, the difference-in-differences coefficients
indicate a significant positive effect of relaxed dismissal protection on the number of hirings
in the post-treatment period. Taking the most conservative coefficients from Table 4.6, there
are roughly 0.7 additional hirings per year due to relaxed dismissal protection coverage. This
is a large effect, since there are on average around 1.35 hirings per year in treated establish-
ments. A positive significant effect is also observed for the hiring rate, which grows by roughly
5 percentage points.
The estimation results for separations and separation rates are reported in Table 4.7. Similar
to hirings, I also observe a negative common time trend in separations and separation rates for
both groups of establishments. The treatment group exhibits on average a lower number of sep-
arations per year but similar separation rates. Most importantly, the estimates show a positive
effect of dismissal protection deregulation on separations of around 0.3 additional separations
per year, which is statistically significant only at the 10% level. For the separation rate I find
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a statistically significant positive effect of over 3 percentage points. The weaker effect on sep-
arations is to be expected and might be explained by incumbent employees not losing their
protection against a dismissal after the reform was implemented.
The estimated treatment effects reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 do not react strongly to the
inclusion of control variables. As a next step, I consider some extensions to the main model
specification in equation 4. I separately estimate models with added establishment, state-year or
industry-year fixed effects, as well as state-specific or industry-specific time trends. As Tables
4.8 and 4.9 demonstrate, the estimate of the treatment effect on both hirings and separations
remains remarkably stable over all considered alternative model specifications.
Finally, I consider the year-by-year development of the treatment effects over the 2002-2007
period with the baseline year 2002. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 report yearly DiD estimates for the
effect of reduced dismissal protection on hirings and separations. All estimations include both
sets of establishment control variables. Reassuringly, there is no effect on hirings or separations
in the pre-treatment year of 2003. The effect on the number of hirings and the hiring rate is
strongest in the first post-treatment year and slowly diminishes in the years that follow. The
post-treatment effect on separations increases until its peak in 2006 and declines afterwards.
This points to a time-lag in the effect that may be explained by incumbent employees keeping
their dismissal protection after the reform.
4.5.2 Hire Quality
Turning to the effects of reduced dismissal protection on hire quality, this section presents DiD
estimation results for the 2002-2005 period on an establishments’ minimum and maximum hire
quality approximated by CHK individual fixed effects, as well as the 90/10 hire quality per-
centile ratio in a given year. Table 4.12 shows no significant effects of the reform on any of
these outcomes. Employees hired by treated establishments in the post-reform period do not
exhibit significantly lower minimum ability, indicating that establishments do not adjust down-
wards their minimum hiring standards when facing weaker dismissal protection regulations,
which is the prediction of the matching model by Pries and Rogerson (2005). Similarly, the
estimation results show no evidence for an increase in the maximum ability of new hires, nor
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an increase in the 90/10 hire quality percentile ratio. These findings do not support the theoret-
ical prediction of Lazear (1995) either, i.e., an increase in the spread of the ability distribution
emerging from firms hiring more risky workers as dismissal regulations weaken.
Finally, the estimated kernel density of individual fixed effects for the treated group of es-
tablishments presented in Figure 4.7 shows no significant post-reform shift in ability along the
entire distribution of new hires.
4.6 Robustness Analysis
To test the robustness of the findings in Section 4.5.1, I conduct a series of sensitivity tests to
sample modifications and alternative specifications. As stated in Section 4.2, the provisions of
the PADA specifically refer to small independent establishments. The establishment definition
in the administrative data (based on economic activity and municipality) does not necessarily
correspond to the interpretation of the establishment definition in the PADA (based on the man-
agement of personal matters, with courts having a margin of discretion). In order to test the
sensitivity of the findings in Section 4.4 to the establishment definition, I restrict the sample to
autonomous, independent establishments without branches elsewhere. Tables B.3 and B.4 show
that while the estimation sample decreases from 1,404 to 968 establishments, the findings are
robust to this alternative establishment definition.
In addition, I conduct a two-way placebo analysis within the difference-in-differences frame-
work. First, I artificially move the timing of the reform from 2004 to an artificial year 2002. I
run the estimations of equation 4 using a placebo post-treatment period of 2002-2003 with 2001
as the pre-reform period. Finding a suitable placebo period for the 2004 reform is challenging
due to the 1996 and 1999 reforms closely preceding it. Thus, using 2000 as a placebo pre-
treatment year might be inappropriate. The definitions of treatment and control groups remain
unchanged. Finding a significant coefficient on the difference-in-differences interaction term of
interest in this placebo specification would question the validity and identifying assumptions
behind the causal interpretation of previous results. The results of these placebo estimations for
hirings and separations are presented in Table B.5. Reassuringly, the coefficients of interest are
not statistically different from zero and in some cases even turn negative.
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As a second placebo test, I change the definition of the treatment group to establishments, in
theory, unaffected by the 2004 reform. The placebo treatment group includes German establish-
ments from 15.75 up to 20 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments
with 20.75 up to 30 FTE employees based on establishment size in each of the three years
prior to 2004. The estimation period of 2002-2005 remains the same as in the main specifica-
tion. Table B.6 presents the estimation results from the placebo treatment group estimations on
hirings and separations. Reassuringly enough, the estimated effects from these placebo group
regressions on both hirings and separations remain insignificant. Overall, the placebo analy-
sis conducted in this section further validates the adopted identification strategy and its main
findings.
Another potential threat to the identification are omitted macroeconomic factors in the main
specification. Although previously considered industry- and state-specific time trends and year
fixed effects should capture such developments and level-differences, estimations presented in
Table B.7 explicitly control for the state-specific unemployment rate. The results remain robust
to the addition of control variables capturing macroeconomic developments.
As a final robustness check, Table B.8 reports the estimated effects of the 1996 reform on
hirings and separations. The 1996 reform has fairly similar properties to the 2004 deregula-
tion of dismissal protection, but is not associated with any obvious contemporaneous reforms.
Overall, despite suffering from a loss in sample size, the results are fairly comparable to the
estimated effects of the 2004 reform, supporting the validity of the findings.
4.7 Conclusion
This study investigates the causal effects of dismissal protection deregulation on hirings and
separations in small German establishments between 5 and 10 full-time equivalent employees. I
take advantage of large and reliable linked employer-employee data, which provide detailed ad-
ministrative records on employment biographies of employees, to calculate full-time equivalent
sizes of establishments and to identify every hiring or separation over the course of a calen-
dar year. I apply a difference-in-differences estimation approach to exploit exogenous variation
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over time and establishment groups generated by a 2004 reform of German dismissal protection
regulations.
I find positive and significant effects of relaxed dismissal protection regulations on the hir-
ings in establishments, largely confirming prior findings in the literature based on survey data
for Germany. I find an effect of 0.7 more hirings per year and an increase in the hiring rate by 5
percentage points. Interestingly, I also find evidence, albeit of smaller magnitude, for an increase
in separations by 0.3 separations per year. The smaller effect on separations might be a result
of incumbent employees hired before the reform maintaining their protection after the reform
came into effect. These results are of bigger magnitude than previous findings, possibly con-
firming the presence of attenuation bias due to higher measurement error in prior studies caused
by a less precise calculation of full-time equivalent establishment size determining treatment
status and not identifying worker flows over the whole calendar year.
Overall, the findings largely support theoretical predictions that exempting establishments
from dismissal protection regulations leads to an increase in worker flows in affected establish-
ments (e.g., Bertola, 1999). The stronger effect on hirings points to a net job creation effect,
which has important implications for employment levels and the fiscal household.
The analysis of hire quality shows, first, that there is no significant decrease in minimum hire
quality in establishments exempted from dismissal protection regulations during the post-reform
period. Second, there is no visible increase in the spread of the ability distribution of new hires.
These findings provide no evidence for establishments lowering their hirings standards (Pries
and Rogerson, 2005) or increasing the hiring of risky workers (Lazear, 1995) as a reaction to
relaxed dismissal protection regulations. On the supply side of the labor market, these findings
do not find evidence for jobs in establishments affected by the reform becoming less attractive
to potential employees, i.e., a reduction in the ability of new hires as a result of negative self-
selection of employees into these jobs. However, more research is needed to disentangle these
effects, as in Butschek and Sauermann (2019), by investigating proxy measures for the screening
behavior of establishments.
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Finding an effect of relaxed dismissal protection on who gets hired would have distributional
implications, since a reduction of hire quality, e.g., due to lowered hiring standards of firms im-
proves the employment prospects of the disadvantaged labor market participants, such as the
long-term unemployed (Butschek and Sauermann, 2019). One potential explanation for finding
no such effects for Germany is the state of the German labor market during the analyzed period.
Germany faced high unemployment levels until the mid 2000s, combined with a high degree
of employment regulations on the labor market. Since employment regulations are proved to
decrease entry and exit from unemployment (Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004; Verick, 2004), this
reduction in churning turns the pool of unemployed workers more positively selected (Butschek
and Sauermann, 2019). In addition, any adverse effects of reduced dismissal protection on the
job appeal and the negative self-selection of workers into these jobs are conceivably softened in
times of high unemployment levels. However, more research is needed to disentangle and iden-
tify these effects. In particular, future research can focus on the effects of dismissal protection
on the ability of transitions from unemployment to employment and distinguish these from new
hires arriving from former employment.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Changes in German Dismissal Protection Coverage Threshold
 
Note: Dashed vertical lines represent the timing of changes in the establishment size threshold regulating
dismissal protection coverage on October 1st, 1996, January 1st, 1999 and January 1st, 2004.
Source: Own illustration.
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Figure 4.2: Establishment Size Distribution Measured in FTE Units, 2003
 
Note: The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the
control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over
three years prior to 2004. To avoid the censorship of establishment size values with less than 20 establishments, I
round establishment sizes to the closest integer value.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own illustration.
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Figure 4.3: Development of Hirings, 2001-2005
 
Note: Development of hirings in control and treatment group of establishments. The treatment group includes
German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments
with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over three years prior to 2004.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own illustration.
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Figure 4.4: Development of Separations, 2001-2005
 
Note: Development of separations in control and treatment group of establishments. The treatment group includes
German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments
with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over three years prior to 2004.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own illustration.
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Figure 4.5: Development of Minimum Hire Quality, 2002-2005
 
Note: This figure shows the trend in the minimum ability of new hires, as approximated by Card et al. (2013)
individual fixed effects in control and treatment group of establishments. The treatment group includes German
establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75
up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over three years prior to 2004.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own illustration.
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Figure 4.6: Development of Maximum Hire Quality, 2002-2005
 
Note: This figure shows the trend in the maximum ability of new hires, as approximated by Card et al. (2013)
individual fixed effects in control and treatment group of establishments. The treatment group includes German
establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75
up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over three years prior to 2004.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own illustration.
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Figure 4.7: Kernel Distribution of Hire Quality - Treated Establishments
 
Note: Kernel distribution of hire quality as approximated by Card et al. (2013) individual fixed effects. Treated
establishment denote German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees. The blue line represents hires
in the pre-treatment period of 2002-2003. The red line includes new hires in the post-treatment period of
2004-2005.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own illustration.
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Table 4.1: Calculation of FTE Establishment Size
(1) (2)
FTE weight PADA LIAB-LM
0.5 [0, 20] [0,18]
0.75 (20, 30] (18, Full-time)
1.0 (30,∞) Full-time
Note: The table presents the weights assigned to an employee based on the employee’s weekly working hours in
order to calculate the full-time equivalent size of an establishment, as defined by the German Protection Against
Dismissal Act (first column) and the assignment allowed by the used LIAB dataset (second column).
Source: Priesack (2015).
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics: Establishment Outcomes, 2003
Description (1) (2) (3)
Treatment group Control group (1)-(2)
Mean Mean Mean Diff.
Hirings 1.388 2.529 -1.141 ***
Hiring rate 0.200 0.177 -0.023
Separations 1.379 2.480 -1.101 ***
Separation rate 0.191 0.170 -0.021
N 165 191
Note: The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the
control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over
three years prior to 2004. The symbols ’/’ and ’*’ represent anonymized values with less than 20 observations.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics: Control Set 1, 2003
Description (1) (2) (3)
Treatment group Control group (1)-(2)
Mean Mean Mean Diff.
Founding year
Before 1990 0.515 0.435 0.080
1990-1995 0.388 0.435 -0.047
1996-2000 0.085 0.130 -0.045
After 2000 0.012 0.000 0.012
Collective labor agreement
None 0.527 0.508 0.019
Branch level 0.412 0.414 -0.002
Firm level 0.061 0.078 -0.017
Works council
No 0.830 0.827 0.003
Yes 0.170 0.173 -0.003
Foreign ownership 0.024 0.026 -0.002
Legal type
Individual enterprise 0.352 0.225 0.127 ***
Partnership 0.073 0.063 0.010
Limited liability company (GmbH) 0.461 0.539 -0.078
Limited company 0.030 0.026 0.004
Corporation 0.061 0.052 0.009
Other 0.024 0.094 -0.070 ***
N 165 191
Note: The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the
control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over
three years prior to 2004. The symbols ’/’ and ’*’ represent anonymized values with less than 20 observations.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics: Control Set 2, 2003
Description (1) (2) (3)
Treatment group Control group (1)-(2)
Mean Mean Mean Diff.
Female share 0.422 0.412 0.010
Foreigner share 0.031 0.019 0.012
Apprentice/employee ratio 0.178 0.543 -0.365
Schooling degree (1-6) 2.378 2.395 -0.017
Working experience 13.445 13.758 -0.313
Real daily wage 61.040 62.990 -1.950
Log surplus per worker 11.831 11.506 0.325 *
N 165 191
Note: The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the
control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over
three years prior to 2004. The symbol ’/’ represents anonymized values with less than 20 observations.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics: AKM Fixed Effects
Description Treatment group Control group
Pre Post Pre Post
Min FE 3.901 3.855 3.822 3.815
Max FE 4.035 3.998 4.041 4.030
90p/10p FE ratio 1.039 1.040 1.061 1.057
N 380 672
Note: The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the
control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over
three years prior to 2004. The symbols ’/’ and ’*’ represent anonymized values with less than 20 observations.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table 4.6: DiD Estimates on Hirings
Hirings Hiring rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.6968 *** 0.7358 *** 0.7182 *** 0.0563 *** 0.0625 *** 0.0607 ***
(0.1685) (0.1766) (0.1772) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0189)
Treatment Group -1.1923 *** -1.2012 *** -1.3402 *** 0.0128 0.0038 -0.0088
(0.1768) (0.1649) (0.1550) (0.0187) (0.0170) (0.0156)
Post -0.5419 *** -0.5625 *** -0.2112 -0.0353 *** -0.0370 *** -0.0070
(0.1487) (0.1558) (0.1687) (0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0138)
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404
R2 0.0562 0.2282 0.2770 0.0171 0.2269 0.2660
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings and hiring rates
over the 2002-2005 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE
employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on
establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table 4.7: DiD Estimates on Separations
Separations Separation rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.3237 * 0.3519 * 0.3510 * 0.0338 * 0.0393 ** 0.0390 **
(0.1790) (0.1883) (0.1883) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0187)
Treatment Group -1.2240 *** -1.2519 *** -1.3171 *** 0.0117 0.0014 -0.0045
(0.1728) (0.1617) (0.1593) (0.0176) (0.0157) (0.0151)
Post -0.4396 *** -0.4397 *** -0.1784 -0.0237 * -0.0235 * -0.0018
(0.1622) (0.1698) (0.1771) (0.0126) (0.0132) (0.0142)
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404
R2 0.0704 0.2226 0.2442 0.0117 0.2142 0.2349
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on separations and
separation rates over the 2002-2005 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to
9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based
on establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table 4.10: Yearly DiD Estimates on Hirings
Hirings Hiring rate
DiD 2003×Treat 0.0613 0.0187
(0.2167) (0.0251)
DiD 2004×Treat 0.8368 *** 0.0845 ***
(0.2254) (0.0233)
DiD 2005×Treat 0.6893 *** 0.0599 **
(0.2365) (0.0263)
DiD 2006×Treat 0.5824 ** 0.0628 **
(0.2667) (0.0287)
DiD 2007×Treat 0.4660 * 0.0467
(0.2521) (0.0293)
Control set 1 Yes Yes
Control set 2 Yes Yes
R2 0.2700 0.2709
N 1,958 1,958
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings and hiring rates
over the 2002-2007 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE
employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on
establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table 4.11: Yearly DiD Estimates on Separations
Separations Separation rate
DiD 2003×Treat 0.2249 0.0181
(0.2288) (0.0224)
DiD 2004×Treat 0.3636 0.0563 **
(0.2579) (0.0243)
DiD 2005×Treat 0.5781 ** 0.0410 *
(0.2443) (0.0247)
DiD 2006×Treat 0.7389 *** 0.0523 **
(0.2372) (0.0256)
DiD 2007×Treat 0.5850 ** 0.0368
(0.2700) (0.0286)
Control set 1 Yes Yes
Control set 2 Yes Yes
R2 0.2474 0.2487
N 1,958 1,958
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings and hiring rates
over the 2002-2007 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE
employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on
establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table 4.12: DiD Estimates on AKM Fixed Effects
Minimum FE Maximum FE 90p/10p FE ratio
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Post×Treat -0.0392 -0.0535 -0.0267 -0.0042 0.0053 0.0165
(0.0449) (0.0763) (0.0445) (0.0653) (0.0100) (0.0218)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.0084 0.3540 0.0017 0.3954 0.0112 0.1841
N 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on estimated AKM
individual fixed effects over the 2002-2005 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with
5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE
employees based on establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are
clustered at establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Appendix
Education Imputation
The education variable in the administrative spell data on employment suffers from prevalent
missing and inconsistent values. 20% of all spells in our original data exhibit missing education
information. Inconsistently reported education information lead to entries where, e.g., a lower
attained degree follows a higher reported degree from a previous spell. It is important to note
that the education variable records the highest attained degree of an individual, not the required
degree for current employment. However, there are no consequences for the employer for mis-
reporting. I apply the IP1 imputation procedure as described in Fitzenberger et al. (2005) to
correct the education variable. This procedure assumes no cases of over-reporting the attained
educational degree, only under-reporting or non-reporting. It is based on extrapolating every
degree occurring for the first time that is higher than previously reported degrees. Implementing
this imputation procedure decreases the frequency of missing values to around 1.8% of all em-
ployment spells and our final imputed education variable distinguishes 6 categories of attained
degrees - no degree, vocational training, high-school degree, high-school degree with vocational
training degree, technical college degree and university degree.
Wage Imputation
The wage variable in the administrative data measures the average daily wage of an employee
over the course of an employment spell. Social security institutions determine the size of social
security contributions to be levied on employees and employers based on these reported wages.
A potentially problematic property of this mechanism is that wages are reported only up to the
social contribution limit and the resulting wage variable in our data is censored at the upper
limit of the distribution. To counteract this problem I implement a procedure described by Gart-
ner (2005) and similarly adopted by Dustmann et al. (2009), Card et al. (2013) or Lochner and
Schulz (2016) to impute the censored values. This procedure fits a series of Tobit regressions to
log real daily wages separately by year, region (East or West Germany) and gender.41 In each
41 The social contribution limit is set separately for East and West Germany on a yearly basis.
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regression I control for six education categories, eight five-year age categories and all interac-
tions between these categories. First I compute real daily wages by using the consumer price
index with a base year in 2004. Then I identify censored wage observations as values above
99 percent of the social contribution limit to the pension insurance of workers and employees.
According to this identification 3.5 percent of all wage observations in the original adminis-
trative data are censored. Before running the Tobit regression I restrict the sample to full-time
employed individuals with a real daily wage not lower than 10 Euro and in the case of parallel
spells at the same employer I keep the spell with a higher real daily wage.
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Table B.1: DiD Estimates on Hirings, Narrower Size Range of the Control Group
Hirings Hiring rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.8408 *** 0.8722 *** 0.8570 *** 0.0703 *** 0.0759 *** 0.0741 ***
(0.2327) (0.2483) (0.2461) (0.0219) (0.0234) (0.0234)
Treatment Group -1.0174 *** -0.9525 *** -1.0449 *** 0.0030 -0.0015 -0.0102
(0.2261) (0.2130) (0.2006) (0.0226) (0.0213) (0.0195)
Post -0.6877 *** -0.6899 *** -0.5026 ** -0.0534 *** -0.0537 *** -0.0343 **
(0.2051) (0.2174) (0.2200) (0.0156) (0.0167) (0.0169)
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 965 965 965 965 965 965
R2 0.0365 0.2699 0.3164 0.0117 0.2679 0.3023
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings and hiring rates
over the 2002-2005 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE
employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 15 FTE employees based on
establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table B.2: DiD Estimates on Separations, Narrower Size Range of the Control Group
Separations Separation rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.4520 ** 0.4927 ** 0.4939 ** 0.0471 ** 0.0529 ** 0.0531 **
(0.2183) (0.2314) (0.2311) (0.0208) (0.0224) (0.0225)
Treatment Group -0.9767 *** -0.9159 *** -0.9824 *** 0.0042 0.0024 -0.0029
(0.2087) (0.1907) (0.1853) (0.0207) (0.0194) (0.0188)
Post -0.2958 -0.3042 -0.1488 -0.0194 -0.0196 -0.0046
(0.1918) (0.2018) (0.2104) (0.0150) (0.0162) (0.0172)
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 965 965 965 965 965 965
R2 0.0413 0.2494 0.2835 0.0070 0.2561 0.2828
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on separations and
separation rates over the 2002-2005 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to
9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 15 FTE employees based
on establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table B.3: DiD Estimates on Hirings, Independent Establishments Only
Hirings Hiring rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.6663 *** 0.6594 *** 0.6429 *** 0.0600 *** 0.0612 *** 0.0605 ***
(0.2011) (0.2132) (0.2150) (0.0208) (0.0221) (0.0223)
Treatment Group -1.2946 *** -1.3955 *** -1.4627 *** 0.0001 -0.0184 -0.0219
(0.2233) (0.1983) (0.1987) (0.0228) (0.0189) (0.0192)
Post -0.4788 *** -0.4667 *** -0.2696 ** -0.0342 *** -0.0332 *** -0.0153
(0.1589) (0.1670) (0.1739) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0126)
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 968 968 968 968 968 968
R2 0.0647 0.3021 0.3250 0.0107 0.3304 0.3452
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings and hiring rates
over the 2002-2005 period. The estimation sample is restricted to independent, autonomous establishments
without branches elsewhere. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE
employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 15 FTE employees based on
establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table B.4: DiD Estimates on Separations, Independent Establishments Only
Separations Separation rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.4977 ** 0.4881 ** 0.4920 ** 0.0530 ** 0.0539 ** 0.0549 **
(0.2281) (0.2399) (0.2380) (0.0221) (0.0233) (0.0233)
Treatment Group -1.3625 *** -1.3241 *** -1.2979 *** -0.0042 -0.0096 -0.0052
(0.2212) (0.2001) (0.2022) (0.0218) (0.0187) (0.0189)
Post -0.2530 -0.2477 -0.0110 -0.0104 -0.0098 0.0110
(0.1852) (0.1942) (0.2027) (0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0145)
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 965 965 965 965 965 965
R2 0.0686 0.2881 0.3118 0.0082 0.3329 0.3527
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on separations and
separation rates over the 2002-2005 period. The estimation sample is restricted to independent, autonomous
establishments without branches elsewhere. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to
9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 15 FTE employees based
on establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table B.5: Placebo DiD Estimates - Placebo Treatment Years
Hirings Hiring rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.0014 -0.0516 -0.0807 -0.0488 -0.0561 -0.0581
(0.2377) (0.2436) (0.2437) (0.0425) (0.0448) (0.0446)
R2 0.0784 0.2623 0.3053 0.0133 0.1812 0.2123
Separations Separation rate
Post×Treat 0.1356 0.0815 0.0445 -0.0120 -0.0178 -0.0203
(0.2384) (0.2464) (0.2493) (0.0218) (0.0225) (0.0227)
R2 0.0923 0.2687 0.3025 0.0088 0.2414 0.2781
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings (separations)
and hiring rates (separation rates) over the 2001-2003 period. The treatment group includes German
establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75
up to 20 FTE employees based on establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in
parentheses are clustered at establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table B.6: Placebo DiD Estimates - Placebo Treatment Groups
Hirings Hiring rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.1959 0.2046 0.2134 -0.0064 -0.0045 -0.0036
(0.1515) (0.1532) (0.1531) (0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0194)
R2 0.0574 0.1846 0.2124 0.0193 0.1333 0.1924
Separations Separation rate
Post×Treat -0.0836 -0.0723 -0.0556 -0.0143 -0.0122 -0.0110
(0.1597) (0.1623) (0.1616) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0141)
R2 0.0556 0.1684 0.1761 0.0123 0.1289 0.1470
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 2,481 2,481 2,481 2,481 2,481 2,481
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings (separations)
and hiring rates (separation rates) over the 2002-2005 period. The placebo treatment group includes German
establishments with 10.75 up to 14.75 FTE employees while the control group comprises establishments with
15.75 up to 25 FTE employees based on establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors
reported in parentheses are clustered at establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table B.7: Placebo DiD Estimates - Macroeconomic Controls
Hirings Hiring rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.7354 *** 0.6968 *** 0.7177 *** 0.0624 *** 0.0563 *** 0.0607 ***
(0.1765) (0.1685) (0.1772) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0189)
R2 0.0562 0.2282 0.2771 0.0171 0.2270 0.2660
Separations Separation rate
Post×Treat 0.3237 * 0.3502 * 0.3491 * 0.0338 * 0.0392 ** 0.0389 **
(0.1790) (0.1881) (0.1882) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0187)
R2 0.0704 0.2227 0.2443 0.0117 0.2142 0.2349
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
State unemployment rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings and hiring rates
over the 2002-2007 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE
employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on
establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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Table B.8: Placebo DiD Estimates - 1996 Reform
Hirings Hiring rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Post×Treat 0.8237 ** 0.7420 * 0.7395 * 0.1161 ** 0.1097 ** 0.1113 **
(0.4122) (0.4412) (0.4272) (0.0447) (0.0473) (0.0481)
R2 0.0407 0.5343 0.5816 0.0507 0.4601 0.5082
Separations Separation rate
Post×Treat 0.2626 0.2495 0.2433 0.0643 * 0.0672 0.0671
(0.4199) (0.4657) (0.4335) (0.0381) (0.0426) (0.0412)
R2 0.0394 0.5498 0.5979 0.0439 0.5400 0.5814
Control set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control set 2 No No Yes No No Yes
N 328 328 328 328 328 328
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences regressions on hirings and hiring rates
over the 1994-1997 period. The treatment group includes German establishments with 5.75 up to 9.25 FTE
employees while the control group comprises establishments with 10.75 up to 20 FTE employees based on
establishment size over three years prior to 2004. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
establishment level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Source: LIAB LM 9310. Own calculation.
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5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This dissertation empirically evaluates the effects of three separate policy interventions in Ger-
many. The first two are immigration policies directly affecting the civic and economic rights
of immigrants residing in Germany. The third policy involves the German labor market and
its participants on both the supply and demand side. The introductory Section 1 provides this
dissertation with main theoretical concepts in the economic theory of migration and labor. In
addition, the section presents an overview of the related empirical research in both fields and
summarizes the conducted analyses in the three studies included in this dissertation. Sections 2
through 4 consisting of three empirical studies represent the nucleus of this dissertation. This
section first briefly summarizes the main findings of the three studies included in this disser-
tation, followed by a discussion of their contributions. Subsequently, the section identifies the
limitations of these studies and concludes with proposals for future research to fill the missing
gaps.
5.1 Summary and Contribution
The first study in Section 2 is co-authored with Regina T. Riphahn and contributes to a scarce
international literature on the effects of host-country citizenship acquisition on immigrant inte-
gration. We contribute to the existing literature in a number of essential ways. First, we analyze
a sample of more recent immigration cohorts than previous studies. The immigrants covered
in our sample migrated to Germany on average up to roughly 10-15 years later. As the com-
position of cohorts with respect to the country of origin and the migration motive arguably
changes over time, so may the effects of naturalization. Second, we contribute to the literature
by investigating a wider range of outcomes not fully included in other data sources, from gross
monthly earnings and wages, to various job characteristics and language skills. Third, the high
degree of detail in our data on migration biographies, backgrounds and motives, as well as in-
dividual socioeconomic characteristics, allow us to compute the timing of individual eligibility
for naturalization more precisely than previous studies. Fourth, we test the sensitivity of our
findings to alternative specifications and functional forms of our instrumental variable. Given
these extensions and largely confirming the previous findings of the literature, we contribute to
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the robustness of the currently existing empirical evidence on the effects of naturalization in a
substantial manner.
The second study in Section 3 is single-authored and contributes to a sparse literature on the
effects of voting rights acquisition on immigrant integration in the host-country. I estimate the
effects of a reform granting municipal voting rights in Germany to EU citizens on a number of
integration outcomes. I contribute to the existing literature in the following manner. To my best
knowledge, this is the first existing causal empirical study to evaluate the impacts of the EU-
wide reform granting voting rights to EU citizens in municipal elections of another EU country.
In addition, this is the first analysis on the effects of non-citizen voting rights on the integration
of immigrants in Germany. Germany is a particularly interesting country to study due to its high
population of immigrants. Third, I study the integration of an interesting immigrant group con-
sisting of intra-EU immigrants. Intra-EU migration is an increasing phenomenon and freedom
of migration within the EU a much debated topic (Wachter and Fleischmann, 2018). Fourth, I
exploit a large and representative longitudinal dataset, with detailed biographical information
on migration history, citizenship and residency, which allows me to precisely construct a group
of immigrants eligible to vote. Finally, I consider a different set of immigrant outcomes than
prior studies on the effects of non-citizen voting rights. The analyzed outcomes include subjec-
tive individual well-being and identifying as a German. In addition, I analyze outcomes closely
related to the labor market integration of immigrants, including intentions to permanently stay
in the host country and host-country language skills.
The third study in Section 4 is single-authored and complements the existing literature on
the labor-market effects of dismissal protection regulations. I contribute to the existing literature
in four ways. First, I make use of a dataset which has not yet been exploited to study the effects
of dismissal protection in Germany. This dataset provides my analysis with three advantageous
traits: its longitudinal structure, the more reliable administrative origin of its data and mea-
sures of workers’ individual ability and weekly working hours. Second, available information
on working hours allow me to calculate full-time equivalent establishment sizes more precisely
than several previous studies based on German survey data (e.g., Verick, 2004; Bauernschuster,
2013). These studies may suffer from measurement error and attenuation bias ensuing from a
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misclassification of establishments into treatment and control groups. Third, unlike previous
German studies, (e.g., Verick, 2004; Bauernschuster, 2013; Priesack, 2015), the longitudinal
spell nature of my data enable me to identify each hiring and separation over the course of a
calendar year. Finally, to my best knowledge, this is the first study for Germany analyzing the
potential effects of relaxed dismissal protection on the quality of new hires in small establish-
ments.
5.2 Limitations and Future Research
In Section 2, we estimate the effects of citizenship acquisition on the labor market integration
of immigrants in Germany. Essentially, we find no beneficial effects of naturalization for male
immigrants. In contrast, naturalized females profit from a more stable labor market attachment
and a lower risk of unemployment and welfare dependence.
An important limitation of the study is the relatively small sample used in its analysis. The
high degree of precise information on citizenship and migration biographies in the IAB-SOEP
Migration sample comes at the expense of a bigger sample size. The study in Section 2 is able
to distinguish between different immigrant groups based on the country of origin, ethnicity
and immigration status, e.g., refugees, ethnic Germans or family members. However, the small
number of individuals within these immigrant groups prevents an analysis of heterogeneous
citizenship effects across these groups. Another drawback is the cross-sectional nature of the
dataset. Immigrant outcomes and individual characteristics are observed only at one point in
time, potentially a long time after naturalization takes place. Finally, our instrumental variable
arguably includes a time component which is potentially endogenous, as we are not solely
using the discrete jumps for specific ages and years of arrival induced by changes in citizenship
regulations.
Future research should pay close attention to gender differences in the effects of policies
aimed at reducing barriers to immigrant integration. The heterogeneous results in Section 2
across gender might be an indication that citizenship serves as a policy tool of empowerment
for female migrants. An important follow-up question for future research is whether there are
any barriers to immigrant integration specific to women, such as cultural norms. Future studies
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can focus on outcomes of social, cultural and political integration. In addition, it would be
interesting to study the effects of citizenship benefits for migrant women on the integration
outcomes of their children.
In Section 3, I find no effects of an extension of municipal voting rights to EU citizens on any
of the considered integration outcomes. The acquisition of voting rights does not increase EU
immigrants’ well-being, German language skills and intention to stay permanently in Germany
or identification as Germans.
The study faces a number of challenges due to particular traits of the analyzed reform and as
a result of data limitations. First, the treatment group under this reform are intra-EU immigrants,
a group with complex characteristics and more fluid migration patterns (Engbersen et al., 2010)
due to freedom of movement between EU member states (Wachter and Fleischmann, 2018).
This uncertainty may affect their integration process (Geurts and Lubbers, 2017) and benefits to
voting rights acquisition. Second, the time lag between the EU Council Directive 94/80/EC and
the implementation of its provisions by individual states leaves room for anticipatory effects
and makes the exact timing of the treatment unclear. A series of data limitations restrict the
scope of the study. First, the sample of immigrants in the SOEP data is very limited for the
relevant time period of the mid-1990s. The group of EU immigrants consists of low-skilled
Greek and Italian guest workers who immigrated to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, more
than 20 years prior to the reform of municipal voting rights. Observations on individuals with
different nationalities are scarce. As discussed in Section 3.6, this group arguably represents a
selected sample of long-term immigrants who do not take up German citizenship. If the treated
individuals are never-takers with respect to citizenship and, by extension, election participation,
this might explain the findings in Section 3. A second key limitation is the absence of individual-
level data on (municipal) election participation in the SOEP. The available variables measuring
individual interest in politics have weak coverage for the analyzed time period. Other German
data sources with more information on political preferences, e.g., ALLBUS (for a description
of the data, see the report by Wasmer et al., 2014), suffer from small sample sizes of EU citizens
in the considered period. Likewise, official voter turnout of EU citizens in German municipal
elections is not being recorded by public authorities. As a result, there are also no available
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aggregate data on voter turnout of EU citizens in Germany. As a consequence, it is not possible
to analyze the first-stage effect of voting rights on election participation or political interest.
Considering these limitations, future research on the effects of voting rights on immigrant
integration can follow two potential paths. Future studies evaluating the same EU-wide reform
as Section 3 can analyze the effects of EU-citizen municipal voting rights within all EU mem-
ber countries at that time. It would be interesting to study whether the effects on the integration
of EU immigrants differ across EU countries. Future studies can analyze the determinants of
heterogeneous effects across EU countries, as EU countries are likely to differ in immigrant
composition, the institutional setting and the powers of municipal governing authorities. The
scope of authority and influence of municipal governments across EU countries is particularly
interesting to study as a determinant of the impact of voting rights, since it is likely to increase
the value of election eligibility. The second path for future research is the evaluation of reforms
that go beyond extending municipal voting rights to EU citizens. Several European countries
grant municipal voting rights to all non-citizen residents.42 Evaluating these reforms facilitates
the analysis of immigrants from outside of the EU and the identification of potential heteroge-
neous effects across different regions of origin. An interesting question is whether the quality
of democratic institutions and the set of cultural norms in the country of origin affect the re-
turns to democratic rights of immigrants in the host-country. On a more general note, future
studies shall exploit richer data sources to investigate the first-stage effects of voting rights on
election participation and political interest. Bigger sample sizes aid the study of heterogeneous
effects across immigration cohorts, migration histories, gender, education and other immigrant
characteristics.
In Section 4, I find positive significant effects of relaxed dismissal protection regulations
on worker flows in affected establishments. While hiring and separations increase, the effect
is comparatively smaller for separations and associated with a time lag. In contrast, I find no
effects on the minimum or the spread of hire quality, i.e., the ability of new hires.
The study analyzes the effects on hire quality at face value. A limitation of this study is that
it does not separate the channels on the supply and demand side of the labor market affecting
42 As mentioned in Section 3, this group of countries includes Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia.
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the realized quality of new hires. In particular, the study cannot isolate the effects of lower
employment protection on the amount of screening establishments carry out from worker self-
selection into these jobs. Instead, the study argues that, according to theory, both channels react
in the same direction to relaxed employment protection regulations. Following that argument,
the study interprets the estimated zero effect on hire quality as missing evidence for these two
channels. However, the macroeconomic situation on the German labor market might play a
role in ’hiding’ the true effects of these channels. High unemployment levels, combined with
strict employment protection regulations, as was the case in Germany at the time of the reform,
might turn the pool of unemployed workers more positively selected (Kugler and Saint-Paul,
2004; Verick, 2004; Butschek and Sauermann, 2019). Thus, establishments may change their
screening behavior without reducing the resulting hire quality.
In light of these limitations, the study leaves several gaps which can be closed by future
studies. Future research shall try to exploit proxy measures for firms’ screening (see Butschek
and Sauermann, 2019) in order to isolate this channel from the self-selection of workers. It
is also of interest to distinguish new hires coming from unemployment, active labor market
programs and from previous employment, to investigate the hypothesis of a more positively
selected pool of the unemployed as a result of the business cycle and previously high levels
of employment protection. Future studies can also apply individual register data to identify the
effects of employment protection on the socioeconomic characteristics of new hires. A partic-
ularly interesting strand of the literature analyzes the employment prospects of disadvantaged
groups on the labor market, such as females, immigrants, the youth and the uneducated (e.g.,
Autor et al., 2006; Bertola et al., 2007; Kahn, 2007). Future research of German employment
protection reforms could investigate additional establishment-level outcomes already covered
in the international literature, such as profits, investment, capital-to-labor ratios and total factor
productivity. Finally, future research should analyze the impact of employment protection be-
yond traditional labor-market outcomes. Using linked survey-register data on individuals (e.g.,
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for Germany, the PASS-ADIAB dataset of the IAB43), future studies can explore the effects on
employees’ well-being, stress, health and job satisfaction.
43 The PASS-ADIAB dataset refers to The Panel Labour Market and Social Security (PASS) Survey linked to
administrative data of the Institute of Employment Research (IAB). See Beste et al. (2018) for a description of
the data.
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